The increasing turbulence in both Brazil and Venezuela in South America must be of concern for Guyana and indeed the countries of Caricom. The emergence and recognition of Brazil as one of the BRICS – major emerging countries often seen as challenging the global industrial countries for a new space and influence in the international economy, does not bode well for other countries in our hemisphere, desirous of finding a gateway to influence the policies of the major industrial countries.
And from a somewhat narrower perspective, Caricom states, many of whom are now beneficiaries of Alba or PetroCaribe, must be somewhat nervous as political challenges to the Maduro government in Venezuela appear to be becoming increasingly intense, forcing the government to resort to extraordinary modes of governance to sustain itself. And that, in turn, is opening the way to more and more vigorous action by the United States, reminding observers of the path which developed in the relations between that country and Cuba a few years after the emergence of the Castro government.
To some, the developments in Brazil may seem surprising and unexpected, after the praise showered on the administration of then President Lula da Silva for his persistence in ensuring that the economic gains achieved under the 1995-2003 administration of his predecessor Fernando Henrique Cardoso were sustained. For it seemed, especially to Western observers, that the socialist da Silva had created a basic consensus on Brazilian economic policy, by accepting the innovations of Cardoso which had moved the country onto what appeared to be a path of consistent economic growth.
Yet, it would appear that the Western economic recessions occurring around 2008-09 and following, have obviously affected Brazil and, it would appear to have caught President Rousseff somewhat by surprise. But while she won reelection to the presidency even as the signs of economic trouble ahead were visible, she does not appear to have attained a grip on matters as the recession has become worse. And this, in turn has affected the morale of her government, including, it appears, both herself and her new, allegedly economically liberal, appointee as Minister of Finance.
Former President Lula’s advice to Rousseff, last week, to “hold up her head” in the midst of the present difficulties was a clear recognition of a loss of confidence on her part. This perception would now appear to have affected her Minister of Finance. And in turn, the political protests in the country over the weekend have indicated that it has become widespread over the population, as her opponents have been able to take advantage of what would now appear to be a mass concern about her administration’s policy-making.
With inflation increasing, interest rates rising, the currency falling against the major Western currencies, the economy as a whole (the gross domestic product) contracting, and the simultaneous revelation of extensive corruption at the state-owned Petrobras oil company, President Rousseff’s opponents have sensed she may be, as we would say, on the back foot, and seem to have decided to press home their advantage.
Venezuela’s situation, as many will admit, is the consequence of the course set by President Chávez – a level of projected one-party dominance of the political arena, but one now obviously led by a much less skilful successor, whose opponents now feel that they can push hard enough to topple. He has not, of course, helped his own case much, given what has seemed to be an inability to come to terms, over quite a long period now, with the decline of the economy, aggravated by the recent sudden decline in oil prices.
In seeking to advance, obviously with much less subtlety, Chávez’s radical approach to the management of the economy, and the former president’s assertion of increasing institutional control of the political system, President Maduro has now been faced with increasing internal antagonism, a factor now given support by the recent United States’ assertions and executive action against the regime. And in turn, as his opponents’ morale has undoubtedly now been enhanced by the actions of the US, it would appear that we can expect an increasing turning of the political screws internally.
The nature of the United States’ statement of last week would appear to some observers as having forebodings of the path of diplomatic isolation taken against Cuba in the early years of the revolution there. What is, so far, omitted, is action against Venezuelan oil exports to the US, a diminution of which would be more serious for the US than was the cutting off of Cuban sugar exports as the situation there became radicalized.
The American statement itself, comes at a time of projected détente and the search for a resolution of the long period of difficulties with, and isolation of, Cuba; and perhaps it may have been thought in Caracas that that situation would be somewhat of an inhibiting factor in the United States adopting its present attitude. But of course President Obama is clearly watching his own political flanks as the Cuba discussions proceed, well aware that there must be domestic political opponents anxious to accuse him of “softness” towards, and being guilty and neglectful of American security through an alleged abstinence of firm action against Venezuela. And this, on top of recent attacks on his diplomacy towards the Government of Iran.
With the American administration watching its own diplomatic flanks, President Maduro is left to be comforted by the statement of the Union of South American Nation (UNASUR) that it rejects the US Executive Order as “an interference and a threat to the sovereignty and to the principle of non-intervention”; and its call for the US administration to “evaluate and implement dialogue as an alternative.” And in turn, the sub-set of Alba states’ ambassadors (among whom are representatives of Caricom states) in Havana have insisted that Venezuela is “not a danger to the national security of the United States.”
What will be significant is whether the United States, in this period of aggravated economic difficulty in Venezuela, is prepared to engage progressively in economic sanctions against Venezuela, and whether that will, in turn, precipitate Venezuelan action, even at the price of further difficulty.
We are left to see whether the strength of South American diplomacy, even as Brazil is preoccupied with its own difficulties, can have an influence on the evolution of this situation.
