Introduction Production sharing agreements or contracts (PSAs), have been, from the time of their earliest introduction to the oil and gas sector, subjected to in-depth critical analyses and/or evaluations from economic, legal, and institutional perspectives.
Introduction At the time of writing this column media reports indicate that a signature bonus of US$18 million has been paid to the Government of Guyana (GoG) by Exxon and its partners.
Introduction Last week’s column welcomed the coming release of Guyana’s petroleum contracts. It also identified that, based on the standard industry classification, there are four principal types of such contracts.
Introduction Last week’s column argued that, the best use of Guyana’s oil wealth would be strategic spending on, and through, a dedicated Ministry of Renewable Energy.
Introduction Last week’s column had raised an outside-the-box consideration, which is that Guyana’s best use of its coming petroleum benefits/revenues might well lie in their utilization as strategic spending on renewable energy.
Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column is designed principally to pronounce on Decision Rule 4.
Decision Rule 3 Last week’s column continued the exploration of Guyana’s natural gas prospects, both “associated with/and not associated with” its recent substantial petroleum finds.
Introduction Last week’s column had raised the conundrum: What next? Given that, I am advising against state investment in oil refining therefore, what other major options I am recommending for realizing the substantial potential of Guyana’s recent petroleum finds.
Introduction As matters presently stand, and in order to be precise as well as taking into account the discussion concerning a Guyana state-owned oil refinery has lasted for several weeks (since August 20, 2017) it is perhaps prudent that today’s column starts by summarizing my two recommendations.
Today’s column concludes my discussion of Decision Rule 2, which posits: there is no overall economic justification for a Guyana state-owned oil refinery (of approximately 100,000 barrels/day).
Introduction Today’s column, and the next, continues to evaluate the feasibility of a Guyana state-owned oil refinery, promoted by many as the leading edge of a local content requirements (LCRs) regime aimed at maximizing downstream domestic value-added in the coming petroleum sector.
Introduction In last week’s column I sought to recall, for the benefit of readers, several key observations and conclusions that were drawn from my earlier review of refinery economics in order to support Decision Rule 2.
Introduction Last week’s column focused on reviewing the results of Pedro Haas’ feasibility study for a state-owned oil refinery, sponsored by the Ministry Natural Resources (MoNR).
Introduction Last week’s column was aimed at walking readers who are unfamiliar with economic feasibility studies, through the PowerPoint presentation by Pedro Haas of Hartree Partners, on the feasibility study for a state-owned Guyana refinery.
Introduction Today’s column aims at walking readers through the Guyana Refinery Study, presented in a talk by Pedro Haas of Hartree Partners, in May this year.
Introduction Last Sunday’s column (September 3) marked one year of uninterrupted weekly articles addressing the topic: ‘Guyana in the coming time of its oil and gas industry, circa 2020’.
Introduction: Proviso It is worth repeating: my two previous columns had sought to make it abundantly clear that if a local oil refinery is established, which is wholly owned, managed and operationalized, either separately, or through a partnership (or some other joint arrangement), involving only 1) foreign investors (whether private, state, or some combination thereof), or 2) domestic private investors, this would be acceptable in my judgement, subject to one important proviso or caveat.
Introduction – Re-cap As posited last week, it is my view that the true essence of an oil refinery that is deemed local, lies in its type (form) of ownership, management, and operationalized control.
Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column initiates a presentation in the coming weeks, of my considered view on the efficacy of Guyana establishing a local oil refinery, in order to exhaust successfully the potential benefits of its recent oil and gas discoveries.
Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column aims to update my earlier (October 2016) assessment of Guyana’s petroleum discovery.
Introduction Today’s column revisits my previous estimate of the likely crude oil price at the time Guyana’s first oil is anticipated to be fully on-stream (2025).
Today’s column concludes the coverage on the economic characteristics of mini-oil refineries, started last week.
Today’s column wraps up the discussion started last week on the general economic characteristics of oil refineries.
Introduction Today’s column addresses several economic factors which are key to the oil refinery business.
Introduction This week’s column and the next will attempt to evaluate the pros and cons of small mini-oil refineries.
Introduction My last column had introduced what is often deemed in the literature as the most fundamental observation related to oil refineries in energy economics.
Introduction Oil and natural gas industry analysts and energy economists repeatedly highlight the basic observation that no two oil refineries are the same; stressing that they are unique in essential ways.
As repeatedly urged, readers need to be familiar with the basic structure/features of global oil refining, if they wish to make informed contributions towards Guyana’s first oil, particularly in view of the fact that a local refinery would likely contribute marginally (0.1 per cent) to global refining capacity.
Introduction If one began with the standard industry description of an oil refinery that was earlier introduced, which is: “an industrial plant or complex that manages hydrocarbon molecules extracted from crude oil, natural gas liquids and national gas” (in the case of Guyana, at the Stabroek bloc Liza wells), that complex could produce an assemblage of different petroleum based products that can potentially reach several thousand.
Introduction Last Sunday’s column introduced several of what I labelled as nuts and bolts matters related to oil refining, of which I believe an informed Guyanese public needs to be aware.
Introduction In concluding last Sunday’s column (May 21), I had indicated that, starting today, I would offer commentary on the topic: establishing a local refinery to process Guyana’s expected production of crude oil, post-2020.
Today’s column starts with an offering of a few concluding comments on the topic considered over recent weeks: local content requirements/policies (LCRs) in the petroleum industry, as Guyana prepares for its own industry, scheduled to come on-stream post-2020.
Introduction My two previous columns (April 30 and May 7) were devoted to, respectively, the main findings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2013, and the World Bank’s 2013 evaluation/research of the lessons to be learned from global experiences with local content requirements/policies (LCRs) in the oil and gas sector.
Introduction Today I provide my penultimate presentation on “lessons to be learned from global experiences with local content requirements (LCRs) for the oil and gas sector”.
Introduction There is a formidable body of literature devoted to economic theorizing on the efficacy of local content requirements (LCRs) policies generally, and in developing countries specifically.
Introduction Today’s column continues the effort to provide for readers’ guidance a response to the burning question: What are the lessons to be learned from oil and gas producing countries that have implemented policies/regimes for local content requirements (LCRs)?
Introduction Last week’s column had indicated that, starting today, I would seek to draw lessons arising from global experiences with national local content requirement (LCR) regimes, which are aimed at maximizing economic benefits derived from the creation of export-oriented oil and gas extraction industries, based on significant domestic resource finds.
Introduction My aim has been in recent columns to lay out carefully the economic rationale in support of the proposition that, if Guyana’s coming oil and gas extraction industry is to play a transformative role in its economic development, then the dynamic integration of whatever economic benefits are derived from the industry into other economic sectors is essential.
Introduction In last week’s discussion of Guyana’s proposed local content requirements (LCRs) policy for its coming oil and gas extraction industry, I had introduced three key concepts, which require further elaboration.
Introduction In my New Year’s Day column this year I had indicated there are three policy priorities which seemingly guide government’s preparations for the development of its impending oil and gas-based extraction sector.
Introduction Today’s column concludes discussion on the institutional aspects of Guyana’s preparations for its coming petroleum industry.
Introduction At the conclusion of last week’s column, I had indicated the intention to wrap up in today’s column my discussion concerning the institutional architecture and governance in preparation for Guyana’s coming gas and oil industry.
Introduction Last week’s column advanced the view that Guyana’s membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a crucial plank in the institutional governance architecture being designed for managing its impending oil and gas extraction industry.
Introduction Today’s article brings to a conclusion the three-part series of columns that have been reviewing Guyana’s proposed membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Today’s column continues the discussion of Guyana’s long declared policy option of seeking membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a cornerstone of its approach to governance of the fast approaching time of oil and gas production and export.
Introduction Last Sunday’s column completed my presentation of ten lessons which I have argued the Guyanese authorities can profitably learn from a studied appraisal of worldwide experiences with oil-based sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) over the past six decades.
This week I propose to conclude for the time being, my portrayal of lessons that can be learnt from worldwide experiences with SWFs over the past six decades.
Today’s column continues the presentation of lessons Guyana can learn from global experiences with oil and gas-based SWFs.
Today’s column attempts to draw lessons from global experiences with Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), operating in the oil and natural gas sector.
Following last week’s discussion of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) as a mechanism for avoiding and/or controlling the triad of crises typically associated with booms in oil and gas export revenues, I describe below the Government of Guyana’s declared intention with regards to its own SWF.