Russia and the West

Much anxiety seemed to pervade comment in the major countries of the Western world as Russia approached the opening of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. There seemed to be a certain doubt as to whether preparations for the games would be successfully concluded, or whether some kind of incident might in effect sabotage the opening arrangements, and in turn reflect negatively on the prestige of Vladimir Putin and therefore on his country as a whole.

On the face of it, negative perceptions and comment seemed to originally derive from what has been deemed as Putin’s negative stance on the issue of homosexuality, perceptions that influenced the very top of the decision-making in Europe and the United States, finally influencing President Obama into refusing to himself attend the opening of the Games, and indeed, sending a relatively low-level delegation.

With the obviously successful opening of the Games and, so far, their incident-free conduct, much of the early negative comment has ended, and Mr Putin has felt confident enough of things to have made a special visit to the US headquarters of the Games in Sochi, appearing relaxed and willing to banter.

What would seem to be the case, however, is that the anxieties emanating from Western comment really reflected little concern about the ability of the Russians to organize, and ensure the appropriate security for the Games, but derive from a wider concern in the Western world with Mr Putin’s general management of Russia as a whole as some observers have perceived him as not being particularly concerned to permit the development of a degree of liberalism in Russia itself.

This concern has been reflected  by extensive criticism of the Putin administration’s attitude to the so-called Pussy Riot incident, where some young ladies were given what in the West would be considered harsh sentences for negative behaviour in Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Saviour. And that the two members still in prison were released as the Games approached, suggests that the government felt it necessary to do this in order to remove that matter from being persistently featured in the Western press.

But Western comment over the last few months has gone further than this to two more prominent issues, one of which, in particular, has been reflected as negative to Putin. For the opening of the Winter Olympics has virtually coincided with the negative events occurring in Ukraine which US and European diplomacy has attributed to unacceptable initiatives taken by Putin.

In the case of Ukraine, the European Union, in particular, has taken great umbrage over Putin’s decision to grant extensive assistance to the that country’s leadership at a time when the EU had anticipated that Ukraine would come to an arrangement that would consolidate a new arrangement, and bring the country, as has happened with other former Eastern European countries of the now extinct “world socialist system,” into the sphere of the European Union. Putin’s decision has precipitated a gathering storm of protest within Ukraine itself which the EU has assisted, and which initially seemed to have the potential for bringing down the Ukrainian government and facilitating its replacement by an administration partial to a formal arrangement with the EU.

There can be little doubt that the EU, and increasingly American diplomacy, has seen Putin’s initiative as detrimental to the process of European-wide integration that has seemed to be on course. But there appears to have been some underestimation of Russia’s apparent affinity to Ukraine (once governed by Nikita Khruschev before he ascended to greater things in the Soviet Union as a whole).

The Russians have obviously considered large parts of Ukraine as encompassing, like Russian itself, large populations of Slavic origin, and having therefore a special affinity and relationship with Russia. And Putin’s initiative of pulling the Ukraine leadership away from its courtship with the EU is obviously designed to demonstrate Russia’s desire to maintain a sphere of influence that will remain as a sort of buffer, as both Russia and the EU reorganize themselves in the period following the collapse of the Soviet system, now characterized, in Russia’s perception, by a Western European attempt at an extension of itself and, therefore, of the Western world.

Russia’s present attitude reflects a perception on the part of its leadership of the need for reconsolidation on both its European and Asian borders, as the Cold War has terminated what for long appeared to be the previous post-World War Two frozen arrangements. And in that context, Putin’s initiative towards Ukraine is paralleled by his equally surprising (to the Western world) initiatives that have induced the United States to rethink its attitude towards Iran – a process that has major implications for the geopolitics of the Middle East.

Some observers in the West are dubious about Putin’s own ability to consolidate his strength in Russia itself, as the Cold War underpinning of the Russian economy has largely disappeared, and Russia itself perceives the need for a consolidation of what is, in effect, Putin’s attempt to establish a capitalist economy under strong state supervision.