Hard on the heels of our editorial last week on Russia and the West has been the culmination of the incipient, uprising centred particularly in Kiev, against Ukraine President Yanukovitch, his swift departure from the capital as he sensed the rising power of his opponents, and then the establishment of a new temporary ruling regime in the country.
As things have developed, the European Union which had been pressing hard to ensure a closer integration between itself and Ukraine, along lines taken by many countries in Eastern Europe and along the borders of the now distintegrated Soviet Union, would now appear to be on the brink of sealing such an arrangement. And the EU has certainly been helped in its strategy of encouragement of the opponents of President Yanukovich, at a time when President Putin has obviously been somewhat hobbled by his own desire not to have any action taken by Russia to disturb the Sochi games, seen by him an instrument of raising Russia’s, and necessarily, his own, prestige.
So while, only in recent weeks, it appeared that the ruling regime in Ukraine might have been able to hold the fort, utilizing external fears of the possibility of an historically multicultural country disintegrating if too much pressure were put on Yanukovich, both the dissidents internally and the European Union externally, decided to take a chance that the fall of Kiev would induce other regions to capitulate, and that the regions on the Soviet border would hardly be able to be rescued by a preoccupied Putin.
The Western powers themselves, but in particular the United States, seem to have been satisfied to let the revolt against Yanukovich proceed more gradually, if the negative expletive about the EU’s involvement, recently used by the main American diplomat involved, is to be taken as a sign of dissatisfaction with the EU’s strategy. But the EU itself would appear not to have taken American predilections seriously, given an apparent sentiment in EU capitals that President Obama is generally loathe to encourage direct interventions in countries experiencing domestic uprisings.
Clearly, the Europeans’ stance stems not simply from an opportunistic desire to capitalize on further disintegration of the relationships bred under the old Soviet Union, but from a notion that the consistent integration of bordering countries within its own political sphere, is a process permitting its own participation in the reorganization of global relations since the demise of the USSR. This would, in their view, assist the positioning of Europe, once again, as a distinctive and accepted centre of geopolitical gravity and influence, as new powers, in particular China, emerge on the global scene.
In this regard, specialists on the European scene have made reference to the recent Vilnius Summit of EU states in the capital of Lithuania in November last year, where, according to reports, countries present like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova, all once wards of the USSR, were reminded that it was necessary to decisively indicate where – East or West – they would wish to have integrated and secure relationships on which to advance their economic adjustment to the emerging global economic and geopolitical arrangements on the continent.
Obviously, in the Western world, there will be close observation in the next few months of what the effect of the fall of Yanukovitch will have on the domestic and external prestige and influence of President Putin himself. In response to the EU’s persistent extension of itself, Putin has sought, particularly in relation to the countries directly bordering Russia, to encourage them to adhere to a concept of Eurasia which he has been developing, as a means of stabilizing Russia’s relationships on both the Asian front – vis-à-vis patterns arising from growing Chinese strength – and on its reorganizing European borders.
Some Western specialists see Putin’s design as a means of finding a new base for restructuring and stabilizing Russia’s own economic and political base, given the disintegration of the economic relationships which it had as the Soviet Union, as a means of reorganizing the geopolitical status of Russia in the emerging world arrangements.
The hardline stance taken by the EU, eager to see a denouement of the conflict in Ukraine, vis-à-vis the United States which has recently been marking diplomatic steps with Russia on both the Syrian and the Iranian issues, seems to have induced the EU to force a resolution of the conflict rather than seek to involve Russia in participating in a solution acceptable to the main major power parties. And it is interesting, in that regard, that the former United States National Security Adviser (in President Carter’s government), Zbigniev Brzezinski, has quickly written to advise the Europeans no doubt, that whatever arrangement is arrived at in Ukraine should not be antagonistic to Russia.
As he has put it in an article in the United Kingdom paper, the Financial Times, “the US could and should convey clearly to Mr Putin that it is prepared to use its influence to make certain a truly independent and territorially undivided Ukraine will pursue policies towards Russia similar to those so effectively practised by Finland…The Finnish model is ideal for Ukraine, the EU and Russia in any larger east-west strategic accommodation.”
Whether the US administration will be inclined to display any empathy of that sort to Russia and President Putin is an open question. Within the United States itself there are, in some political quarters, doubts about President Obama’s willingness to engage Russian diplomacy in efforts to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. And the fact that the President is presumed to have allowed the Europeans to take the significant role in the removal of Gaddafi in Libya, when put together with the subsequent assassination of the American Ambassador in that country, has allowed his opponents to hammer him for hesitation to act decisively.
In addition American Congressmen and Senators supporting the Israeli criticisms of Obama strategy towards the Iranian regime, seek to reduce any further actions that might seem to enhance the prestige of Russia and Putin.
In all of this, of course, the world awaits President Putin’s response to the present situation. He had committed extensive financial resources to Ukraine to help stabilize the economic situation. He will, no doubt, be waiting to see, first, the extent of the financial bait offered by the EU, and how that can play a part in being able to ensure the short-run economic stabilization of the country. And secondly, whether the EU strategy will induce a new Cold War between Russia and the countries that have been historically referred to as its “near abroad.”
