Introduction
As pointed out in the conclusion of last week’s column, today’s will wrap-up my current efforts to interrogate the IDB report on Guyana’s Oil Opportunity and its estimation of likely Government of Guyana (GoG) revenues.
Introduction
In the previous three columns I have been addressing the August 2020 IDB report, which estimates prospective Guyana Government Take (revenues) accruing from its one- year- old crude oil and gas sector.
Introduction
As promised last week, today’s column begins with my presentation of a simple schedule depicting the sequencing of the five projects of ExxonMobil and its partners around which the IDB has modeled Guyana’s oil and gas sector to 2025 in its recent report, ‘Traversing a Slippery Slope: Guyana’s Oil Opportunity, 2020.’
Introduction
To round off my evaluation of Guyana’s emergent oil and gas sector in its very first year, I shall report in coming columns on the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) Technical Note, IDB-TN-1994, published August, 2020 and entitled, ‘Traversing a Slippery Slope: Guyana’s Oil Opportunity.’
Introduction
Today’s column wraps-up my rather extended assessment of the impact of the 2020 general crisis (as I have previously defined this phenomenon) on Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector.
Introduction
As indicated last week, today’s column will continue my summing up of a few remaining concerns, which I have identified and have been evaluating in recent columns.
Introduction
Today’s column starts the wrap-up of my on-going evaluation of several remaining concerns still of great importance to Guyana’s emergent oil and gas sector, in the closing days of the “2020 general crisis,” as I have earlier defined this phenomenon.
Introduction
The global competitiveness of Guyana’s infant crude oil and gas sector and therefore foreseeable national economic growth, development and poverty reduction are over-determined by two basic economic variables and how they perform.
Introduction
Today’s column reviews estimated Government of Guyana (GoG) revenue and related benefits arising from its International Oil Companies (IOCs)-led oil and gas sector.
Introduction
In a forthcoming edited volume on the Caribbean Economy, (Routledge, November 2020) I have a Chapter entitled, “Guyana and the Advent of World-class Petroleum Finds”.
Introduction
Today’s column continues my extended assessment of the cost of delay encountered at the Payara project, as modelled and reported on by Rystad Energy back in July this year.
Introduction
Today’s column continues consideration of Rystad Energy’s modelling of the cost of delay in the Payara Project, incurred from the delayed approval of ExxonMobil and partners’ final investment decision (FID), which had been submitted to the Government of Guyana (GoG) last year.
Introduction
Today’s column offers a summary evaluation of results from Rystad Energy’s modelling of the cost of delay (COD) of the Payara project, as revealed in last week’s column.
Introduction
As promised last week, today’s column starts my review of Rystad Energy’s widely circulated results obtained from its modelling of the cost of delay for the Payara project.
Introduction
The primary concern of last week’s column was to get a handle on the extent to which lagging output in Guyana’s infant oil and gas sector, combined with expected price declines for Guyana’s crude exports provide a proxy indication of the shortfalls in Guyana’s export earnings, Government revenues and ultimately its GDP.
Introduction
Last week’s column continued my examination of the likely impact of the 2020 global general crisis on crude oil prices in world markets this year; and, following that, on the price obtained for Guyana’s Liza crude, as reflected in the price received for Government of Guyana, GoG, petroleum lifts, earned through its Production Sharing Agreement, PSA, with ExxonMobil and its partners.