Last week an incident took place far from us in the Caribbean, which would have been of deep interest to some Caribbean states, though of minimal concern to others. This was the imprisonment for life of the last President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian and his wife, an active partner in his political career. The charges laid against him included stealing and misusing public funds between 2002 and 2008, his period of office, embezzlement of some millions from a special presidential fund and, in concert with his wife, the laundering of monies through Swiss accounts.
Some might cynically say that this was par for the course in many countries, except for the fact that, unlike those places President Chen did not flee the country and stay away. Further the politics of Taiwan has been notoriously bitter, given that one party, the Kuomintang, founded by Chiang Kai-Shek after the Communist revolution in China, ruled the country for most of the years of its self-separation from China. The Kuomintang, now the ruling party of Taiwan again following the one-term victory that ended in April 2008 of President Chen’s Democratic Peoples Party, had, during its previous tenure, been continually attacked by Chen on the grounds of persistent corruption. And it is indeed no secret that running what was a de facto one-party, military-dominated state, the Kuomintang had had its own way for a long time, mixing the interest of the party with those of the state.
The accusations against Chen and his regime are indeed grave, and in the minds of some of his countrymen, were compounded by the fact that he had made the issue of corruption one of the central planks of his electoral campaign. On the other hand, President Ma’s government has been under intense pressure since he took office, as soon after Taiwan was hit by the effects of the deep recession now still affecting so much of the globe. Chen and the Democratic Peoples Party has, in those circumstance, vigorously argued that the corruption issue, and what he deemed to be political persecution, were simply sticks being used to divert the attention of the people from Ma’s alleged incompetence in not only handling the recession, but also the effects of the disastrous hurricanes that hit the country in recent weeks.
The particular interest of some Caribbean countries in all this, is likely to be the accusation against Chen that he not only misused, but embezzled funds from the presidential fund created by the government. In some circles it is being argued that one of the uses of this fund was as an instrument of persuasion of a variety of small countries across the globe to recognize Taiwan when they became sovereign, or to switch recognition from the People Republic to Taiwan.
In the Caribbean, Taiwan has had some successes, most recent and dramatic in its government’s ability to persuade Sir John Compton’s United Workers Party to reverse the decision of the Kenny Anthony government in St Lucia to switch, in 1997, from Taiwan to China. It will be recalled that, for reasons never disclosed, Sir John decided to reverse his own decision to go back to Taiwan, but was unable to persuade his newly elected colleagues, led by Foreign Minister Rufus Bousquet, to agree with him. The contrast in the Caribbean has been that parties like the St Lucia Labour Party, claiming an affinity for China, and expected to move from Taiwan to China after assuming office, did not do so, finding reasons, never fully explained, to remain with the “renegade state.” The social democratic governments of Dr Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines and Dr Denzil Douglas of St Kitts and Nevis come to mind.
Since Sir John’s demise the so-called Taiwan issue has continued to be a source of substantial political contention in St Lucia. The St Lucia Labour Party has claimed that significant monetary rewards have gone to those who supported the pro-Taiwan decision, as well as to the United Workers Party now led by Prime Minister Stephenson King. They further argue that the dispensation of funds by the Taiwanese Ambassador to various interest groups and to individual government members of Parliament, is contrary to proper financial management and lacks transparency. On the other hand Prime Minister King and his ministers maintain, in justification of their policy, an argument originally made by Sir John himself – that Taiwan as a relatively small country understands, and is therefore more sympathetic to the development problems of other small states than superpower China is likely to be. The paradox of Sir John’s own attitude to the issue was that for whatever reason he switched to Taiwan after the elections, he seemed to believe at the end of his life that a return to Taiwan would appear to general Caribbean opinion a retrograde step in historical terms, never mind, for example, Dr Gonsalves’ often proclaimed radicalism.
Compton’s belief that he might have been going on the wrong side of history would appear to have some ground, in the sense that President Ma’s government appears to be seeking a certain kind of rapprochement with China, an initiative to which the Chinese appear to be interested in responding. It would certainly seem to be the case that President Ma has given an assurance that Taiwan will no longer pursue its present recognition policy, while at the same time not being willing to give up the recognition that it has up to now obtained. China, in turn, now seems willing to accept a policy which it had previously rejected – that of allowing Taiwan to have some form of membership, or presence in some international organizations.
The agreement between the two entities, that Taiwan, under the name of Chinese Taipei, can have a presence in the World Trade Organisation, is one example of this. But perhaps even more importantly, it would appear that China has begun to recognize that Taiwan, on the strength of its own economy, is a significant player among the burgeoning developing economies of Southeast Asia; and that other Asian countries do not accept that she should continue to be excluded from the organizations responsible, in particular for trade and the free trade process, in that part of the world. But their play is subtle. For example, former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore (which recognized China in 1992) has explained to Taiwan, in response to her desire to have a free trade agreement with Singapore, that “our relations can only improve in relation to the improvement of Taiwan’s relations with China.”
China has indeed been sweetening the pot for Taiwan. After years of resistance she has now permitted direct air transport between the two countries from their nearest points, and begun major investments in Taiwan, in parallel with the major investments that Taiwan has for many years made in China. In addition, China now permits freer movement of her own citizens to Taiwan, a major boost for Taiwanese tourism.
In this kind of play, China’s main interest surely is to ensure that no country of major significance moves to recognize Taiwan, and it is clear that her liberalization of trade, investment and movement of people vis-à-vis Taiwan is also a potential instrument of pressure in that regard. It is unlikely that China will put any substantial pressure on the very small countries – whether some Caricom states, or the Dominican Republic or Haiti in the Caribbean – which continue to recognize Taiwan, whatever the enticements of Taiwan might be. (Indeed in Haiti’s present predicament China, with over a thousand police there, wishes to engage nonetheless, though Haiti still recognizes Taiwan).
From China’s perspective, consolidating its power where it matters in this time of intense global political and economic change, is more important. We suspect that for her, taking the long view, the recognition of Taiwan is a phenomenon on which she can patiently wait to eventually disappear.
