In 1649 Charles 1 King of England was beheaded largely because he tried to raise taxes without the authority of parliament. Ever since then it has been the staple of democratic politics for parliaments, and more specifically the lower elected houses, to periodically approve taxes and budgets. Indeed, the American constitution, rooted as it is in that Bostonian rebellion which insisted that there should be “no taxation without representation,” makes it mandatory for tax measures to originate in the Congress. Perhaps because of this and its greater adherence to the “separation of powers,” the American parliamentary system is much more rigorous in its consideration of government expenditure than the Westminster system which it was intended to replicate.
Given the tight party control that usually exists in Westminster-type systems, executive dominance is usually assured and the following statement by J. H Mensah, though indicative appears overly optimistic: “It is no use pointing a finger at the Executive. Parliaments, everywhere as far as I know, are masters of their own procedures. The Standing Orders of parliament are at the force of law, but they are exclusively within the mandate of parliament to initiate and to make. Therefore, if the procedures that we are working with are not convenient to allow us a thorough examination of the government spending proposals and if we continue with them, then we have only got ourselves to blame.”(“Parliament and the Budgetary Process, Including from a Gender Perspective:” Regional Seminar, Nairobi, 2000).
The messy disputations over the budget and other issues we are now witnessing in Guyana are a result of the recent aberration (which can easily be reversed) whereby that executive dominance has been severely reduced and we have been released from this parliamentary straitjacket. Please note that the current conditions are not the result of reduced party control which, in my opinion, would be preferable in our kind of society. Indeed, ironically, in the present dispensation, the need for opposition party discipline may have increased the need for party control and the shortcomings of the Westminster system, which in practice favours executive dominance, can only be mitigated by radical constitutional reforms, which reforms are not my immediate concern.
Our experience has been that governments have presented budgets that have been passed without amendments. Over the years, there have been perfunctory prior consultations which left a bitter taste in the mouth of many of those who were ‘consulted’ and may be one reason why the present opposition appears wary of them. As a result, civil society and the vast majority of lawmakers have had no say in the actual crafting of the budgets and only Westminster-type, perfunctory say in their monitoring. Here Guyana has followed the timeworn tradition. Thus another writer bemoaned the fact that “parliament is not playing the important role that it could play in the budget cycle. They do not provide input into the planning phase of the budget, they do not demand regular financial reporting from government, and all too often independent audits are late and parliamentary oversight committees do not have adequate resources to scrutinise public accounts. In theory, parliaments play a key role in the budget process, but there is a tremendous gap in many countries around the world between the potential for action by parliaments and the actual role that they play.” (“Parliament and the Budgetary Process: Including from a Gender Perspective:” Regional Seminar, Colombo, 2003)
It is quite obvious that no meaningful pre-budget consultation is now possible between the government and the opposition so the questions are – what could we aim for and what is achievable. I believe that in the context of the current dispensation, the above suggestion of Mr Mensah makes sense.
The parliamentary parties and more specifically the opposition parties, now have it in their power to change the standing orders of parliament to provide more scope and time to examine the estimates. Scope in the sense that rules which allow the current parliamentary sectoral committees to consider given parts of the budget, taking evidence from public officials and civil society, could be passed. The parties could also determine the optimum time they require to properly consider the budget and acquire the most they could possibly do by way of changes to the standing orders.
Our Standing Orders (2006) require that the budget be laid before the National Assembly “before or within ninety days after the commencement of” the year. At least two days shall then elapse before the debate begins and a further five days may be allotted for a general debate which “… shall be confined to the financial and economic state of the country and the general principles of Government policy and administration as indicated by the budget speech and the Estimates.” After the general debate is completed the National Assembly shall resolve itself into a Committee of Supply which then has seven days to “consider the Estimates and supplementary estimates of expenditure and statements of excesses presented to the Assembly.”
Is the process whereby the entire Assembly, as a Committee of Supply, must consider the budget appropriate and is the seven-day limit sufficient? As indicated above, in my view, detailed consideration of the budget would better take place if there is a division of labour and given parts of the budget are simultaneously considered in open forum by the current sectoral committees of the National Assembly. In these circumstances, the seven-day period may prove sufficient but if it does not, it too could be extended to the maximum possible within the current rules.
Before concluding let me opine that the messiness of which I spoke is not restricted to the area under discussion. The opposition parties came to office committed to investigate certain areas of the previous government’s activities. They should seek to establish technical committees to proceed with that task. The process of requesting information from the government and leaving it in the public domain for all and sundry to speculate upon is unhelpful and possibly dangerous to a collaborative approach.
The above recommendations are but suggestions as to how the current rules may be reconstructed to give meaning to the desire for greater budgetary transparency and accountability. However, and most importantly, care should be taken to develop these changes within the tripartite process. Given their public stance on openness and the need for stakeholder ownership and participation, all the parliamentary parties should be able to reach accommodation on these kinds of transition suggestions.
