‘Shared governance: the most acceptable solution’

After some of  60 years of ethnic jostling, 45 years of de facto division into separate states, and 30 years of  efforts at finding a solution, the United Nations representative to the 30th anniversary bicommunal meeting of the parties on the 21st June 2019 stated that hope still remains alive for the establishment of a bi-communal  federation for it still is viewed as the ‘most acceptable solution’ across the two communities of Cyprus (https://in-cyprus.com/hope-still-remains-alive-un-diplomat-tells-conference-on-bicommunal-party-meetings/)!

Between 1955 and 1959, the same time that Guyanese were in the process of fighting for independence from the British and there was ethnic strife and suggestions about dividing the country essentially between Indians and Africans, a similar national revolt and ethnic squabble had erupted in Cyprus. In 1960 Cyprus had a population of about 572,696: 442,363 Greeks, 104,333 Turks and 26,000 Armenians, Maronites and others. Therefore, like Guyana, Cyprus is a bicommunal society with 2 relatively large ethnic groups constituting over 80% of the population and ultimately their quarrel resulted in the country being physically divided country between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. What is most interesting is that although the problems in the two countries were similar and required similar solutions, the British recommendations for Guyana were different.

In brief, as elsewhere in the empire around this time, in 1955 The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters began an armed struggle for independence from Britain and for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Having been in the country for centuries, the Greek Cypriots believed it was their natural and historical right to unite the island with Greece. Opposing them was the Turkish Resistance Organisation, which wanted the island partitioned and closer relations with Turkey. Faced with nationalist resistance and internal ethnic conflict, Britain in 1960 established the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state, and recognising its ethnic composition it implemented shared governance (SG) arrangements.

Among other things, under the new constitution the president of the new republic would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot with coequal veto rights, employment in the public service was to be divided 70:30 between the Greeks and the Turks and the Supreme Court was to consist of an equal number of judges from both communities plus an independent judge who was not to be a Greek, Turkish or British. The agreement was supplemented by the Treaty of Guarantee, which forbade secession or union with any state. A Treaty of Alliance allowed two small Greek and Turkish military contingents to be established and the Treaty of Establishment gave Britain sovereignty over two bases on the island.

The above governance structure is conceptually similar to the SG regime that was established some four decades later by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 in Northern Ireland. Indeed, in a speech given to mark the 20th anniversary of that Agreement, President Bill Clinton claimed that ‘The Good Friday Agreement is a work of genius that’s applicable if you care at all about preserving democracy. … The most interesting thing was that by creating a space for the identity and the interests and the values of all the people involved – in a framework which protected democracy … it was a work of surpassing genius!’

Plural society and bicommunal theories were in their infancy in the 1950s and early 1960s, but even if the Guyanese leadership were unfamiliar with such theories, it is obvious that the British colonial bureaucracy that had to manage colonies with varied racial, ethnic and cultural differences was not and recognised the value of SG. The question arise then: why, in a region that contributed to the making of both plural society (MG Smith) and SG (Sir Arthur Lewis) theories, the British did not attempted to establish a SG regime in bicommunal Guyana?

It is possible that they did not think SG appropriate for Guyana but much more likely they did not attempt to adopt it because they had more pressing priorities. It was the era of the containment of communism and the major priority of the West in Guyana was on putting restrictions on the ‘communist’ Cheddi Jagan and his PPP, to avoid the possibility of communism being introduced on the mainland of South America. So instead of shared governance, they introduced a proportional representation (PR) system that enhanced the ethnic support of the People’s National Congress/United Force opposition and brought them to government. With some subsequent tweaking by Forbes Burnham, this PR arrangement has left Guyana in the present constitutional stranglehold.

Britain hoped that what was at the time quite a progressive constitutional arrangement would solve the Cypriot problem for all the important parties signed the independence agreement. But from the inception, the Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the new arrangements. Although they had inhabited the island for centuries, comprised 80% of the population and contributed about 94% percent of the taxes, the new constitution gave the Turkish Cypriots, who comprised 18.3% of the population and contributed only 6% of the taxes, 40% of the land and 30% of the government jobs. Frustrated by the Turkish Cypriots using their veto to block the government, in December 1963, the Greek Cypriot leadership attempted to reform the constitution in its favour by adjusting the ethnic quotas, revoking the vice-presidential veto, etc., and the Turkish representatives left the government. 

In 1963, when bicommunal violence was raging in Guyana, it erupted in Cyprus and eventually, in mid-1974, Turkey invaded in support of the Turkish minority. In February 1975, Turkey declared the area it occupied a “Federated Turkish State;” later this became the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. During the conflict, about 5,000 people lost their lives and 220,000 had to leave their ancestral homes. To this day apart from Turkey, the entire international community only recognises the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus as established by the British in 1960.

As the opening paragraph indicated, a SG regime is still viewed as the most acceptable way forward for Cyprus. A 2015 discussion between the two sides, at which some important agreements were reached, had given room for hope, but by November 2016, the discourse had broken down and even the efforts of the UN Secretary General could not get them back on track.  However, there are some important lessons here for Guyana.

Firstly, any form of governance that is largely supported by only one of the major ethnic groups will result in actual and/or perceived forms of autocracy and civil resistance will follow. Perennial low level confrontations as in Guyana, the physical division of the country between the ethnicities or SG are the only possibilities. Indeed, as this essay indicates, a consensual, shared governance regime is still considered by many the only democratic way to deal with bicommunal societies, but this form of governance is not easy to establish or sustain. Talk about holding governments accountable where one ethnic group is shut out and alienated is useless: indeed, as in the case of Guyana, it is impossible since the other ethnic group will support the regime to the hilt. Coequal forms of governance arrangements are important to mitigate ethnic fears and care must be taken to properly cater for the interests of the major ethnic communities. It was the perception of incompetence and corruption on one side that caused the ‘temporary’ breakup in Northern Ireland and thus talk of SG leading to the institutionalisation of corruption is no more than theoretical speculation. Finally, it would appear that the longer it takes to establish SG partisan interests become entrenched and the more difficult it is to introduce.