Venezuelan crisis

No one in this country should feel comfortable about what is going on in Venezuela at the present time.  In fact countries in the region generally will be concerned, more especially our neighbour Brazil, which under normal circumstances would lead behind-the-scenes engagements with the government in Caracas. However, given that nation’s own special version of political chaos whereby Ms Dilma Rousseff is to be impeached, Itamaraty is probably somewhat distracted for the time being.

It is no news to anyone that Venezuela is in an economic crisis: severe shortages of food and essential items; the highest inflation rate in the hemisphere; the highest rates of violent crime in the world; a water crisis in many areas because of El Niño; and massive electricity cuts related to the same phenomenon assail the beleaguered citizenry.  The oil price which funded the late president Hugo Chávez’s social programmes for the poor plummeted a long time ago, but President Nicolás Maduro has nevertheless continued to cling on desperately to the socialist framework bequeathed him by his predecessor as the economy crumbles beneath him.

As is usual in these situations, economic dissatisfaction has been given political expression, but as with the economy, President Maduro appears to have only one move in his repertoire – rigidity.  The combined opposition, usually referred to by its initials, MUD, has a large majority in the Venezuelan National Assembly and announced some time ago a three-pronged strategy to remove the head of state, namely, a legislative measure to reduce the president’s term; a recall referendum; and protests.

The first of these was struck down by the Constitutional Court, and the opposition has now moved to the stage of a recall referendum. MUD collected 1.85 million signatures to set the process in motion, and on May 2 these were submitted to the National Electoral Council which is controlled by government appointees. If the signatures are verified, then the opposition would have to gather another 4 million signatures before a referendum could be held.

There is a problem, however: it is only if the referendum is held this year and Mr Maduro loses, that a new election would be triggered; if the referendum is not held till next year, and Mr Maduro loses, he would go, but the government would stay. In those circumstances he would be succeeded by his equally hard-line vice-president, Aristóbulo Istúriz.  The opposition feels that the electoral council is dragging its feet over verification in order to postpone the referendum, while Reuters reported yesterday that officials had said it would be unlikely that one would be held this year.

If that is indeed how things play out, the opposition would be facing an impasse, and if they follow their own agenda they might move to protests.  The government has traditionally taken a very uncompromising stance against protestors, as was demonstrated most recently on Wednesday, when the opposition led a demonstration to the National Electoral Council to pressure them into allowing the referendum. It should be said they did not get anywhere near it because they were blocked by armed soldiers who threw tear gas at one stage.

President Maduro clearly hopes to play for time, since the rains have arrived in the Cuyuni, and the water levels in the Gurí dam which supplies so much of Venezuela’s electricity have ceased falling. (It is still too early to have an immediate impact on the frequent and prolonged blackouts.) In addition, oil prices are on the rise again, and he may hope that if they climb further this will save the economy.  They won’t, of course, unless they reach levels associated with Chávez’s period of office, which is not going to happen. Furthermore, President Maduro has resisted taking the one move which would have some immediate effect, and which has been urged on him even by some of those sympathetic to the government, ie, abolishing the two-tier exchange rate, and allowing the currency to float.

Maduro has also promised citizens that he would get rid of the gangs and make Caracas – categorized as the most dangerous city in the world in terms of violent crime (excluding war zones and towns of under 300,000) – safe again.  To that end, he sent in the army to the barríos recently, whose activities came in for criticism from human rights groups. The problem is a great deal more complex, however, than he gives it credit for, and even with sustained attention, it is not going to disappear quickly.

The danger is, therefore, that if there is no perceptible economic improvement, and the recall referendum is postponed to next year, there will be increasing numbers of protests in Venezuela and by extension, increasing confrontation and tension. One imagines that at some point in such a scenario, organisations or groups of nations in the hemisphere would try to mediate, although there is no guarantee that this would help. Certainly, if there is any degree of political chaos, one has to speculate whether in fact the military would not intervene, if only for the purposes of restoring order, or perhaps even ensuring the holding of an election.

The problem is, the political options are narrowing, and while it is impossible to predict exactly how events will play out, Guyana has to be prepared in contingency terms for any unexpected developments to the west.