Dear Editor,
As the nation continues to mull the implications of strengthened economic ties with China, our national government has assured us that we will go into any and all deals eyes wide open. It is important therefore, that we initiate a discourse on the geopolitical interests at play in the Latin America and Caribbean [LAC] region against the backdrop of Sino-Guyanese relations.
At present the paramountcy of the USA in our hemisphere remains indisputable. This reality dates to the USA’s success in the Spanish American War of 1898 and having outcompeted British commercial dominance among the newly independent states of the region in the late 1800’s. More recently during the Cold War the United States sought to defend against perceived and real threats by the Soviet Union to its regional hegemony, employing means that Guyana is neither unfamiliar with or recovered from. Indeed, these tactics have had a lasting impact on perceptions of American intent across the region. To further contextualize the willing turn to China of the region’s governments, I have previously written of the favourable economic conditionalities and non-interference foreign policy mandate that makes China attractive to developing countries.
China is not yet, and some will argue may not ever be, a rival superpower to the United States in the same fashion as the Soviet Union of the last century. This has more to do with an increasingly multipolar world with several great powers filling the space left in the wake of America’s decline, than it does with Chinese capability. China maintains a robust presence in the LAC region predominantly for economic considerations and continues to profess its peaceful intent by citing that unlike the United States, it has no military bases in the region. To be sure, there are long term security and foreign policy objectives being pursued by China in the Americas.
During the tenure of President Xi Jingping, China has looked increasingly outward for markets and to a traditional view it has had of itself in the post-1949 era as a leader amongst the peoples of the Global South. Scholars are now assessing the increased presence of China in the LAC region as a long-term counter measure in response to continued American attempts at dominance in East Asia and its rallying of states against China’s claim on the South China Sea. In addition to the well publicized Sino-American trade war, the Trump administration has doubled down on the Obama-era effort to recalibrate geostrategic focus away from the Middle East and pivot to East Asia in response to China’s rise. From Beijing’s vantage point it has long been encircled by a cadre of pro-American or American leaning states: Japan, South Korea, renegade Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and now Vietnam as well as India. Although not comparable in the LAC region at this time to the USA’s Indo-Pacific strength, China hopes to one day have a reliable group of friends in the Americas. At present this is more for international legitimization, especially in the context of votes within the United Nations.
By choosing to cultivate its regional relationships via the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [CELAC], Union of South American Nations [UNASUR] and the Caribbean Community [CARICOM], China has circumvented the Organization of American States [OAS] and therefore the involvement of the USA. In lieu of a military presence in the region, China has increased military sales to many of the region’s states. Training exercises in jungle warfare with the likes of Colombia and Brazil, joint naval exercises with Argentina, Chinese hospital ships calling at ports across the Caribbean basin, and the participation of China in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, all demonstrate China’s growing capability and regional influence.
Additionally, the One China Policy and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan by the international community is increasingly important to China’s foreign policy objectives. At present 9 of the 17 sovereign states recognizing Taiwan are in the LAC region, 5 of whom are our sister CARICOM states [Belize, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and, St. Vincent and the Grenadines]. This has been exacerbated in recent times by the election of Taiwan’s independence-oriented Pan-Green Coalition of President Tsai Ing-wen. The reversal of the PRC’s moratorium on poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies established during the tenure of the Mainland leaning Pan-Blue Coalition government of 2008-2016 is demonstrable in Latin America with the recent recognition of Beijing over Taipei by Panama in 2017 and the Dominican Republic in 2018. In both cases the states were offered large-scale investments, loans and developmental assistance by the PRC for their recognition switch. Our region is therefore crucial to the long-term Chinese strategy towards the Taiwan question and building rapport in the international community while chipping away at the historic tenets of the USA’s Munroe Doctrine. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative to which our government has pledged support is inarguably the largest undertaking of modern China’s foreign policy and will serve to achieve these security objectives via economic integration.
Why does any of this matter in the context of Sino-Guyanese relations? We should not lose sight of Guyana or the Caribbean’s strategic importance. Guyana and the Caribbean’s friendship on the world stage is not without its value. Going forward Guyana as an emerging regional leader must continue its current attempt to forge consensus within CARICOM, eventually on a collective strategy of relations with the great powers. Despite historic amicability between China and Guyana, each state holds their own interests as paramount and we should be no exception. It can be inferred from recent developments in Sino-Guyanese relations that our incumbent national government holds to the international relations tenet of diplomacy not being conducted in the court of public opinion. While there is merit to this, efforts should be made to engage the public comprehensively on our foreign policy in order to assuage fears of domination that are justifiable given our historic and repeated traumas with imperialism.
Yours faithfully,
Brandon Francis Cheong
