The significance of the decision to recognise ‘security’ as the fourth pillar of the Caribbean Community, taken by Caricom Heads of Government at their inter-sessional meeting in St Vincent and The Grenadines in February last year,  seems still not to have been fully recognised in this insecure country.

The heads, considering the fundamental nature and widening scale of transnational crime, had further agreed to formalise their decision by incorporating this provision in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas which, in essence, is the community’s constitution. This would now establish security on an equal footing to economic integration, foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation as one of the bases for the consolidation of the Caribbean Community.

According to new thinking, this move can be correctly called ‘securitisation,’ that is, recognising security as a special and higher form of politics that goes beyond the normal rules of national life. In this way, securitisation is seen as an extreme form of politicisation that is more than merely a part of public policy which requires governmental decision-making and resource allocation. It suggests that security has been presented as an existential challenge requiring extraordinary measures above and beyond the reach of national government and into the realm of regional and international governance.

This change in approach has occurred during what has been a busy year for Caribbean regional security cooperation so far. Three months ago at their special ‘crime summit’ meeting in Port-of-Spain, heads agreed on a Strategy and Plan of Action to stem the rising tide of violent criminality by building on the legacy of the successful security co-operation arrangements put in place for the Cricket World Cup 2007.

Certain elements − the Advanced Passenger Information System, the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre, the Joint Regional Communications Centre, and an Advanced Cargo Information System − ought to have been upgraded, expanded and placed on a permanent basis while discussions would continue to finalise the implementation of the Caricom Visa, the Caricom Travel Card and the Single Domestic Space.

Heads of government also agreed to put into operation the action plan – which includes measures to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons along with the establishment of a Regional Integrated Ballistics Information Network and a Regional Investigative Management System. The draft plan had been submitted earlier this year by the commissioners of police and military chiefs after their meeting in Georgetown and was supported by the Security Policy Advisory Committee and the Council of Ministers Responsible for Security and Law Enforcement. At a glance, these measures are clearly needed by Guyana’s law enforcement agencies.

Meeting in Antigua and Barbuda earlier this month, heads of government took steps towards further strengthening the security mechanisms put in place for the Cricket World Cup 2007. The Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement and the Caricom Arrest Warrant Treaty were available for signature and were signed by those heads who had completed their internal processes in strict compliance with their decision in April to sign these agreements by July 2008. Both of these agreements are considered vital in the fight against transnational organised crime and were available for signature. Strangely, however, Guyana did not sign.

Guyana showed no hesitation last year in swiftly passing seven bills through the National Assembly to lay the legislative foundation for enhanced security and hassle-free travel for inter-regional movement within the then newly-established single domestic space for hosting the Cricket World Cup competition. That was good. But now the administration’s ardour seems to have cooled.

Guyana has every good reason to ensure that it is not left behind in the present process of securitisation of regional integration. This year, the government of Trinidad and Tobago twice responded promptly and tangibly with helicopter diplomacy to requests for assistance − first, in the aftermath of the Lusignan and Bartica massacres and, second, in the still confused and controversial circumstances of the Lindo Creek massacre. Barbados and Jamaica also offered to help. Under the Security Sector Reform Action Plan, the British government has also provided training and material assistance.

If no other lessons have been learnt from the public safety experiences of the past seven years, it should be evident that Guyana needs the assistance and cooperation of other states to combat the combined challenges of transnational organised crime and internal criminal violence.  The administration should do everything possible to ensure that the securitisation of regional integration should not be delayed or obstructed.