Rules of Court for Judicial Review Act come into operation on a date to be fixed by the Chancellor

Dear Editor,

Mr Christopher Ram continues his bold path of misguided criticisms of the Attorney General Chambers and the Ministry of Legal Affairs. I refer to his latest letter published in SN, October 9, 2014, under the caption, ‘Rules of Court for the Judicial Review Act were laid in Parliament in 2010; onus is on Nandlall alone to make them operational.’

Expectedly, Mr Ram began by insinuating that I did not author the letter and I was a mere scribe for the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs. This is a regular affront to which professional women are subjected in our country on a daily basis, by a society dominated by men, whose philosophy is that women are not their equals and should be domesticated at home, confined to housekeeping responsibilities. It is even more nauseating when it comes from those who present themselves as social activists and public commentators.

I was elated to observe that Mr Ram made no comment on my explanation in relation to the transformation which has and is taking place at the Deeds Registry. The public and I will therefore assume that he is satisfied with the explanation which I proffered in my last letter and that his silence on that issue in this letter is an admission that his fulminations on that issue in his first letter were much ado about nothing.

Unfortunately, it is evident that I was not so successful in my explanation, in relation to the reasons why the Judicial Review Act is not in force. I will nevertheless try again.

As I predicted, Mr Ram capitalised on the opportunity presented, as is his wont, to publicly exhibit the research which he did in respect of the evolution of the new high court rules and regaled us with the details of his learning. For that exposition, I hope the public is grateful. It is beneath me to respond to the personal attacks which he litters along the way. I am interested in substance. There is one serious omission of which Mr Ram is guilty in his research regarding the new high court rules. It is that, apparently, he didn’t bother to read the rules themselves. Had he done so, he would have been confronted on the very first page of the rules under the caption, ‘Commencement’ the following passage:

“These rules shall come into operation subject to the transitional provisions in Part 73, on a date to be fixed by the Chancellor, acting on the decision of the Rules Committee.”

But then again maybe he did read it. Additionally, I made that point emphatically in my last letter that it is not the responsibility of the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs to bring the rules into operation. In any event, I am aware that these rules have been sent by the Chancellor to the Guyana Bar Association of which Mr Ram is the Secretary, for their input. Yet he asserts publicly that these rules are in force.

Mr Ram listed Rules establishing the Commercial Court, the Constitutional and Administrative Law Division of the High Court, and the Family (Proceedings and Procedures) Rules 2012 and argues that the Attorney General must use these as precedents and extract from the new high court rules the parts dealing with judicial review and bring them into operation. I am advised, that this argument is flawed on so many levels that it is impossible to deal adequately with it in a letter to the press. Suffice it to say, that I was further advised that the promulgation of the rules of court, of whatever kind, is always an intrinsic function of the judiciary and will never in, our constitutional matrix, be a functional responsibility of the executive.

Indeed, I am advised that each of the rules to which Mr Ram has made reference were brought into force by practice directions issued by the Chancellor of the Judiciary. As a lay person I presume that these are matters with which lawyers must be familiar.

Mr Ram asks why after two years since the Family Court Rules and the completion of the building to house the Family Court, “the Court has still not been established.” The executive funded the construction of a building, furnished it, and facilitated the drafting of the rules. The court is established. It is the judiciary which must make it operational.

The conceptual dilemma of Mr Ram is laid bare by his assertion that, “in my view Mr Nandlall has taken the administration of justice to its nadir.” Even I know that the administration of justice is a constitutional responsibility of the judiciary from which the executive is trenchantly insulated. If Mr Ram wishes to see a constitutional change, as secretary of the Guyana Bar Association, he is well positioned to persuade his organisation to publicly campaign for such reform.

 

Yours faithfully,  
Indira Anandjit
Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Legal Affairs