Mr Bellerive is the sixth prime minister of Haiti since the second removal of President Aristide in 2004, an indication of a certain lack of consistency in the governance system and an indication of the extent to which institutional stability in the country is still far from secure. Ms Pierre-Louis seems to have been widely supported by countries involved in providing assistance to Haiti, both in respect of what they have believed to be her facilitation of conditions for external investment in the country and for a fairly aggressive response to the serious multiple hurricane damage done in the last year. The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) did indeed go as far as issuing a statement on her dismissal, praising her for her work and calling on the responsible institutions to “proceed without delay with the installation of a new prime minister” and warning of “any risk of a return to a period of instability that could hinder the encouraging prospects that have emerged recently in the fields of investment and job creation.” It has also been asserted that there was likely to be, for the same reasons, a certain concern on the part of former President Bill Clinton, the UN’s Special Envoy to Haiti who has chosen to focus on inducing investment and creating conditions for an enhancement of human development. And in that context, the IMF, early in October had indicated a degree of satisfaction with the progress of the country’s economy, projecting growth of 2.4% for 2009, considered positive given the ravages of the hurricanes.
Yet, in spite of the international concerns, the recent events have shown that Haiti continues to march to its own drums, and that the political manoeuverings among its major governance institutions, within the governing party, LESPWA, and between them and the President continue, with them paying regard to external concerns more or less only when they can facilitate the objectives of the domestic actors. This was the case in the most recent overthrow of President Aristide, and the reaction to the MINUSTAH suggests that the pattern continues. For an assault on the ghetto sections of Port-au-Prince (the so-called ‘troop massacre’ of July 2005) by the UN peacekeeping forces gave rise to substantial protests within the country and even towards the Government of Brazil in that country’s capital itself. Yet there would appear to be a general consensus among ruling circles in Haiti, that the UN presence is overall a force for stability.
The new Prime Minister has asserted that his programme is “the same programme basically… we have the same priorities” as the cabinet of Ms Pierre-Louis. This suggests that, with his wide experience, he is aware that the present external arrangements pertaining to Haiti’s development are operating in a wider framework than has been the case in the past. From the period of the first overthrow of President Aristide, it has been American dominance that has been prominent, as Caricom itself found as it sought to influence developments during the second removal of Aristide. In this last circumstance, however, the Americans had strong diplomatic support from the French in particular, themselves anxious to put to rest Aristide’s increasing demand, in the year of the 200th anniversary of the Haitian revolution, for reparations.
A case can, however, be advanced that in the circumstances of the presence of a reinforced MINUSTAH since 2004 and a substantial Brazilian military participation in the stabilization force headed by a Brazilian senior officer, Brazil’s concern for a progressive elevation of Haiti’s social and economic status has been marked. In that context, it should also be observed that other Latin American/OAS countries, including Argentina and Chile, are present in MINUSTAH, and that Canada, with its large Haitian diaspora (symbolized by the elevation of an individual of Haitian to the position of Governor General) also maintains a certain presence in the assistance and diplomatic process towards Haiti. President Lula himself seems to have taken a particular interest in developments in the country, reflecting not only his own political status as a long-time working class social democrat, but also Brazil’s increasing interest in the Caribbean, starting, as is obvious with the countries of northern South America. In a certain sense he, and his country, are more immune to the aspersions cast against “interventionist forces” in situations of this kind than the Americans would be.
This buffer of intermediate states, so to speak, has really created a platform for other states and regional and international institutions wishing to play a part in Haiti, to operate from. And that, really, is the new geopolitical context in which the Caribbean Community, of which Haiti is a member states is, we could almost say with a certain realism, constrained to act as it deals with the country and its government. We have had to psychologically get over the high politics of Arisitide’s 2004 removal which we did not have the capabilities to influence. And in a sense, we are now more in the role of a moral guardian of Haiti’s interests and future, given our particular filial relationship with the country.
Our specific interests are really two: the first, from the point of view of Jamaica, the Bahamas and some OECS islands in the north-east Caribbean, inhibiting the effects on us of major Haitian migrations in times of social disturbances leading to economic distress in the country. We need to be stressing all the time that though the US and Canada are subject to the same pressures, our capacity for reasonable absorption of any substantial flight of Haitians to our states is certainly much more limited than theirs. Hence a certain right which we claim to seek to exert diplomatic influence on the decisions by the larger powers vis-à-vis Haiti.
Secondly, and perhaps more important for the longer run, is the fact of Haiti’s membership in Caricom in a context in which we wish to advance the Single Market and Economy in all member states of the system. To this end, the stabilization of the governance system of Haiti must be a particular concern of ours, and it is important that an emphasis on the part of our Representative in Haiti should always be placed on this in encounters with the Haitian political establishment and the wider intermediating states. The practical import of this of course is, that the steps being taken to progressively match the institutions of Haiti dedicated to ensuring the practical machinery for eventual integration into the Single Market and Economy, must be progressively pursued by Haiti, amidst all its other concerns, and amidst the more powerful priorities of other countries and institutions. That alone is a handful for us, modest though it may seem.
