It is probably the case that the anxiety, indeed the sense of foreboding about the future, which dominated Caribbean decision makers when Britain decided to negotiate entry into the then European Community and Common Market, is not as great at this time, when the British leadership has been forced, from within its own ranks, to negotiate an exit from the European Union.
This is not to say that our decision makers do not recognise the implications of the so-called Brexit to be of extensive concern. But that it is also necessary to recognize that our assessment of the experience of the original negotiation to join the EC, which was one of foreboding about its possible extensive effects on our economies, has taught us much about the necessity, difficult as it might be, to recognize that our relationships with various parts of the world have already lost the institutional permanence that they once had. And certainly, that anticipation of, and planning for, adjustment to today’s global relationships is now a constant, not based on the imperial sentimentality of the past.
The decision by Prime Minister Cameron to call a referendum itself reflected a sense of uncertainty on the part of the British government, as to developments going on beyond Britain’s shores, and indeed within her neighbourhood, over which she was having marginal influence. Yet, the referendum called by Cameron did not really reflect any deep sense of foreboding about the country’s future immediate environment, showing as it did, a relatively marginal difference between those in favour of leaving the EU, and those in favour of staying in.
And indeed now, the British leadership must be beginning to concern itself about the ramifications of the decision to leave, particularly as the leadership of the European Union has not hesitated to accept it, and to begin its own internal negotiations for adjustment to the new situation. The Europeans themselves recognize that the British decision has been a half-hearted one, already beginning to induce extensive concern among both the British leadership and general population.
Consequently therefore, as of this moment, the state of opinion in both leading political parties does not appear to be particularly decisive, one way or another, as to the extent of the response that is to be made in respect of the country’s future. For the fact of the matter would appear to be that current activities within both parties reflect a certain lack of decisiveness as to what the consequences, in the immediate future, for their own leaderships, might be.
This situation itself seems to reflect the uncertainty within the major parties, Conservative and Labour,, about the extent of the significance for the country’s future of the so-called Brexit. The immediate consequence for the Conservative leadership would appear to be a concentration on consolidating support for the decision taken, even though there was certainly no dominating support for the Ayes or the Noes within the party.
In that regard, David Cameron’s leadership has led to uncertainty about the country’s future relationship with the EU, given that he was in support of remaining, while the opponents within the party gave, or were pressured to give, no substantial indication of what future external relationships of the country would have pre-eminence. And clearly new Prime Minister May’s immediate concern must surely be not so much the country’s exit negotiation, but pacification between those who supported leaving the EU, and those who took an outward looking view of Britain’s relationship with the Union as, in effect, the major future diplomatic anchor of its relationships with the wider world.
In that regard, the no decision, will have been a disappointment not only for EU countries desirous of building the Union to ensure competitive relationships among the present and future major powers around the globe; but also for the government of the United States whose President Obama paid a special visit to Britain to support the yes campaign.
So in that regard, as is certainly already obvious within the EU, the leaderships of the major countries – the US and in the EU, have been forced to come to terms with a Western alliance that has, through the recent vote, in effect made a decision to reverse the trend to strengthened geopolitical decision-making unity, vis-à-vis what they perceive as emerging challenging trends particularly in Asia, and with respect to what they have also been perceiving as challenges from a repositioning Russia.
We can therefore see the rationale for the differentiation of objectives between the no’s and the yes’s. And among those supporting yes in Britain, and led by David Cameron, the perspective indicates a desire to reconstruct the European continent to ensure that it can come to terms with the new emerging powers in the East, as well as the effort which President Putin has been making to reconsolidate Russia’s geopolitical, and therefore diplomatic, strength.
For the no’s their rationale, as it became clearer during the referendum campaign, would appear to have been to maintain a presence as a power, even though with allies, but making its own autonomous decisions. And this perspective was linked to a view that autonomy, as against interdependence in decision-making, must be based on a homogeneity of the British population, unencumbered in today’s world by the perspectives and strategies of others. So the hostility to immigration was merely an aspect of that yearning for continued decision-making autonomy, as against recognition of the implications of global interdependence.
It would appear that then Prime Minister Cameron was loath to put before his people the stark implications of the realities of the geopolitical interdependence, and the necessity for the UK to play a co-operative role with other Europeans as the new world of Asian continental giants has begun to define the terms of diplomacy, and indeed trade. And he was unable to show too, any hint of domestic political harmony on the home front, based on any British perception of the emerging world.
There was no better instance of this than the fact that immigration, undoubtedly less than it was, in its socio-economic consequences, for the Britain of the 1950’s and 60’s emerging from world war, became a central issue and political challenge to the government, in the course of the referendum with which Cameron seemed unable to cope.
As governments of the Caribbean ponder the consequences of this situation, including the issue of a longer-term sustenance of the ACP-EU agreement, they need to also ponder the wider emerging issues of geopolitical reconstruction that will influence the attractiveness for the Europeans themselves of that 1970’s multicontinental arrangement, as the geopolitical definitions that brought the African and Pacific countries and ourselves together, appear to be fast disappearing.
