Last Sunday, President Hugo Chávez urged the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to free all their hostages and end their decades old insurgency.
In his weekly television and radio show, Aló Presidente, the Venezuelan President declared: “I believe that the time has come for the FARC to release unconditionally all the people it has up in the mountains. It would be a great humanitarian gesture.” He added: “At this juncture, an armed guerrilla movement is out of order.”
Even by the unpredictable Venezuelan’s standards, it was, at face value, an astonishing about turn. Mr Chávez had hitherto made no secret of his fraternal support for the Marxist revolutionaries, notwithstanding their murderous ways and deep involvement in narco-trafficking. Indeed, he had repeatedly called for them to be recognized as legitimate political actors and belligerents, and not terrorists, much to the displeasure of successive Colombian governments.
There have also been allegations that Mr Chávez has been providing shelter and succour to the FARC, including protecting clandestine camps in Venezuelan territory and providing money and arms. The Colombian Government is claiming that these suspicions have been corroborated by information gleaned from three laptop computers captured a few months ago in the attack on a FARC guerrilla camp across the border with Ecuador, which succeeded in killing the FARC number two, Raúl Reyes, and twenty others.
However, in addition to this and other military setbacks suffered by the guerrillas, there has been a huge popular backlash in Colombia against the FARC and mounting Latin American and international condemnation of what has generally been recognized as a criminal, narco-terrorist organization. The coup de grace to the FARC would appear to have been the death of natural causes, last month, of their longstanding leader, Manuel Marulanda. Guerrillas are now coming out of their hideouts and voluntarily surrendering their arms.
But up to late May, there was no indication of what Mr Chávez was thinking. Indeed, the cancellation of Aló Presidente on 25th May set many tongues wagging among friend and foe alike.
Apparently, all interested parties, including the foreign press, the diplomatic corps and especially the Colombian Government, were eagerly waiting to hear what Mr Chávez would say about the death of Mr Marulanda. But… nada.
As the week progressed, the President’s silence became more eloquent, for in all his lengthy, recorded daily television appearances, he pronounced not a word on the death of the guerrilla leader of whose friendship he had boasted over the years.
Naturally, there was much speculation as to why Mr Chávez was avoiding the issue, especially as he had gone out of his way to mourn publicly the killing of Raúl Reyes and had observed a minute’s silence on Aló Presidente.
It may well be that in the face of the potentially damning evidence on the laptops, taken in conjunction with the apparent demoralization of the FARC, Mr Chávez has decided that he needs to boost his credibility by opting for the path of peace and reconciliation.
The Washington Post, for one, believes that he is now seeking to avoid the consequences of supporting a terrorist organization against a democratic government, which could lead to Venezuela being blacklisted as a sponsor of terrorism by the US Government The fact that, just two days before Mr Chávez’s declaration, a Venezuelan army officer was arrested with munitions intended for the FARC supports this theory and is itself more ammunition for Mr Chávez’s critics.
More cynically, the Post suggests that Mr Chávez is hoping to take credit for the release of the hostages, which according to Colombian sources, the FARC may be close to doing anyway. This scepticism is widely shared in Colombia.
But there may also be a more mundane explanation. An estimated 70% of Venezuelans reject the FARC and Mr Chávez’s own popularity at home is dropping steadily. Regional elections are due in Venezuela in November and he cannot afford to lose them, following his defeat in the constitutional referendum last December and a recent series of unpopular decisions.
It is a no-brainer really. Mr Chávez is portrayed by his critics in the Western media and increasingly so in Latin America, as not only the ideological champion of an alternative, “Bolivarian” approach to development, but also as an oil-rich buffoon and an exporter of revolution. Even his supporters and admirers – and there are many outside Venezuela – have been sometimes driven to distraction by his mercurial temperament and dodgy alliances. It is perhaps only surprising that it has taken Mr Chávez this long to come to the conclusion that he needs to project a more responsible and less confrontational image, if he is to be taken seriously in the regional and global arenas.
