As we draw closer to 2020 and national elections, the calls for shared governance have increased. Exactly what form that would take is not usually spelt out in its larger aspect, although there have been various proposals from a number of sources in the past. Minister Volda Lawrence’s extraordinary comments and her failure to apologise for them (an apology for causing offence is not an apology for the substance of what she said, or an admission that she was wrong) has given the appeal for “national government” as one letter-writer called it, a new impetus.
Many political observers, however, have tended to concentrate on specific issues in relation to the larger topic of constitutional reform, rather than on shared governance per se. These invariably include the powers of the president and the inability of parties to form coalitions after an election rather than before it, as is the situation at present.
As has been remarked on several times before, the demographic situation in Guyana is changing and this is bringing political change in its train. The constituencies of the two major parties are shrinking so that even if, for the sake of argument, the Indian segment of the population – the largest − did vote solidly for the PPP, it cannot on its own bring that party to power; it needs the assistance of other voters, more especially Indigenous ones. A viable Indigenous party with a charismatic leader might change the name of the game, making our political structure more akin – although far from identical – to that of Suriname. In other words, we would enter sooner or later into the world of coalition politics.
However, as has also been commented on many times before by watchers of the political scene, parties are only interested in coalition-style politics and for that matter, more particularly in shared governance, when they are out of office. It is true that the PPP has made some accommodating noises since finding themselves in opposition, but that notwithstanding, they give every appearance of having no genuine interest, since they believe they will win the election of 2020, and consequently have no need to share power. As things stand, the leadership of the major parties controls the lists, and makes it possible for them to evict anyone from their parliamentary complement who does not hew closely to the official line of the whips, or who tries to defect.
If an Indigenous party does come on stream, it might deny an overall majority to either of the two major parties, and could under the present constitutional arrangements potentially offer its support to legislation on a case-by-case basis in the House if it chooses not to go into a pre-electoral alliance. While it presumably might be courted before a national poll with a coalition in mind, a savvy Indigenous leadership would probably avoid it, given the fate of the AFC in coalition with the current government. Were the coalition provision to be amended, however, it is difficult to predict exactly how the political terrain would evolve if given enough time, and whether it would create space in due course for the appearance of other viable, if very small, political entities. Furthermore, the advent of oil and gas is likely to create new dynamics in the society.
However, it could not be ruled out either that faced with a stalemate created by the current restrictive constitutional structure and an Indigenous party that will not join a coalition before a national election, the two big parties will agree to certain constitutional changes which create some areas of shared governance. In such circumstances, however, there is the possibility they could have been seduced by the lure of the supposed coming oil boom.
This doesn’t mean to say, of course, that the constitution isn’t in dire need of reform; it is just to suggest that it may have to be viewed as an evolving framework that would be responsive to new conditions as they overtake us. This would not make it unusual in terms of constitutions, the US and French (in their very different ways) being cases in point. In other words, we cannot produce a complete final document which will stand us in good stead for the time being in the two years till 2020. Theoretically, of course, it is quite doable; it is just that given the reluctance of our two major parties for constitutional change, their ingrained slothfulness, and the government’s lack of capacity for organisation, it is simply not realistic at this point.
This is not the same thing as to say that the amendment of certain provisions of the constitution could not be accomplished before the next national poll – indeed it could if the major parties were pushed into being so disposed. It would not necessarily involve looking at shared governance as such, since that would require longer, more careful debate than the current time-frame might allow, although certain reforms could reflect a trend in that direction which could be expanded or built on later. As Mr Ralph Ramkarran has pointed out, the administration has gone out of its way to betray its manifesto commitment to amending the constitution – and it would have to be the one to initiate the process. In one of his more recent columns, the former Speaker called on the AFC to redeem itself by coercing the government into constitutional reform. The likelihood of that happening, however, appears very remote.
In a column last year, Mr Ramkarran reminded his readers about what promises APNU+AFC had made in 2015. These included separate elections for the presidency and National Assembly, a president being elected by a majority of electors and the prime ministership going to the person who secured the second highest number of votes. There was also a proposal that members of the Cabinet should be subject to approval and dismissal by the National Assembly, and that the immunities of the President should be reduced. The governing party also was of the view when in opposition that Cabinet should comprise members of parties which had secured a minimum of 15% of the votes, and that executive power should be shared between the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Nothing more has been heard of this. The government did set up the Steering Committee for Constitutional Reform under Mr Nigel Hughes to look at the process, but since that committee reported, everything has come to a standstill. Then it invited experts from the United Nations system, a move which was seen by many, including this newspaper, as a delaying exercise.
It then presented in July last year, draft legislation for establishing a Constitutional Reform Consultative Commission and this was referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Constitution Reform. However, nothing has developed.
If different sections of civil society were to agree on certain specific, if limited reforms to the constitution, leaving the more ambitious elements to be dealt with after 2020, and were then to form a pressure group, perhaps the government could be induced to bring a motion in Parliament as a start. Mr Hughes’s committee, for example, recommended a reduction of presidential immunities, as well as excluding the Attorney General from the Cabinet so s/he remained impartial. There were others too.
Our politicians have traditionally been deaf to the people’s arguments and contentions, and they have been behaving so far as if they intend to remain that way. While it is little consolation to the electorate, it may well be that demographics will sooner or later overtake them.
