Central to many of the contentious planks that remain (especially 4-9) is the observation of Timothy Kondo (Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa) that the draft EPA, which formed the basis of negotiations for his region was prepared by the EU, (Third World Economics, October 1-15, 2007). This observation was reiterated more generally by Marc Maes: “The texts that the Commission has tabled have reflected the Commission’s approach to global trade. They do not reflect the interests and needs of ACP countries.” (ibid, p12)
At a recent Caricom seminar, where I presented a listing of contentious planks on which the EPA is based (reprinted in the first article of this series), another presenter (Havelock Brewster) observed that all the contentious planks listed were embedded in the EU Template, around which CARIFORUM-EU negotiations were framed. The flaws therefore go as far back as the original design.
While it is expected that the EU would represent its interests forcibly in the design of the EPA, in Europe its tactics and modus operandi have come under severe criticism and censure as inappropriate for a “partnership of equals” as the EPAs were being portrayed by the EU. Nothing of the kind has been echoed in our region, except for the voices of a few NGOs and academics. All of these have been effectively marginalized from the trade negotiating process.
By no stretch of the imagination can blame for this situation be entirely attributed to the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM). This has been a collective failure of the region, especially on the part of the political directorates that should have guided the process.
Self-criticism
At the time of Britain’s presidency of the EU, and the appointment of Peter Mandelson as EU Trade Commissioner, the Select Committee on International Development of the United Kingdom Parliament, reviewed the on-going EPA negotiations for which purpose it interviewed key officials including those at DFID and DTI. In its sixth report it expressed four concerns of enormous significance to our present review of the EPA.
First, it condemned the negotiations for being non-transparent and conducted away from effective public scrutiny, in parallel to the Doha Round of negotiations. Thus the report laments, “The lack of public scrutiny over the negotiation process between one of the world’s more powerful economic actors, the EU, and 79 of the world’s poorest economies, the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP). Outside of a small trade circle, very little notice is being taken of these negotiations which are running parallel to the WTO’s Doha ‘development’ round.”
A similar lack of public scrutiny prevailed in Caricom, even though I publicized these concerns expressed by the select committee. The committee highlighted the fact that with negotiations “running parallel” to the Doha Round, this was bound to disadvantage the ACP states.
Second, the committee noted that it was unfair to the ACP for the EU to push an agreement through without “special and differential treatment” and pressed for the developing status of the ACP countries to be guaranteed. Thus the report states: “The negotiations will fundamentally alter the trade relationship between the EU and the ACP. In particular, the ACP group, which used to be the most preferred trading partner of the EU, will be moving from non-reciprocal preferential access to reciprocal trading arrangements with the EU. Because of slow progress at the WTO, the EU cannot guarantee to offer the ACP states consideration of their development status in these new Partnership Agreements. Without special and differential treatment, the agreements will not be fair.”
Third, the committee advised of potential conflict with ACP regional integration efforts. It urged that ACP positions at the WTO were being subverted by the piecemeal, region-by-region mode of negotiations the EU had foisted on the process. Thus the report states:
“Any agreement offered to the ACP must have a developmental component; should not conflict with regional integration processes; should not demand liberalisation in sectors where the EU has not itself liberalized; and should not seek to put onto the agenda in regional negotiations, issues which the ACP group has previously rejected as the all ACP level.”
Finally, the committee was appalled at the cynical, manipulative way the EU was handling the negotiations, comparing it to a game of poker, where the winner-takes-all. It also stressed the unequal power relation. Thus the report states: “That the EU is approaching the negotiations with the ACP as if they were playing a game of poker. The Commission is refusing to lay its cards on the table and to dispel the ACP’s fear that it stands to lose more than it will gain
