Amidst the turmoil caused by the earthquake and extensive destruction and loss of life in Haiti, and the focus of the international community on rescue and recuperation efforts, there has been little time to pay too much attention to the unfolding of events in the Central American republic of Honduras. There, seven months after the coup that removed President Manuel Zelaya from office on June 8 last year, a new President, Porfirio Lobo, was sworn in to replace the temporary President Roberto Micheletti. Accounts indicate that external diplomatic representation at the swearing-in ceremony of this thirtieth Honduran President was minimal – Panama, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic being present, as well as the President of Taiwan.
President Micheletti and the forces in Honduras determined to keep Zelaya out, seem to have attained their objective. Closing off themselves from both diplomatic and economic pressure from major hemispheric countries, including the United States, Brazil and Argentina, and indeed the Organisation of American States, they have worn down these countries and the major hemispheric organisation in their attempts to insist that Hondurans and Hondurans alone have the right to select their government. Of course, for those holding the reins of power, ‘Hondurans’ mean the majority of those opposed to Zelaya’s attempt to change the constitution to allow a sitting president to run again, which they considered bordered on a criminal and treasonable offence.
The resistance of hemispheric countries opposed to what has been, in effect, a coup, has seemed to waver as time went on. Some might have initially thought that with the strong collective pressure, led by the United States and reinforced by denunciation in the main regional organization, the OAS, the Honduran incumbent and Congress would have easily succumbed, and agreed to the compromise terms proposed for a return to constitutionality, allowing Zelaya to serve out the short remainder of his term. But with the support of the Honduran armed forces, de facto President Micheletti and Congress have stood firm, arriving at the point which they wanted to achieve – the diplomatic exhaustion of a United States now consumed with domestic difficulties; a waning of interest or display of ambivalence by other Latin American countries as the crisis extended itself; and a certain bemusement of larger states like Brazil and Argentina at their inability to get Micheletti and the armed forces to conform to their various compromise proposals.
Some commentators in the hemisphere have accused the United States, which for a while brought its heavy diplomatic guns, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to bear on the Honduran coup leaders, of not being sufficiently consistent or persistent in dealing with them. The sentiment of the critics has surrounded the US’s unwillingness to go the whole hog implementing economic sanctions. But a United States, itself concerned at the rapid rallying of the radical states in the hemisphere led by Venezuela to the Zelaya cause, seems to have sought to find a solution that would not lead to a strengthening of the radical forces in Honduras or the region as a whole. What the US thought that these forces could achieve in Honduras itself is not clear – the Cold War presumptions now no longer having any salience. But obviously there has been a fear of a new Venezuelan-led left alliance extending itself, though no one in the US has as yet explained what real damage such an alliance can realistically do to American interests in the present environment.
American diplomacy has been affected by two circumstances. First a domestic one: the existence, no doubt unanticipated by President Obama, of Congressional hostility led by the resurgent Republicans, to his diplomatic appointments in respect of the hemisphere, in particular Congress’s initial resistance to approving the appointment of the experienced diplomat Arturo Valenzuela, as Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs. Congress has effectively frustrated the government up to now, this leading to a degree of uncertainty about the real amount of interest the US has, at present, in defining its hemispheric policy. As time has gone on, and the economic crisis has gripped the United States, and as Congressional resistance has been extended to other domestic policies of the United States, it is clear that American interest in the Honduran issue has waned – what of course the Honduran coup leaders would have wanted.
The second circumstance has been the weakness of leading Latin American countries assumed to have been gaining influence in global affairs, in their efforts to achieve a solution to this problem in their own backyard, so to speak. It would appear that the Brazilian authorities in particular, have been perplexed by the resistance to their entreaties which the Hondurans have displayed. Even when, as now, the Hondurans could well feel that they have defeated the giants of Latin American diplomacy – whether the moderate Brazil and Argentina, or the sub-regional giant Costa Rica, or the radical giants led by Venezuela and Ecuador. The new Honduran government’s denial of entry to the country of a Brazilian diplomat even after the crisis has been officially solved, suggests a contempt for the Brazilian efforts, even though formal apologies have now been made.
Interestingly, a country which seems to have gained some credit from the crisis has been the Dominican Republic, a Caribbean state. DR President Leonel Fernandez had been, initially, a strong opponent of the coup. But over time, he seems to have softened his position and joined the internal forces seeking some kind of compromise. His efforts have concluded with an agreement that Zelaya should at least have temporary exile in the DR, with the most serious charges being made by the Micheletti temporary administration against him being dropped. Zelaya has been designated a “distinguished guest” of the Dominican Republic and permitted residence there, all this having been concluded by a meeting between Zelaya, the incoming President Lobo and the Dominican President at the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras.
The Dominican Republic, particularly under Leonel Fernandez, whatever Caricom diplomats may think of it following the Cariforum-EU-Economic Partnership Agreement, has been displaying a certain diplomatic dexterity in regional affairs in recent times. The government quickly decided, in the face of the US offer to the Central American states of a free trade area agreement, to seek access to the agreement itself. This it successfully achieved utilizing, in part, an extensive network in the United States itself of Dominicans resident there. Secondly, it has succeeded over the years in gaining diplomatic leverage from, in particular the Spanish presence in the European Union, to ensure what it considers to be acceptable outcomes for the DR in the evolution in EU-Cariforum relations that has been taking place over the last twenty years or so, this culminating in what President Fernandez has considered a satisfactory conclusion of the EPA negotiations. This in turn has led his government to step up its efforts to influence Caricom to change the nature of the Cariforum arrangements to fit the new circumstances of the post-EPA era. Now, deviating somewhat from the OAS position, it feels it can claim some success in achieving a solution to the Honduran problem through flexible diplomacy. And finally recently, the DR has exploited its geographical position vis-à-vis Haiti, to raise its profile in the current post-earthquake period and, no doubt, to ensure that the development of an international strategy on Haitian recuperation takes Dominican interests into account.
From this Honduran episode, the United States, though obviously presently distracted from consistent attention to hemispheric affairs, will certainly have to draw some conclusions from this particular dénoûment, even if some feel that it does really mind the outcome. International public perception of its diplomacy is, however, important.
Secondly, the OAS and its leading states will want to examine the diplomatic strategies conducted during this Honduran episode, strategies which would appear to have left them on the sidelines. The OAS has held tightly to the Inter-American Democratic Charter which it agreed in 2001, and must ponder the implications of what would appear to be the Honduran rejection of its principles.
Thirdly, Caricom will want to examine the growing influence of the Dominican Republic during the tenure of President Fernandez in regional affairs. No doubt the President sees the refining of Caribbean relations with the EU in parallel with the prior signing of the Free Trade Area Agreement between the US and the Central American states and his country, and as constituting a new broad framework for future Caribbean-North Atlantic relations. How he and his country will influence these relations as he seeks to establish simulataneously a more conclusive relationship with Caricom, is a matter for us to begin to ponder about.
