Introduction – Re-cap As posited last week, it is my view that the true essence of an oil refinery that is deemed local, lies in its type (form) of ownership, management, and operationalized control.
Introduction As indicated last week, today’s column initiates a presentation in the coming weeks, of my considered view on the efficacy of Guyana establishing a local oil refinery, in order to exhaust successfully the potential benefits of its recent oil and gas discoveries.
Today’s column wraps up the discussion started last week on the general economic characteristics of oil refineries.
Introduction My last column had introduced what is often deemed in the literature as the most fundamental observation related to oil refineries in energy economics.
Introduction Oil and natural gas industry analysts and energy economists repeatedly highlight the basic observation that no two oil refineries are the same; stressing that they are unique in essential ways.
As repeatedly urged, readers need to be familiar with the basic structure/features of global oil refining, if they wish to make informed contributions towards Guyana’s first oil, particularly in view of the fact that a local refinery would likely contribute marginally (0.1 per cent) to global refining capacity.
Introduction If one began with the standard industry description of an oil refinery that was earlier introduced, which is: “an industrial plant or complex that manages hydrocarbon molecules extracted from crude oil, natural gas liquids and national gas” (in the case of Guyana, at the Stabroek bloc Liza wells), that complex could produce an assemblage of different petroleum based products that can potentially reach several thousand.
Introduction Last Sunday’s column introduced several of what I labelled as nuts and bolts matters related to oil refining, of which I believe an informed Guyanese public needs to be aware.
Introduction In concluding last Sunday’s column (May 21), I had indicated that, starting today, I would offer commentary on the topic: establishing a local refinery to process Guyana’s expected production of crude oil, post-2020.
Today’s column starts with an offering of a few concluding comments on the topic considered over recent weeks: local content requirements/policies (LCRs) in the petroleum industry, as Guyana prepares for its own industry, scheduled to come on-stream post-2020.
Introduction My two previous columns (April 30 and May 7) were devoted to, respectively, the main findings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2013, and the World Bank’s 2013 evaluation/research of the lessons to be learned from global experiences with local content requirements/policies (LCRs) in the oil and gas sector.
Introduction Today I provide my penultimate presentation on “lessons to be learned from global experiences with local content requirements (LCRs) for the oil and gas sector”.
Introduction Today’s column continues the effort to provide for readers’ guidance a response to the burning question: What are the lessons to be learned from oil and gas producing countries that have implemented policies/regimes for local content requirements (LCRs)?
Introduction Last week’s column had indicated that, starting today, I would seek to draw lessons arising from global experiences with national local content requirement (LCR) regimes, which are aimed at maximizing economic benefits derived from the creation of export-oriented oil and gas extraction industries, based on significant domestic resource finds.
Introduction My aim has been in recent columns to lay out carefully the economic rationale in support of the proposition that, if Guyana’s coming oil and gas extraction industry is to play a transformative role in its economic development, then the dynamic integration of whatever economic benefits are derived from the industry into other economic sectors is essential.
Introduction In last week’s discussion of Guyana’s proposed local content requirements (LCRs) policy for its coming oil and gas extraction industry, I had introduced three key concepts, which require further elaboration.
Introduction In my New Year’s Day column this year I had indicated there are three policy priorities which seemingly guide government’s preparations for the development of its impending oil and gas-based extraction sector.
Introduction At the conclusion of last week’s column, I had indicated the intention to wrap up in today’s column my discussion concerning the institutional architecture and governance in preparation for Guyana’s coming gas and oil industry.
Introduction Last week’s column advanced the view that Guyana’s membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a crucial plank in the institutional governance architecture being designed for managing its impending oil and gas extraction industry.
Introduction Today’s article brings to a conclusion the three-part series of columns that have been reviewing Guyana’s proposed membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
Today’s column continues the discussion of Guyana’s long declared policy option of seeking membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a cornerstone of its approach to governance of the fast approaching time of oil and gas production and export.
Introduction Last Sunday’s column completed my presentation of ten lessons which I have argued the Guyanese authorities can profitably learn from a studied appraisal of worldwide experiences with oil-based sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) over the past six decades.
Today’s column continues the presentation of lessons Guyana can learn from global experiences with oil and gas-based SWFs.
Following last week’s discussion of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) as a mechanism for avoiding and/or controlling the triad of crises typically associated with booms in oil and gas export revenues, I describe below the Government of Guyana’s declared intention with regards to its own SWF.
From early colonial times, Guyana’s commodity potential has attracted external investments. And this attraction has remained easily the leading indicator of both Guyana’s growth and development performance as well as its prospects.
Introduction Under Section 31 of the Petroleum Act, official notification was given last month, by ExxonMobil and its partners (Nexen Energy and Hess Corporation), to the Government of Guyana confirming the find (discovery) of commercial quantities of oil and gas in the Stabroek Block.
Introduction Today’s column concludes the discussion on fiscal break-even prices for crude oil, introduced three weeks ago on November 13.
Introduction In this ongoing series discussion of Guyana’s prospect during its coming time of oil and gas production and export (that is circa 2025), I had introduced in last week’s column the notion of the break-even price.
Introduction: Cost-Price Relation Two weeks ago (October 23), this column had introduced as part of the continuing discussion of “Guyana in the coming time of oil and gas production and export”, the notion of the “cost-price relation” that could emerge after production starts.
Introduction Today’s column is primarily aimed at amplifying those references, which were made last week to the dynamic features of Guyana’s ‘potentially massive’ oil and natural gas discovery.
Introduction Based on the medium and long-term outlook of the world’s energy market, today’s column introduces two further policy lessons to guide Guyana’s planning for future oil and gas production and export.
The question I respond to in today’s column is: Does the prevailing world energy outlook offer useful policy lessons for Guyana’s benefit, in anticipation of its oil and gas production coming on stream in the early 2020s?
Introduction Last’s week column identified several key trends on the demand side of the global energy market.