Now that new leadership is in place in the Guyana Defence Force the environment has been created for a fresh approach in the way the army interfaces with the public on matters of national interest.
The key outstanding issue is the AK-47s. Chief of Staff, Commodore Gary Best and his support team now have the opportunity to be forthcoming on this without prejudice to national security.
One person, Warrant Officer John Peters was found guilty of an offence related to the missing weapons, but his sentence was remitted on the orders of the immediate past Chief of Staff Edward Collins. The court-martialling of Lieutenant Colonel Tony Ross has since started afresh on four charges of negligence of duty.
Since March 2006, the presumed month of the loss of the weapons, the army has not been able to present to the public any convincing information on what happened within army headquarters at Camp Ayanganna that would enable the shocking theft of 30 AK-47s and five pistols.
Notwithstanding the court-martial underway and others that may take place, the onus remains fully on the army to explain the following and do so convincingly.
*Who in Camp Ayanganna at the time of the disappearance of the weapons had functional control over the weapons and should have been held directly accountable?
*Were regular checks being done on arms stores and bonds in Camp Ayanganna and other bases on a routine basis? Is there documented evidence to substantiate this?
*When and to whom was the first report made about the missing weapons?
*What action was immediately taken to retrieve the weapons in consultation with the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the Defence Board?
*Why was there no intensive sweep for the weapons immediately after they were first discovered missing?
*What were the findings of the US FBI’s investigation into the matter?
*How high up in the army did this conspiracy to steal the weapons reach?
*Have new systems of storage and record keeping been put in place at all army depots?
*Has the army confirmed conclusively that 14 of the AK-47s have been recovered?
*Is there any intelligence on what has become of the remainder?
In years to come, when this incident is looked back upon it will stand out as a major blot on the record of the army. It was the harbinger of the changes that have now been wrung in the hierarchy of the army. The new team in place at Camp Ayanganna must now objectively evaluate what transpired in March of 2006 and determine what needs to be done to ensure it doesn’t occur again. Before that is done it needs to know definitively how its own soldiers suborned the system and betrayed the trust of their fellow soldiers.
The loss of deadly and dangerous weapons from the headquarters of the army amid a brutal and pernicious crime wave which has seen the liberal use of such weapons cannot be overstated.
If the new leadership of the army is unable to provide to the public the answers that it needs then it must do the responsible thing and seek to have an independent commission of inquiry investigate what transpired at Camp Ayanganna that could have caused weapons to be smuggled out wholesale to terrorise the public.
The army must also be seen to have a plan to retrieve the outstanding 16 AKs and to be goal oriented in this respect.
A culture of openness which does not compromise national security must suffuse the army. This will help to build public confidence in the institution which was severely damaged by the loss of the weapons.
