Introduction: Catalogue
The catalogue of desirable features energy economists promote for effective PSAs are that 1) ownership of the petroleum wealth should remain within the domain of the country in which it is discovered; 2) the State/Principal should maintain managerial control of this wealth, but 3) the Contractor/Agent (in Guyana’s case Exxon and its Partners) should maintain operational control of contract-assigned petroleum activities.
Introduction
Last Sunday’s column introduced a simple basic ‘Setting’ (as energy analysts label it) or more commonly, analytical framework drawn from energy economics, under which the Guyana 2016 Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) will be appraised in coming columns.
Introduction
From their very inception, oil agreements/contracts have embodied dynamic processes between states, as sovereign owners or guarantors/regulators of rights to a country’s petroleum wealth, and individuals/oil-companies that contract to develop this wealth.
Introduction
Production sharing agreements or contracts (PSAs), have been, from the time of their earliest introduction to the oil and gas sector, subjected to in-depth critical analyses and/or evaluations from economic, legal, and institutional perspectives.
Introduction
At the time of writing this column media reports indicate that a signature bonus of US$18 million has been paid to the Government of Guyana (GoG) by Exxon and its partners.
Introduction
Last week’s column argued that, the best use of Guyana’s oil wealth would be strategic spending on, and through, a dedicated Ministry of Renewable Energy.
Introduction
Last week’s column had raised an outside-the-box consideration, which is that Guyana’s best use of its coming petroleum benefits/revenues might well lie in their utilization as strategic spending on renewable energy.
Decision Rule 3
Last week’s column continued the exploration of Guyana’s natural gas prospects, both “associated with/and not associated with” its recent substantial petroleum finds.
Introduction
Last week’s column had raised the conundrum: What next? Given that, I am advising against state investment in oil refining therefore, what other major options I am recommending for realizing the substantial potential of Guyana’s recent petroleum finds.
Introduction
As matters presently stand, and in order to be precise as well as taking into account the discussion concerning a Guyana state-owned oil refinery has lasted for several weeks (since August 20, 2017) it is perhaps prudent that today’s column starts by summarizing my two recommendations.
Today’s column concludes my discussion of Decision Rule 2, which posits: there is no overall economic justification for a Guyana state-owned oil refinery (of approximately 100,000 barrels/day).
Introduction
Today’s column, and the next, continues to evaluate the feasibility of a Guyana state-owned oil refinery, promoted by many as the leading edge of a local content requirements (LCRs) regime aimed at maximizing downstream domestic value-added in the coming petroleum sector.
Introduction
In last week’s column I sought to recall, for the benefit of readers, several key observations and conclusions that were drawn from my earlier review of refinery economics in order to support Decision Rule 2.
Introduction
Last week’s column focused on reviewing the results of Pedro Haas’ feasibility study for a state-owned oil refinery, sponsored by the Ministry Natural Resources (MoNR).
Introduction
Last week’s column was aimed at walking readers who are unfamiliar with economic feasibility studies, through the PowerPoint presentation by Pedro Haas of Hartree Partners, on the feasibility study for a state-owned Guyana refinery.
Introduction
Today’s column aims at walking readers through the Guyana Refinery Study, presented in a talk by Pedro Haas of Hartree Partners, in May this year.
