Dynamics of normal coalition governments

In recent weeks, criticisms of the coalition government’s internal processes have only been surpassed by criticisms of its handling of its relationship with ExxonMobil. Of course, generally, fractious internal coalition relations only appear unusual to those such as ourselves, unaccustomed to this type of arrangement. It does appear that coalition behaviour differs depending on the stage in its lifecycle and one commentator surmised, ‘The first two years of coalition is about working together …It’s logical in the later stages of coalition that both sides emphasise their differences. Parties increasingly focus on the election and developing and setting out their policies for the election.’ Our coalition government is nearing the final half of its term during which coalition parties usually begin to seek opportunities to emphasise their ‘distinct values and achievements, while defending the overall coalition record.’ But again, Guyana is politically different: in our situation the smaller parties are focusing upon finding opportunities to negotiate arrangements with their larger partner to avoid having to go separately to an election. If not a contradiction, what appears to be developing in Guyana is a permanent coalition. In two parts, based upon comparisons with usual coalition dynamics, I will consider how and why this occurred and where we may be heading.

For the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom had a coalition government between the Conservative party and Liberal Democrats between 2010 and 2015. About two years before the 2015 general elections, the British Institute of Government, in a paper intended for distribution at the Liberal Democrat conference, considered how the coalition government would work in its final 18 months (https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/ publications/ Lib%20 Dem%20Conference%20Briefing%20Paper%20Finalv.2.pdf). Drawing upon international experiences, the Institute had been studying the life cycle of coalition governments and some of its findings will be used here to indicate the dynamics of normal coalition governments.

The German Green party was the first to break the traditional hold of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Social Democratic Party (SPD) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) on government when it entered a coalition with the SPD in 1998.  Given its pacifist position, early in the coalition the Greens were much criticised when the government supported intervention in Kosovo and for its backing of some controversial SPD policies having to do with welfare and labour market reforms. Indeed, the latter caused a split in the larger party which brought down the coalition. However, the stance of the Greens demonstrated that it was prepared to take hard decisions and improved its image as a credible governing party. Furthermore, the party went on to secure a number of policy successes under its strong, charismatic and popular leader, foreign minister Joschka Fischer. This prevented it from being overshadowed by its larger partner and in the elections that followed the split in the SPD, while the SDP lost votes, the Greens gained them. According to the study, what the entire episode served to indicate is that ‘Coalitions are often rewarded or punished as a whole for their performance in office. Ensuring that the government is seen as effective and competent is crucial, and particularly so for the smaller party, which will often have less credibility at the outset as a party of administration.’ Bearing in mind their own agenda, smaller parties are also required to show discipline in supporting major policy initiatives of their larger partners.