At the end of July 1990 an attempted coup in Trinidad & Tobago against the government of ANR Robinson took place, that continues to the present to be the subject of a Commission of Inquiry in that country. The start of the event preceded, by a few days a Caricom heads of government meeting in Jamaica, and in the course of that meeting the Government of Venezuela then led by President Carlos Andrés Pérez requested that a high level delegation from the meeting consult with him in Caracas on the events in Trinidad.
The President’s request was acceded to, and consultations led by one of the heads of government took place, the intention being essentially to brief him on the collective perspective of the heads on the event. The event indicated the continuing intense interest of Venezuela in the region as a whole, and naturally in Trinidad & Tobago, given that portions of the coastlines of both states are visible from each other.
That very proximity had long been the basis of an intense interest by Dr Eric Williams in Venezuela, and the subject of continuing statements to his country’s citizens on what he finally described as the Venezuela “threat to the Caribbean Community.” The threat that, in his view, included Venezuela’s claim to certain locations in the Eastern Caribbean, served, from Williams’ perspective to generalize his country’s specific concerns vis-à-vis Venezuela’s long-term interests in the Caribbean. And of course, the Prime Minister was well able to note the Venezuelan claim to territory recognized by other Caricom states as encompassed within the state of Guyana.
Venezuela quickly sought the accreditation of its diplomats to the countries of the Eastern Caribbean as they attained independence, and initiated specific aid grants to some of them, at a time, too, when the country’s airline VIASA regularly transited through some of the territories, as did the Trinidadian airline BWIA. And as time progressed, at least in the Eastern Caribbean, Venezuela was accepted as a normal state, even while they gave their continuing support to resolutions on Guyana’s territorial integrity at Caricom heads of governments conferences, and in other fora like the Commonwealth.
As we noted in an editorial last week, certainly in the Eastern Caribbean, the general perception of Venezuela as what might be called a normal state, has been disrupted by its transition to quasi-military rule following the election to the presidency of Hugo Chávez who, had previously, in 1992, led a failed coup against Carlos Andrés Pérez.
So even as the Cold War has receded, or indeed disappeared, the radicalization of the Venezuelan regime has led to a degree of division between ruling and opposition parties in the Eastern Caribbean zone. The source of this is the governments’ acceptance of Venezuelan aid, relating in particular to the terms of the sale of petroleum. But to that have been added concerns about what appears to some opposition parties, as the regime’s initiatives towards alliances with countries not in the democratic fold, as defined in this region.
These divisions are viewed by the governments now committed to PetroCaribe and Alba as fabricated for political reasons. They perceive the opposition stances in countries like Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia and Grenada as opportunistic, and intended to appeal for support particularly in the United States, where hostility to the Venezuelan regime has not diminished with the death of Chávez and the assumption of the presidency by Maduro.
The charge against ruling parties which have joined PetroCaribe-Alba, is in the words of the leader of the opposition in St Vincent & the Grenadines, that the government is “drawing St Vincent into an ideological battle with the United States.”
This reflects a view that given the narrow victory won by Maduro, in spite of his government’s command of the state machinery, and given the difficult relations between the US and that country, that with a possible victory by the Venezuelan opposition in the next presidential elections, the states now attached to Petro Caribe-Alba will find themselves in the difficult position of not having the empathy of a new government, and by extension, of the United States.
The public indications from the opposition parties are that they will be unlikely, if successful in future elections, to adhere to the positions taken by governments of their countries announced following the recent meeting in Cuba. And this could be interpreted as giving a diminished solidity to commitments made by Caricom in the wider hemisphere, and particularly in relation to CELAC, now perceived as having a more autochthonous, or self-driven character than the up-to-now leading hemispheric organization, the OAS.
A central characteristic of the CELAC meeting, held in Cuba, distinguishing its arrangements from previous periods, has been the attendance of an individual like the Secretary General of the Organisation of American States. This appears to indicate a perception of a change in the way in which the diplomatic winds are blowing, suggesting the continuation of the trends towards diminution of the influence of Cold War ideological contentions, and emphasizing inclusiveness, even in the face of outstanding contentions.
Caricom governments, too, would appear to have recognized that the terms of future global production and trade are undergoing change, and that new allies are needed to permit them to develop a greater negotiating strength in the global and bilateral negotiations now likely to proceed. So even in relation to the negotiation of issues and arrangements in which Caricom states will hardly be centrally engaged, the empathy of larger states in understanding the possibilities for negative consequences for small states well in advance of conclusions of such negotiations, becomes important for them.
It is sometimes difficult for very small states, like those of our Caribbean, to comprehend these trends, and to grasp that they require dispassionate, as against ideologically inherited, stances of the past two-bloc world
From that perspective, it will be important for even the small Eastern Caribbean states to locate themselves in negotiating situations that allow them to indicate the practical consequences for themselves, among as many states as possible, without upholding the dying ideological stances of the past. In one sense, the Nixon-Kissinger visit to China and Mao Zedong should long have demonstrated that. Where better for them to start than within a hemispheric framework that is enhancing its autonomy?
