Round Two

We have now entered Round Two with Suriname it seems. It should come as no surprise, given our neighbour’s history in relation to the border; as we all know from experience Suriname has only two strategies in its playbook − brute force and bullying. That it went to arbitration over the maritime boundary with this country, owed nothing to any predilection it had for negotiation; starting out with its customary belligerence, it simply overplayed its hand thereby allowing Guyana to take the dispute to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).

And now, Paramaribo has fallen back again on its traditional tactics, this time seizing a sugar boat close to the Skeldon wharf, ostensibly because it did not have a Surinamese pilot on board in conformity with regulations it had issued. So what is Suriname playing for this time? The answer is that its objective (in somewhat contracted form given the ITLOS decision) is the same as always: a boundary with Guyana reflecting its claims in their entirety. At this point in time that means the whole of the Corentyne River without any concessions such as user rights to Guyana, and the New River Triangle. This latest display of aggression, therefore, is probably step one in this longer term goal.

It has never been possible in the past to get any binding agreements with Suriname, and even the implementation of the ferry across the Corentyne River was delayed for years, in large part because Paramaribo was manoeuvring to secure some border advantage out of it.

The pattern of aggression was established first in 1967, when Surinamese surveyors were evicted from the New River Triangle. In 1969, the Suriname military, which was building a base and planning a full occupation of the area had to be driven out by the GDF. Since then, our eastern neighbour has copied the tactics of Venezuela, producing maps showing the New River Triangle as part of Suriname, and badgering international organizations and companies to use them, and generally proselytizing about its spurious claims to Guyana’s land space.

Where the matter of the river is concerned, in recent years our eastern neighbour has become increasingly confrontational and intransigent, attitudes which were reflected in the utter hogwash talked by Surinamese Ambassador, Ms Soeknandan, last week. Her definition of aggression holds water neither in the Dutch language nor the English one, and her assumption that Guyana must abide by regulations issued unilaterally by Suriname, apart from having no legal or other foundation, reflects nothing short of arrogance.

Her factual information too was manipulated and inaccurate. Her reference to former Foreign Minister Fred Wills, who she said in 1977 agreed that the Corentyne River belonged to Suriname, ignores the fact that this was a draft agreement which at the same time acknowledged Guyana’s sovereignty over the New River Triangle. It was in fact very similar to a draft treaty which Britain and the Netherlands were on the point of signing in 1939, when war interrupted the proceedings.

Suriname has become emboldened in more recent times, and has taken full advantage of the fact that after 1992, Georgetown attributed more benevolent sentiments to the authorities in Paramaribo than their behaviour historically justified; they were, for example, allowed into Caricom without any prior conditions about border settlement. Of course,  most importantly, the Guyana government allowed the army’s maritime capacity to run down to zero, and it stopped the regular GDF river patrols to Orealla, which its predecessor had maintained just to make a point to the government to the east about the status of the Corentyne.  In the meantime, over the years as was pointed out in SN’s editorial on Tuesday, Suriname has been “methodically rebuilding its national army and navy and refurbishing its military image since 1991.” In addition to its greater military strength, the Government of Suriname has also perceived weakness on this side of the Corentyne, both at the governmental and the military level, which has no doubt been fed into its calculations.

When in 2000, Suriname gunboats evicted the CGX rig from what ITLOS later determined were our waters, Paramaribo rejected joint exploration pending a final settlement of the border, because it intended the expulsion as a lever to extract concessions on all segments of the frontier – sea, river and land. The Corentyne River, it insisted, should be excluded from the talks because Guyana should recognize it outright as Suriname territory, leaving the New River Triangle and the maritime issue to be negotiated (their claim to the New River Triangle it must be said is extraordinarily flimsy). As we all know, Suriname refused to budge and Guyana went to ITLOS.

It should be understood that the Surinamese people had been led to believe that the ITLOS decision would have been in their favour, and President Venetiaan’s government took a battering on the announcement of the result despite the fact it was not his administration which had put Suriname in this position in the first place. Unfortunately, in order to mitigate the loss of face, Surinamese were told that the tribunal had given the river to Suriname. In fact the decision did not deal with the status of the river at all; however, in the introductory section covering, among other things, the historical background to the dispute − which it must be emphasized again does not form part of the judgement − it is stated: “In 1799, the border between Suriname and Berbice, a colony, then situated in the eastern part of modern Guyana, was agreed by colonial authorities to run along the west bank of the Corentyne River.”

The eminence of the members of the tribunal notwithstanding, Foreign Minister Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett was perfectly correct when she wrote in a letter to the press last week that what she called the “Governors’ Agreement” of 1799 did not, “assign to Suriname ownership of the river.”
So having misled the Suriname people about the status of the Corentyne, a status which is not covered by any treaty or arbitral decision, the Government of Suriname is pursuing the logic of its own dissimulation. This latest foolishness – albeit dangerous foolishness – at Skeldon, may be a reprise of 2000, except that this time there will be no unilateral move to arbitration. It is no accident that the sugar wharf was selected as a target; as in the case of CGX it is intended to apply economic pressure on Guyana to force us to concede. In the first instance, as suggested above, we would have to recognize Suriname’s sovereignty over the river, and then at some point the New River Triangle would come into play again in some form or the other. And that, one must assume, is the ultimate target of President Venetiaan’s administration, because it would be seen as erasing the humiliation of the ITLOS judgement.

And as for the Government of Guyana, obviously there has to be some engagement with the Paramaribo authorities, although as Dr Luncheon rightly said last week, we have no reason to be optimistic about the outcome. What the government must do, however, is involve the parliamentary parties in agreeing the outlines of a national response – this might be a divided society, but surely, no matter what our political views we can agree on the subject of preserving our territorial integrity – and be prepared to tap into the experience and skills of the opposition in relation to frontiers.  It also has to sensitize the nation, as was done in the past, to the issues, so the population across the board understands this country’s rights.

Clearly some immediate and long-term border strategies need to be looked at by the army, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries with some urgency, and serious contingency planning undertaken. And all necessary support must be given to the military to discharge its functions in relation to the border.

If the action in the Corentyne River is a test of Guyana’s resolve, we should not be found wanting.