Impulses towards change in Cuba

The conclusion of the Seventh Congress of the Cuban Communist party last week gave an indication of the tendencies towards both change, and resistance to it, at the highest level of decision-making on the country’s future course. And the statement to the Congress by Fidel Castro suggests that there will be continuing debate on the actual pace of change the government will be permitted to pursue, in a situation in which there would appear to be still differing perspectives on the extent to which the government feels a persistent necessity to respond to a changing global environment. For Cuba as a communist state, of course, that changing environment essentially began, in recent times, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union

As might have been obvious and increasingly apparent, the decision of the United States government led by President Obama to actively initiate some form of rapprochement with the Cuban government, and undoubtedly positively, however slowly, responded to by the government of President Raul Castro,  has set the stage for persistent, now publicly indicated, diplomacy by the two countries. But as might obviously have also been anticipated, there are efforts of resistance within Cuba, and to some extent in the US itself, with which the governments of both countries will have to cope.

President and First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Raul Castro will have anticipated some form of negative, albeit not blocking, action by Fidel Castro, apparently represented in some measure at the highest levels of party and government by the party’s Second Secretary and Vice President Ramon Machado Ventura. But the acceptance, before the holding of the Party Congress, of a visit to the country by President Obama, will also have suggested that a consensus had been arrived at to formally pursue better relations with the US, a decision to which Fidel Castro, in spite of his recent statements, will have acceded at that time.

The former President’s speech at the Congress might therefore well be seen as an effort of conciliation and comfort towards those in the Party who hold his view, but also as an indication to them that, to the extent that government and party had obviously previously agreed to the initiation of some degree of rapprochement with the US, along with the necessary diplomacy towards it, the matter was now a fait accompli.

The Party would also have been well aware that for some time now, and particularly after President Obama’s assumption of office, the issue of improving or resuming formal relations between Cuba and the United States had become increasingly evident in discussions and promptings by various countries of Latin America in international and hemispheric forums. And in a sense, the decision to accept a visit from the American President will obviously have been the final effort to formally institutionalise such discussions between the two countries towards that end.

In addition, too, the decision-makers at the highest levels of the Cuban Communist Party would appear to have placed a certain emphasis on creating a climate that would permit a more systematic approach to a degree of opening of the Cuban economy towards its largest neighbour, given an increasing acceptance of the need for finding more appropriate options towards advancing a modernisation of the Cuban economy.

It will also have been apparent to the Cuban leadership that, in the context of the coming to an end of the Obama administration, a certain unpredictability in the character of the next American leadership should not be discounted.  This, in turn, would suggest the conclusion of certain lines of rapprochement before a change should occur in the US.

For the current American President has shown a certain empathy towards the prospects of developing countries which, particularly on the Republican side of that country’s party system, is not particularly evident among those currently contesting the presidency. And Raul Castro would seem to have had a strong sense of the importance of this, when he observed that in terms of the US’s and Cuba’s present positioning, “it’s a question of establishing a new type of relationship between the two states, different from those of all our common history”.

The expression of this sentiment will be well appreciated by Caricom states which were early in accepting the Castro government in terms of establishing diplomatic relations at a time when the Cold War still strongly prevailed, and they were expected to ideologically and diplomatically  line up with the “right” side. For at that time, the then governments, in most of which strong anti-communist sentiment still prevailed, made a clear distinction between the nature of domestic governance and the commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs, the latter being the prime  index of maintenance of appropriate diplomatic relations.

From that perspective, the warming of relations between the US and Cuba does not, in the context of the conduct of wider Caribbean relations, have a substantial immediate effect on Caricom governments themselves.  There will be some sentiment that as a drawing card for tourists, American citizens’ unimpeded access to Cuba can have a challenging effect on their own countries’ positioning in that market. But it seems to be the case that contemporary Caribbean specialists in the industry no longer accept this as a viable cause for concern.

It will surely be in the interest of the United States to be circumspectly encouraging cooperative relationships in differing economic and social spheres, in particular those that permit the modernisation of the Cuban economy, including the facilitation of enhanced trading relationships, in terms of trade with a variety of countries in the Hemisphere in particular.

It will undoubtedly be the case that, regardless of a certain normalisation of relations, strong sentiment will remain in the US concerning the nature of Cuban governance.  How this plays out in terms of the party politics of the United States is left to be seen, particularly as the country is in the midst of a presidential election contest, and it will be a matter for the next president. And at the same time, the discussions there seem, on this occasion, to have a lesser ideological content as far as the terms of the future conduct of the country’s foreign policy is concerned. And much more focus is seeming to be placed on the issue of the effect of migration on the American polity and economy.

In those terms, the US will be watching to see whether any internal normalisation of domestic relations in Cuba begins to occur, such that there will be a greater permissiveness of emigration from the Cuban policy perspective. The Cuban government will be aware that the visit of President Obama has enhanced the visibility of the United States in the country, and that there can well be a desire on the part of some Cuban citizens to take advantage of an apparent conciliatory relationship between the two countries to seek access to the US.

From a Caricom perspective, in certain spheres a degree of wariness has begun to occur in terms of the possibility of enhanced access by American tourists to Cuba. But it should be made clear by governments in particular, that the disadvantage to Cuba of uncooperative US-Cuban relations are likely to persistently diminish, and that the days of an advantage gained by the Caribbean in a context of disadvantageous Cuban-American relations, are rapidly coming to an end.

And further, that even as American influence in the system grows, we may as well accept that as time goes on, the evolution of the Cuban political system will continue to be endogenously determined.