Dear Editor,
The AFC is a multiracial party operating in a racially charged voting environment. To be fair, it is a Sisyphean task to wage this kind of war in Guyana’s ethnic political battleground. That said, overall racial voting as measured by the percentage of total voters who vote for the race-based parties (PPP and PNC/APNU) is down since 2006. In 2001 around 90% of the electorate voted for the race-based parties. In the last two elections only 61% to 63% of total electorate voted for them. The AFC’s problem is not just that 17% to 21% of the electorate refused to vote when it first arrived on the scene in 2006 with its message of change, but that it did not appeal to or could not connect with this massive chunk of the electorate since that time. These voters have not only tuned out the time-worn PPP and PNC, but they have also rejected the new arrival (AFC) despite its message of change and its bold promises.
The second problem for the AFC is its marginal gains in terms of total votes and percentage of votes captured in two elections despite significantly improved spending, a markedly better campaign machinery in 2011, the presence of an energized youth vote component, and vast disenchantment with the PPP and APNU’s early struggles. The AFC’s strategy of targeting the Indian vote and PPP strongholds was successful in delivering the AFC as the balance of power third party. That brings us to the third problem for the AFC; it still benefits from ethnic voting in the form of transient ethnic voters who have flocked to the AFC primarily due to the racial composition of the party’s leadership at the time. Transient African voters moved to the AFC led by Trotman and a noticeable African leadership front in 2006 but departed in 2011 just as Indians arrived to an AFC with a leadership front led by Ramjattan and dominated by former PPP-ites led by Nagamootoo. No party can become a legitimate balance of power entity in a racialized voting cauldron if it depends on shifting ethnic voters who can pack up and leave at any time. Indian ethnic insecurity could easily derail the AFC’s 2011 gains just like African ethnic security or insecurity propelled them away from the AFC in 2011.
This highlights the fourth predicament of the AFC: its lack of a critical mass of diehard voters to become a genuine third party threat. Most of that diehard core of voters actually lies in the 17% to 21% of voters who have chosen to stay home since 2006. Within that group perhaps around 15% are likely prepared to vote but not for any of the current political choices in Guyana. The AFC’s failure to motivate them off the couches and into voting AFC is a colossal problem for the AFC in its current configuration. The lack of a critical mass of committed voters undermines its efforts to be an effective balance-of-power third party that can consistently split the ethnic vote, deliver minority governments and continually marshal electoral gains towards a majority government as the political climate changes. The AFC’s core of unwavering voters in the past two elections is roughly half of its tally in the last two elections. This puts its core of diehard supporters at around 4% to 5% of the participating electorate. The AFC cannot be a credible third force when approximately half of its voters are transients who seemingly vote for it for largely ethnic reasons. The AFC needs 10% to 15% dedicated voters before it can deliver consistent change.
Why can’t the AFC connect with the sidelining voters (17% to 21%) or with more ethnic transient voters (this figure accounts for probably around 5% each of the entire electorate within the PPP and PNC/APNU at any given time)? It is simple: lack of trust, or rather mistrust. The fact of the matter is that the AFC’s Trotman and Ramjattan cannot deliver what the AFC needs to become a credible third force. They have too much baggage, are missing pervasive public trust, do not have enough inspiration and provide insufficient indicia of the ability to deliver genuine change. In addition, there are questions about their machinations in relation to power and exhibitions of too much vindictiveness against or cosiness with their former parties. In less than a month, Moses Nagamootoo exposed exactly what is lacking with Messrs Ramjattan and Trotman and why their continued domination of the AFC could imperil its future growth. For the AFC to get that holy grail of 10% to 15% of dedicated voters with that salient group of transients tagging along, it must find credible and dynamic leaders who bring no political baggage to the table. This would bring the sideliners into the game. The current leadership of the AFC has run its course. It needs a facelift. Why hasn’t the AFC conducted a presidential candidate primary?
The future of the AFC also lies in how it uses its balance of power in Parliament to shape its identity as an independent party, to hold its own and to become a champion of the citizenry while distinguishing itself from the PPP and APNU. It needs to push an agenda that weakens ethnic insecurity as a dominant reason for voting. It is the only way the AFC could get those non-participating voters and secure a bigger pool of transient ethnic voters who may convert into permanent supporters. In a nutshell, Indians fear the return of PNC unelected dictatorship while Africans fear the continuation of the PPP elected dictatorship. The AFC has to fix those areas where there is ethnic fear, which underpins ethnic voting. It must call for curriculum reform to introduce more tolerance education in schools, pass laws for tolerance training in the workplace, create an agenda of greater freedom of the media, create a more independent Gecom to remove the possibility of electoral rigging, push for a referendum on the constitution to reduce the powers of the presidency, explore ethnic balancing of the armed forces and clamour for the creation of more agencies of oversight, accountability and transparency. These initiatives will create ethnic trust and make it extremely difficult for any party that wins power to engage in autocratic behaviour. More critically, it will open the possibilities for races to vote outside of race without fear or without the motivation of ethnic triumphalism.
Yours faithfully,
M Maxwell
