Ongoing polls in the course of the United States presidential elections campaign generally show Hillary Clinton leading Donald Trump by a margin not dramatic enough to decisively state that she is already home and dry. The national conferences held to confirm the two individuals as the official candidates of the Republican and Democratic parties have not shown excessive enthusiasm for either of the candidates, but in the case of the Democrats, at least, have been decisive enough to convince the party professionals that it is time to stand firmly behind Clinton. The state of Trump’s relationship with mainstream Republicans is more uncertain.
A view of the campaign, which can now be said to be in its last lap prior to November, suggests that neither of the candidates has put forward a platform that can dramatically impress the electorate. The Republicans in particular can hardly be said to have found a basis of dramatic criticism of the Obama policy lines over the last few years; and Mrs Clinton, Secretary of State in the first Obama administration, recognizes that she is tied, perhaps even more than normal, to Obama’s record as a base for holding Democratic Party supporters.
From the perspectives of citizens of other countries, and in particular those of Latin American and the Caribbean, it probably goes without saying that there is preference for the Democratic candidate, a situation deriving not simply from a relatively traditional bias, but also, importantly, from the fact that her practical, as distinct from verbal, record, unlike that of Trump, is relatively well known. And in addition, they will recognize that she is, in some respects, tied to the Clinton-Obama records, leaving little leeway for dramatic departures from the past.
Obviously, Trump does not have that kind of record deriving from past, high-level policy activity, though in a period of uncertainty in domestic policy-making even as President Obama has tried to maintain a consistency of recent Democratic activity, there remains some degree of doubt as to the capacity of the American economy to automatically continue on its present path.
Trump, of course, in order to deflect a perception of untried public policy activity, has sought to purvey his record as that of a successful actor in private economic affairs, stressing that the American economy itself is supposed to be based on a commitment to private sector activity, as against public intervention. That this kind of description of the economy does not completely reflect its functioning and the role of the state in that regard, is not a major concern to Trump since he seeks to purvey a sense of the bases for past successes of the economy as essentially private sector driven.
An interesting characteristic of the current campaign therefore, is that given the historical records of their activities, while the Democratic candidate has had no choice but to put before the electorate her record in public policymaking, the Republican candidate has sought to emphasise his private sector record, and consequent commitment to the functioning of the US-private sector-dominated economy, as the optimal requirement for the high public office of the presidency at present.
Many observers have, in this regard, commented on the apparent lack of historical visibility of Trump’s role as a major intervener in the advancement of new private sector activity, his record of private sector and real estate activity depending on a continuing performance of the wider economy managed by previous office-holders who have recognized the role of the state in recent times.
So it can probably be asserted that to the electorate, Trump’s ability to manage the wider US economy is something of a ‘black box’, an unknown, which they are being asked to trust given his claimed success in his participation in the private sector of the economy.
To those of us outside of the US system, while it is well-recognised that the stable functioning of the American economy is critical to our own well-being, it is most likely the case that the aspect of Trump’s potential behaviour, if he is elected, will be more visible, and therefore more significant to us, may be in respect of his foreign policy, a relative unknown apart from his public statements as a candidate in recent times. But it is noticeable that he appears to have partially abstained from automatic criticism or denunciation of the record of the other historical superpower, Russia.
A seeming, though muted, love-affair between himself and President Putin, as reflected in recent remarks by the Russian leader, would suggest that Trump wishes to continue, or accentuate, the present level of de facto détente between the two superpowers, thus abstaining from the traditional hostilities of the Cold War. Instead, he would appear, at least from pronouncements, to be more concerned about some of the states rising as substantial economic powers (China in particular) whose recent success, in his view, is due to an excess of American investment in those countries, rather than the maintenance of American private investment within the boundaries of the US.
Observers will have noticed that this perception, and his continued emphasis on it, has raised concern within the Americas in particular, since there is a Trump focus on the growth of the Mexican economy on the basis of US investment, and the financial return to that economy on the basis of a large Mexican presence within the American economy.
Leaders in Latin America, while no doubt, concerned about some negative fallout in American continental relations if Trump is elected, will be still wondering how he intends to implement his policies in that regard. And indeed, while the leaders of the US’s immediate Latin neighbour, Mexico, have shown their umbrage at these Trump-expressed sentiments, they show little inclination to regard the candidate’s espousal of what are perceived as negative policies to Latin American neighbours, to be viable.
