Anyone who thought that we had entered a less adversarial phase in relation to Venezuela following the return of the fishing vessels will have to think again. On Wednesday the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying that at approximately 13:20 hrs, two Russian-made Venezuelan army Sukhoi 30 fighter jets overflew the airstrip and community of Eteringbang at a very low altitude of 1500 feet. It went on to say that the jets circled the location once before flying off in an easterly direction.
No one on this side of the Cuyuni will be at all surprised to learn that the Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Relations of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela wasted no time in dispatching a response couched in its customary confrontational language. It said that it “strongly” rejected “the inaccuracies and false accusations contained in the communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana on March 3rd, 2021, with which they seek to manipulate reality to feed a negative matrix against Venezuela in relation to the territorial dispute over the Guayana Esequiba.”
Even if some local citizens could not be bothered to unpick that linguistic tangle, they surely could not have missed the tone of what was said. The Venezuelan statement went on to denounce “sisterly Guyana” for making an unfounded assertion “based on videos published on social networks, without providing the precise and geo-referenced location of the area in question.” Leaving aside the fact that it would really not be necessary for our Foreign Ministry to give co-ordinates for a location that is indisputably sited within Guyana’s boundaries, it is interesting that the release seems to place emphasis on the claim that the authorities here are making things up, rather than insist that Eteringbang falls within Venezuela borders and that on that basis its army has a right to patrol there.
The reason for this emphasis soon becomes apparent. Our western neighbour’s traditional position has always been that it is entitled to all the land west of the Essequibo River. It is worth repeating that this official stance has not varied down the decades, although there have been private discussions with officials here on occasion when Caracas has sought a ‘piece’ in a ‘compromise’ move. But what this latest statement says is: “… since there is a dispute over Guyana Esequiba, none of the Parties can refer to this territory as its own, under its sovereignty and jurisdiction, as provided by Article 5 of the 1966 Geneva Agreement.”
No such thing is set out in Article 5 of the Geneva Agreement, but that is not the point here. To all appearances this is the biggest shift in Venezuelan strategy since 1962. They have not reiterated their claim; they are maintaining that no one owns the land west of the Essequibo because it is in “dispute”. The Venezuelans are no strangers to policy contradictions, of course, and whether this is just a temporary revision is impossible to say.
In an earlier leader column it was suggested that Venezuela was trying to change the reality on the ground with a view to influencing the global narrative on the Essequibo controversy. It looks now as if that view might have some substance, although the objective would not be, as was thought then, to tilt the outside world in favour of our neighbour’s claim, so much as to convince the international media, governments and foreign affairs specialists, etc, that Essequibo really is a region in dispute. One supposes that above all else it has as its aim the persuading of the justices of the ICJ that this is indeed the case. In fact, it is the prospect of a World Court judgement vindicating Guyana that has probably sent Caracas back to the drawing board.
In its release Takuba Lodge had said that the “latest hostility” on the part of Venezuela came closely on the heels of President Nicolás Maduro’s decree establishing a Venezuelan Atlantic Façade territory in Guyana’s land and sea space; the illegal detention of two Guyana fishing vessels; and the resolutions of the Special Commission for the Defence of “Guayana Esequiba” and Territorial Sovereignty which was to convene a special session with the armed forces.
The first ‘hostility’ listed by Takuba Lodge relating to this country’s maritime territory may possibly be on hold, as evidenced by the return of the fishing vessels and the fact that when they were accompanied back to Guyana’s waters by Venezuelan naval vessels, these did not cross the line into our maritime space. It may be, as has also been suggested before, that Mr Maduro decided not to pursue aggressive actions in Guyana’s waters at the present time in order not to aggravate the US in circumstances where he could be hoping for some concession from the Biden administration.
Be that as it may, the most pressing issue for current purposes at any rate, relates to item three, and the Special Commission for the Defence of “Guayana Esequiba” set up in the National Assembly and chaired by Mr Herman Escarrá.
Both the Caracas Chronicles and El Universal had reported that the Commission was meeting senior officers of the army on February 24 to discuss Essequibo. What emerged from that meeting has so far not been publicly circulated. The two news outlets also made reference to a proposal to amend the constitution, so Essequibo would be recognised as part of Venezuela and not a ‘disputed region’, and as if that were not enough, Mr Escarrá was said to have presented 100 recommendations to the representatives for the exercise of sovereignty in Essequibo.
The oddest statement in both reports, however, concerned the plan to move to the territory of ‘Guiana Esequiba’ to hold the sessions and “send a message to the world”. Are they serious? Just how is that to be accomplished except by force? Or is it that they will do this on a boat in Guyana’s maritime zone, or even on the Cuyuni, the middle and lower reaches of which belong to Guyana, although the Venezuelans behave as if it is theirs? Whatever the case, do Mr Escarrá’s 100 proposals involve our maritime territory, or just the land? Even if, for the moment, the decision has been taken not to pursue hostile actions in our sea space, Caracas’s argument would be that since the land is in ‘dispute’, the waters extending from our coast would be as well.
Exactly what Miraflores will sanction in relation to implementing the proposals of the Special Commission, and in particular the recommendations of that Commission in conjunction with the armed forces High Command, remains to be seen. It may depend at least partly on how President Maduro and his advisors read the international situation. There is one thing he will be confident about, and that is that he has the full support of the opposition on this issue, which appears as lazy about familiarising itself with the true facts as does his government.
As things stand, the new phase in Guyana-Venezuela relations, heralded by the seizure of this country’s fishing vessels, is seemingly now being pursued on the land boundary. There have been problems here for a long time with incursions, sindicatos, raids on Guyanese mine operations, river pollution and even shelling, to mention a few. And overflights are nothing new either, as at some periods in the past they have been quite regular. As mentioned above, Guyana is not in control of its own stretch of the Cuyuni which it was awarded in 1899, since Venezuelans often treat Guyanese as trespassers there. The situation is complicated by the fact that miners on this side have traditionally paid bribes to obtain subsidised Venezuelan fuel, since it would be uneconomical to transport it from the coast, in addition to which there is the smuggling of produce from this side to the Venezuelan bank.
Whatever it is the Venezuelans are proposing to do, Guyana needs to be prepared at the political, diplomatic and military level. They cannot do nothing and just depend on strong statements from regional and international bodies, and friendly countries to stop Caracas this time. It might not work, particularly if initially actions are concentrated in the border areas, and even if more intense and threatening than previous episodes, could potentially be categorised as the kind of aggression which has been going on for decades. The government needs to convene councils of all those who have knowledge in the area, and explore ‘what if’ scenarios and how the country should respond to these.
Most of all, the President Irfaan Ali administration must get the nation behind it, and working with the Ministries of Education, Amerindian Affairs and the Department of Public Information, among others, should have a blitz on providing data and explanations to the public so the ordinary man and woman in the street understands what is at stake. Most of all, the President has to reverse his refusal to speak to the opposition on a formal basis, as opposed to utilising the services of individual members where this issue is concerned. On a question affecting our very survival as a nation there can be no argument for the opposition’s exclusion at an official level.
El Universal quoted Mr Escarrá in part as saying, “in no way is Esequibo going to be lost …”
Well of course it isn’t. Because the Venezuelans never had it in the first place.
