The so-called Westminster model of democracy has been an unmitigated disaster wherever it has been practiced in ethnically, or racially or religiously mixed societies. The definitive history of colonialism and imperialism has, of course, not yet been written, but the evidence is already quite strong that the consequences of this system when practised in multi-ethnic, multi-racial, or multi-religious communities are dire. On the one hand, it leads to the legal domination of minority groups by the majority clan, or tribe, or religious group, in perpetuity. On the other hand, if the minority group happens to attain power by guile, or by rigging elections, it often results in a dictatorship by the minority who, aware that it cannot retain office if elections are free and fair, hold on to power through the utilization of extra-legal means. In some instances, the minority group, denied legitimate access to government, engages in armed strife. This seems to be the case in Sri Lanka, where the minority Tamils are conducting what can only be described as a civil war against the majority Sinhalese. The stark reality, therefore, is that the Westminster type of governance in non-homogeneous societies spawns oppressive regimes, whether the majority group or the minority gains office, or leads to war.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that, given the Westminster process, it is inevitable, indeed it is almost a political law, that the minority group would be voted out of office, and remain there, so long as the ethnic, or racial, or religious demographics remain unchanged. It is the realization of this fact which, in great part, accounts for the rigging of elections by Burnham in Guyana for over two decades. It is this painful understanding which accounts for the depredations of Saddam Hussein in Iraq for an even more protracted period. In Guyana, the African minority could never win free and fair elections. In Iraq, the Sunni minority could never hope to muster more legal votes than the Shia majority. The consequences in both countries have been, and continue to be, tragic.
Moreover, it is this system which permits governments, such as that in Guyana, with an unassailable majority, and therefore a guarantee of perpetual rule, no matter what their policies, no matter how incompetent they might be, to be individually and collectively arrogant; to ignore public opinion; to fail to punish or even to admonish senior elected officials who perpetrate the most heinous of crimes; to refuse to promote senior judicial officers because they have passed judgements of which the government did not approve; and to impose on Public Servants whatever salary it deems appropriate, ignoring the principles of collective bargaining. In short, it is a system of democracy when practised in multi-racial societies which seems to lead governments to eschew the imperatives of accountability, and continuously to breach the rule of law. It is the type of governance which permits presidents to distribute a nation’s financial resources as if they were feudal princes giving away the country’s funds to suit their private whims and fancies. It is the form of democracy that makes our leaders so intoxicated with power that they lend the country’s money to characters who might find it difficult to obtain loans from reputable private banks.
It must not be assumed that the evil effects of this system are confined to any particular part of the world, or are to be found at any special level of socio-economic development. The pernicious consequences of this system might be observed, for example, in Kosovo in Europe, in East Timor and Sri Lanka in Asia, in Iraq in the Middle East, and in countless African countries which the European proconsular classes created when they carved up the continent, splitting tribal areas, and arbitrarily lumping disparate ethnic groups together as one nation, doomed inevitably to experience intense rivalries and strife.
In contrast, where by accident or design, nations and societies are relatively homogeneous, there has been a marked absence of internecine conflict, the democratic process has operated fairly and effectively, and the countries have attained relatively high rates of economic growth and development. Some of the countries that spring readily to mind, which illustrate the benefits of the system, when pursued in relatively homogeneous societies are India (with comparatively few Muslims) and the several countries of Caricom (with the notable exception of multi-racial Guyana). In all these countries there have been free and fair elections continuously since Independence, and governance has been transferred peacefully from political party to political party. The lesson that has been learnt is that for the Westminster model to be effective the nation has to be homogeneous. If this condition does not obtain, a system has to be devised to take account of the society’s mixed nature. A system of power-sharing has to be put in place. It is proposed here that, in the specific case of Guyana, there should be enshrined in our Constitution that the Cabinet should comprise ministers from all the parties which have representatives in Parliament (a minimum number of seats must be obtained to entitle a political party to a place in the Cabinet). In addition, by law, certain ministries should be reserved for the majority party, and others for the minority, in order to ensure an equitable distribution of the sectors of power and influence in government.
The Constitution should also provide for regional or local governments in which the parties would share power, based on the proportion of seats which they gain in elections. The power-sharing formula used at the Centre would be applied at the local level. It is important too that provision be made, in the Constitution, for the funding of the local governments both from revenues which they would collect for themselves, and from revenues which the Centre is bound by the Constitution to allocate to them.
Power-sharing mechanisms would therefore operate at both the central and local levels. Moreover, the Centre would be responsible for the formulation and implementation of national policies, while at the local level, the regional administrations would be responsible for the formulation and implementation of well-defined local policies, programmes and projects. The constitutional division of power between the Centre and local authorities would therefore be crucial.
Some have argued that all that this type of power-sharing achieves would be the transference of the disputations among the political parties from the Parliament to the Cabinet, where the majority party will still wield the power of numbers. To offset this, there has been built into many power-sharing constitutions the necessity for, say, a two-thirds majority in deciding issues before the Cabinet. Those who are opposed to the system claim that this would result in gridlock. In fact, the evidence from those countries in which power-sharing is practised is that instead of gridlock, compromises are hammered out. This is often exactly what is needed in multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies.
Have power sharing systems been successfully practised in any country? Switzerland is the obvious example. Indeed, Switzerland, by almost any criterion, is one of the most efficiently and effectively run countries in the world, with a very high observance of the civil rights of its citizens.
In Lebanon also, since the implementation of a power-sharing system with, among other things, a provision that both Christians and Muslims should share the highest positions in the land, there have been long periods of peace and stability, except, so it is reported, when the Syrians decide to intervene. Power-sharing has also, to a great extent, contributed much to the overcoming of the problems in Northern Ireland, the few disruptions in governance which now occasionally occur having nothing to do with the power-sharing system, but with extraneous factors.
This list of power-sharing
successes is not exhaustive. It is merely representative. It is sufficiently long, however, to illustrate that it is indeed possible to devise systems of governance that would overcome the intrinsic problems of the Westminster model, when applied to multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious societies. Again it must be stressed that the Westminster model does not appear to have worked well in many, if any, multi-racial societies.
It should now be obvious that there should be a change in our Constitution to accommodate meaningful elements of power-sharing. Either the government should realize that if there is to be lasting peace and equity in Guyana power-sharing should be introduced, or the people should pressure the government to institute the necessary reforms. Without such changes Guyana seems doomed to be ruled by arrogant, authoritarian, unaccountable governments, and to remain a country in which the natural condition is one of instability.
