Scotland’s vote

The campaign, and the vote in Scotland on that region’s separation from the United Kingdom, will have reminded West Indians over a certain age of the 1961 referendum in Jamaica, conceded by the Conservative British Government, on whether to stay in the West Indies Federation. Of course, Guyana was not a member of the Federation but, no doubt, interest in the result will have been intense there as well.

Guyanese will also have been interested, however, from the perspective of being a large territory (relative to the other West Indian territories) constituted of large areas populated in the majority with varying ethnicities, and having diverse views as to the future of the country as an independent entity, as Britain was beginning to release the cords binding its English-speaking colonies in the Caribbean.

The leadership of the Scottish Yes campaign, itself the government of Scotland, expressed all the varying sentiments familiar to those who followed the Jamaica referendum campaign, though in the case of Jamaica it was not so much a matter of that country feeling, at the time, too subordinate to external interests, as an expression of view that the country could do better on its own, without linkage to the other West Indies.

The Scottish campaign combined to the two sentiments, stressing that it could use its now declining oil resources more beneficially in Scotland’s interest. But unlike the Jamaica situation, where substantial sentiment seemed more in favour of separate independence, the polls in Scotland seemed to show only a slight difference between the Yes and No camps, giving each side a feeling that with a little extra effort it could win the fight.

The Scottish referendum results showed that the No supporters were, somewhat surprisingly, more on the right track. But perhaps, some observers would have noted that although the Yes camp’s support exceeded, certainly after the second debate between the leaderships of the two camps, that of the No camp, it never did again. This was an intimation that Leader of Government Business Salmond’s Scottish National Party had exhausted its ability to go much further in persuading the voters.

A decisive factor in the British opposition to the secession initiative would seem to have been something that probably surprised the Scottish National Party. This was the cohesion of all the main British political parties in supporting a No result. Particularly noticeable was the persistent opposition, rather than any broad neutrality, of the British Labour Party. And that indicated that the leadership of the party, despite the normal two-party competitiveness, was not taking a stance of letting the Conservatives fight the case by themselves.

In taking this stance of course, Labour had a particular interest related to its own self-preservation. For, as has been widely pointed out, the Labour Party had, in the last general elections, captured 41 of the 59 House of Commons seats in Scotland, giving it a strength that allowed it to maintain its legitimacy as a major party. But on the other hand, even given his generally considered lackadaisical post-election performance in government, David Cameron and his colleagues probably would have felt, in conceding the referendum, less concerned about parliamentary hostility from Labour.

In a sense then, it might not have been surprising to keen observers, that what, in retrospect, may have been the straw that broke the SNP camel’s back was the opinion poll result going in favour of the first No campaign pre-referendum debate. For this showed the SNP and its supporters that any majority sentiment in favour of an independent Scotland would have to be worked for. And it was noticeable that that No campaign was led by a Scotsman Alexander Darling, former Chancellor of the Exchequer in the last Labour government.

The follow up to that first debate, however, showed that the Conservatives may have initially underestimated the effect of a secession on the integrity of Britain itself as a leading state in the global arena.

This is because the closeness of the vote on the debate, though in the British Government’s favour, was not dampening, but leading to extensive speculation, in and out of Britain, on what influence a reduced Britain might have in international affairs, including in the European Union. And perhaps of more significance, was speculation on whether other secessionist provocations might arise in the various sections of Britain, particularly in Wales, but also in Northern Ireland, where the British have felt that they had put such sentiments to bed, at least for the time being.

And secondly, these sentiments were raising the spectre of institutions like the Royal Bank of Scotland moving its headquarters to London, an initiative hardly to be welcomed by Salmond and the people of Scotland.

These perceptions seemed, eventually, to force the Conservative Party to link more closely with its Liberal coalition partners, and with Labour, create an all-English political coalition against the SNP and other advocates of secession. This induced further association with the anti-secession debate on the part of Labour stalwarts, even though retired, like former Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

It appears that the appearance of this coalition surprised, and in effect paralysed, Salmond and the SNP. The inability of the Scottish leadership to widen the numbers gap was the tell-tale indication that their momentum had stalled.

In a sense, the British Prime Minister and his coalition have been saved by this all-party alliance, as much as Salmond and his SNP appeared to have been surprised by it. For it also seemed to have achieved its aim of lessened confidence on the part of the Scottish people in the success of a separate Scotland.

The consequences for Cameron of the British government’s referendum victory, in terms of first, whether Salmond’s Scottish government will up the ante in talks on constitutional devolution leading to intense contestation; and secondly, whether the SNP’s supporters will be satisfied with a negotiation, are left to be seen.

But in the meantime, and in the short run, the English will surely be relieved at the result of the referendum.