Introduction Last week’s column briefly reflected on the ongoing transitioning from the present era of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for global development (2010-2015), which expires this year to the upcoming Post-2015 Development Agenda that is presently being forged by the global community.
Introduction So far in this series of columns I have covered the international discussion taking place on steps to secure the recovery of stolen public assets leading up to the recently concluded Third Conference on Financing for Development (FFD), held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia last month.
Embedding Last week’s column concluded discussion of the hypothesis, which states, there is an ongoing paradigm shift in international mechanisms generating financing for development.
Introduction Last week’s column reported on the Third Financing for Development Conference and the positions it took in regard to the recovery of stolen public assets.
Introduction Hypothesis: Paradigm shift The hypothesis that has been under consideration in my July columns thus far, is that international best practices in the area of financing for development are undergoing a paradigm shift, which is partly reflected in mounting global efforts to incorporate “recovery of stolen public assets” (StPAR) as a central feature of domestic resource mobilization, particularly for developing countries.
Introduction The Third International Conference on Financing for Development has just concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 to 16 July.
A background of crisis Last week I indicated that the first international conference on financing for development held in Monterrey, Mexico at the end of 2002 was a precursor to the launching by the United Nations of its global development agenda.
Introduction Last week I put forward the hypothesis that a paradigm shift is underway in international best practice in the area of financing for development.
Introduction As promised, today I continue discussing the topic: financing for development and its linkage to efforts directed at recovering stolen public assets belonging to Guyana.
Introduction Beginning with this brief introduction, in coming weeks I explore the linkage between initiatives to recover stolen public assets in Guyana and financing for its development.
Introduction Today’s column follows-up on 1) my earlier estimation of the value of potentially recoverable stolen public assets and 2) the ticking time-bombs that threaten the survival of sugar and rice.
Introduction Perhaps a window on public sentiment is reflected in the surprising number of persons that responded to last Sunday’s column, which linked the recovery of stolen public assets initiative to not so discreet intimations of destabilization of the sugar and rice industries.
Political economy fragility Today’s column elaborates on organizational elements, briefly portrayed last week, which are needed for establishing Guyana’s stolen public assets recovery initiative.
As part of the series on managing Guyana’s public investment regime, today’s column proposes a mechanism whereby our newly elected government could, at this unique democratic opening, embark on seeking bread (investible resources) and justice for Guyanese whose national wealth has been rapaciously plundered in recent years.
Introduction I was caught completely off-guard at the depth of the consternation and disbelief expressed by quite a few readers who responded to the estimates that I had provided of the amount of money Guyana loses due to three corrupt practices (public procurement fraud; illicit capital flight; and the underground economy) in last week’s column ($313billion or about US$1.5billion).
Shock and dismay Today’s lesson (4) continues identifying the orders of magnitude of corruption-linked economic haemorrhage currently taking place in Guyana.
Introduction After some introductory material, the lessons dealt with so far in this series on the management of Guyana’s public investment regime have concentrated on: 1) the “basic steps” needed to establish an adequately functioning organization of this regime and 2) the types of failures and weaknesses displayed in public projects during the 2000s.
Introduction Today’s column concludes my examination of project failures and weaknesses revealed in public investment management in Guyana during the 2000s.
Introduction Lesson 2 in the present series of SN columns was presented in two parts over successive weeks; the main content of which was summarized in two schedules carried in last week’s column.
As promised, this week’s column provides the second of a two-part lesson on the topic: organizing the management of Guyana’s public investment regime.
Introduction Last week I introduced the first in the present series of lessons explaining Guyana’s public investment management regime.
Introduction Surprisingly, considering what appears to be the public’s main preoccupations today, thus far I have already received an unusual number of queries concerning the notion of “pathological altruism”, which I had introduced in recent columns that discussed the Venezuelan PetroCaribe scheme.
Introduction As I write this concluding column on PetroCaribe, global crude oil prices have resumed their decline.
Introduction Today’s column, along with next week’s will concentrate on 1) an evaluation of the role the PetroCaribe initiative has been playing in the region’s regime of crude oil importation, since its establishment in 2005, and 2) an assessment of the near-to-medium prospects of this initiative, with special reference to Guyana’s membership.
Introduction: Lifeline or noose I shall outline the key details of the Venezuela PetroCaribe initiative in the next section of this column but upfront I wish to categorically assert that Guyana along with other members of this initiative have benefited greatly from it since its establishment in 2005 and for sure right up to the middle of 2014.