Kato Secondary School

From the photographs which have been published in the press, the Kato Secondary School in Region 8 appears an unprepossessing enough edifice. The two front buildings are one story high, while the back one appears to be two stories, and they all are set on flat ground against a backdrop of hills. From superficial, external appearances ‒ admittedly to the layperson’s eye ‒ the structure would not have represented much of a challenge to a competent contractor.  Yet when the Ministry of Public Infrastructure toured the school last year, they saw cracked and crumbling concrete floors and walls, steel protruding from walls, termite-infested wood, cheap bathroom fixtures and badly installed science equipment in the laboratory.

Rodrigues Architects Ltd which was subsequently contracted to undertake a technical audit of the building, found, among other things, the standard of construction and the quality of material and workmanship below average; the foundations and frames 20 to 25 per cent below the specified strength; corridors, floors, ceilings, stairs and walkways with major defects; and deviation from the specifications and design/construction drawings. Most of the reinforced concrete, they said, should not have been allowed.

They also referred in their report to the Clerk of Works’ daily reports which were “vague” and “incomplete” and did not constitute a reliable record of the daily works. It was no surprise, therefore, that they deemed the building unsafe for children.

This school was erected at a cost of $728.2 million, and Rodrigues Architects calculated it would take at least $144 million to fix the defects. The contractor was Kares Engineering Inc, and the building had originally been scheduled for completion in December 2014 so it could open in early 2015. It did not do so, after then President Ramotar toured the school and heard from engineers about the need for remedial work.  While Kares was awarded the contract when the previous government was in office, the onus of arranging the repair of their woefully sub-par effort falls to the present administration.

Rodrigues Architects final report was submitted in May last year, but not a great deal seems to have happened thereafter. According to a press release from the Ministry of Public Infrastructure, representatives from that ministry as well as those from the Ministry of Indigenous People’s Affairs, the Ministry of Communities, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Cohesion met on February 16 this year to decide on how to proceed. The key decision coming out of that meeting was that Kares should undertake the remedial works under strict supervision and at no cost to the government.

It hardly seems the best possible decision to make the same contractor who has constructed a defective and unsafe building also responsible for its repair. As was mentioned in the report we published on the subject last Monday, there should have been a performance bond attached to the project, and this should have been invoked and another contractor given the job. There is nothing in the statement, however, to give any indication as to how all these officials from so many ministries arrived at their strange conclusion, and neither was there any reference to a performance bond.

But that is not all. It was agreed at the meeting mentioned above, that there would be a supervisory consultant to oversee Kares’ work at Kato. As it has transpired, the Ministry of Public Infrastructure has selected Vikab Engineering for this consultancy work. The problem is that Vikab – a Trinidadian company – has a history here. It was the supervisory consultant on the failed docking system at the Supenaam Stelling, which was built by BK International in 2010. The engineers who investigated that failure were highly critical not just of the contractor, but also of Vikab, and their report said the quality of both the work and workmanship reflected badly on the supervising capacity of the latter. Following sustained criticism, Vikab left Guyana in 2012, and as we reported, never responded to the engineers’ findings.

Last week this newspaper was given to understand that the company had indeed left, but had returned, and had also bid for projects over the last year.

The question is, given its track record how was Vikab retained for the consultancy on the Kato school. The answer from the Public Infrastructure Ministry is that they first approached the Guyana Association of Professional Engineers for assistance in shortlisting consultants, but received no response. As a consequence, they had recourse to a restrictive tendering method first because of time reasons and also because they were already acquainted with the performance of consultants and associated matters. As it was, six consultants were invited to tender.  At the closing of bids on May 9, however, there was no response from any of the consultants except Vikab, which asked for a one-week extension to submit its proposals, which was granted.

Vikab was awarded the supervisory contract in the sum of $29,229,410; the financial proposal that the company submitted, the ministry said, was below its estimation for these services. One can only comment that if this turns out to be an underestimated amount, that potentially could lead to further complexities in respect of this hapless school.

The time issue to which the ministry referred was a reference to the opening of school in September.  The problem is that there shouldn’t have been any rush; Rodrigues Architects submitted their final report a year ago, but as said above, it was not until February this year that the various ministries were galvanized into action. Why weren’t the issues sorted out at leisure last year? Certainly where the supervisory contract is concerned, the ministry could then have employed the full tender process and have had a wider choice.

That way it would have been commended for its transparency and adherence to the required procedures. It might even be argued that this course of action could have been taken in February this year too, since accountability and effective remedial works to make the school safe are more important than having children start the academic year on time.

As said above too, the rationale behind the Kares decision is utterly inexplicable and surely cannot be put down to any time factor. So now we are left with two companies with imperfect records either repairing or supervising repairs on a new school which has been declared currently unsafe.

Is the Ministry of Public Infrastructure really telling the public that this is the best that they can do?