Dr Clive Thomas

This week’s column concludes consideration of the sugar industry’s land productivity measure; that is tonnes cane (TC) per hectare (HA) of harvested land.

Culture of losses GuySuCo is a state-owned corporation. Readers already have in their possession firm details of how deeply mired it is in what I have termed “a sea of losses and indebtedness” (annual losses of about $6 billion and outstanding debt of $90 billion in 2013).

Introduction   When evaluating Guysuco’s profitability and/or losses as a performance indicator the conclusion reached was that the corporation has been “mired in a sea of losses and indebtedness since the 2000s.”

From a dynamic perspective, over the medium to long-term the profitability of the sugar industry as a whole, and GuySuCo in particular, is more than any other variable, the best representative indicator of its sustainability as a commercial venture.

In this week’s column I intended to conclude the evaluation of costs as a performance indicator.

I had reported a few weeks ago in this series data comparing the unit cost of sugar production for Caricom producers in 2005.

Last week’s column introduced six performance indicators for the sugar industry, which I will examine in coming weeks: production, costs, profitability, land productivity, factory productivity, and combined (land and factory) productivity, in that order.

Indicators Despite the unavailability of detailed audited GuySuCo accounts after 2009, in the coming weeks I shall focus on six performance indicators (production, costs, profitability, land productivity, factory productivity, and combined (land and factory) productivity) in assessing the sugar industry since 1990.

Before starting an assessment of the key performance indicators for the Guyana sugar industry, two issues need to be addressed.

I had earlier cautioned readers to be sceptical of the widely held view that the European Community’s (EC) denunciation of the Sugar Protocol (SP) in 2009 was “the final nail in the coffin of Guyana and the rest of Caricom’s sugar industry.” 

King Sugar As indicated previously, several analysts view the EC’s legal denunciation of the Sugar Protocol (SP) in 2009 as the “final nail in the coffin of Guyana and the rest of Caricom’s sugar industry.”

Introduction The world sugar prices for the period 1960 to 2013, which I presented last week, were formed in the ‘free market,’ where the sugar bought and sold is not subject to governmental regulation and control.

This week’s column wraps up my presentation on the long-term situation of the global sugar industry, which as I have argued stands in stark contrast to that of Guyana’s.

Examining the last century or so of the industrial life cycle of Guyana’s sugar industry, it is observed that the period up to the late 1960s and early 1970s marked the phase of its maturity.

Introduction   As testimony to the present dire state of Guyana’s sugar industry and its continued importance to the socioeconomic, political, and cultural life of the country, last week I began a third series of columns on this topic in the space of only three years.

Tipping point Alarmed at the crisis state of the sugar industry in 2011, I devoted more than a score of Sunday columns in that year (May 29 to October 16) to its discussion and drew attention to the crying need for radical reform and restructuring.

Introduction Last week I drew readers’ attention to the far more potent threat facing tax evaders and money launderers operating in and through Guyana, than the activities of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its regional counterpart, the Caribbean Financial Task Force (CFATF).

Introduction   If perchance any reader might have had doubts about the serious intent of the United States as it opens a new front against tax evasion and money laundering, under its Foreign Account Tax Compli-ance Act, 2010 (FATCA), he or she should ponder the pointed remarks made by a Senior United States Treasury official (Robert Stark) on September 2013: “Offshore tax evasion is a significant contributor to the tax gap.”

Introduction In my current series of Sunday columns on countering money laundering and the risks of terrorist financing and proliferation I have consistently advanced what I consider to be the fundamental view that the financial crime of tax evasion is the primary driver of money laundering.

Introduction As indicated last week that column was prompted by the seemingly orchestrated public statements by private organizations, steps being taken by the US Treasury against tax evasion in the region as well as diplomatic and other pressures brought to bear on the parliamentary “opposition.”