Spain and Catalonia

By now, readers will know whether voters in Scotland have taken the low road to political confusion and economic uncertainty that comes with the independence some were seeking, or the high road to preserving the benefits of three centuries of the deepest possible integration and continuing to play a part in a strong union. Whatever the result, the risk of contagion in the European Union remains high, no more so than in Spain where the Catalan separatist movement appears to have drawn inspiration from events in Scotland.

A mass demonstration in Barcelona, on September 11, demanding a referendum on self-determination, has been widely interpreted as a reaffirmation of the Catalan desire for independence from Spain and as a powerful mandate to the autonomous region’s parliament. Next week, the parliament, dominated by pro-independence parties from both left and right since elections in November 2012, is expected to vote on going ahead on November 9 with a referendum similar to the Scottish one.

There is at least one fly in the ointment though: under the Spanish constitution the vote would be illegal without the blessing of Madrid. Unsurprisingly, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and the central government are totally opposed to any such vote and the threat of Catalan secession.

On Wednesday, Mr Rajoy stated that independence referendums, whether in Scotland or Catalonia, are like “a torpedo below the waterline for European integration” and argued that such processes create “more economic recession and poverty.” He then proceeded to dispel Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond’s claim that Scotland would get fast-track entry into the EU in the period between a ‘yes’ vote and actual separation in March 2016, warning that an independent Scotland would have to apply from scratch for EU membership and the application process could take eight years. Obviously, Spain has no desire to encourage separatist tendencies anywhere, least of all at home, where it fears a domino effect. Neither does the EU as a whole wish to countenance fragmentation in other states. Nevertheless, Catalan President Artur Mas seems to be gung-ho about pressing ahead with the referendum.

Catalonia is Spain’s richest and most industrialised region and has felt long-standing resentment about contributing more to the national coffers than other regions, in effect, subsidising the rest of the country. Worse, the imposition of austerity measures because of Spain’s ongoing economic crisis, coupled with the fact that Catalonia is also the country’s most indebted region, has fuelled discontent with the central government and its handling of the crisis and given a fillip to secessionist sentiment.

Spain’s Constitutional Court, however, is expected to rule that a unilateral referendum in Catalonia would be illegal. Mr Mas, in turn, is now conceding that he might have to settle for a “non-legally binding vote” which, he argues, would still be possible under Catalan law. It is unclear what exactly this would signify for practical purposes.

In this respect, the Scottish example is proving instructive, with the possibility of a third way being put on the table. This would involve some sort of constitutional change and more powers shifting from Madrid to Barcelona, Catalonia’s capital, à la “devo-max,” that is, the greater devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament by Westminster.

There are now suggestions that Mr Mas might accept such a deal, as long as Catalans are given the democratic right to vote on it. Based on the latest polls, some analysts even think that the pro-independence camp can be persuaded to shift the debate from secession to Catalans’ so-called “right to decide.”

According to Spanish polling company Metroscopia, 43% of Catalans would support independence from Spain, 42% would support staying as part of Spain, with the rest undecided. But when told that Catalonia would automatically remain outside of the EU, the percentage supporting independence fell to 38%, while 53% favoured remaining part of Spain. Then, when given a third option of constitutional change and greater autonomy for Barcelona, 44% preferred that option, with the number supporting independence falling to just 23%.

None of the above figures really make a compelling argument for full independence and it is therefore hardly surprising that Mr Mas seems to be keeping his options open. Perhaps the Scottish result will give him and Catalonia a clearer indication as to which way the political winds are blowing.