OFCs and tax havens The origins of money-laundering as a global phenomenon are closely tied to the international spread of offshore financial centres (OFCs) and the opportunities these provide for the spread of tax avoidance and evasion; the latter being of course a criminal offence.
Introduction At this point of the ongoing discussion of the money-laundering situation in Guyana, readers would have come to realize that they cannot expect to form an intelligent appreciation of this issue, and as a result the several serious challenges which the country presently faces, without, at the very least, a rudimentary appreciation of the basic contextual issues surrounding this phenomenon.
Introduction This week’s column provides a highly condensed, yet hopefully accurate portrayal of the origins of money laundering, which as we shall observe is a uniquely modern phenomenon.
Introduction In my recent Sunday Stabroek columns I have sought thus far to provide a background for assessing the money laundering situation in Guyana, with specific regard to examining its local, regional, and international regulatory regimes.
Last week the question was tackled: what is money laundering? This week we look at the techniques and circumstances, which give it traction in Guyana and the wider Caricom region.
Introduction The two topics that have dominated national as well as parliamentary debates on Guyana’s political economy in recent months are, namely, the future of the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project and Guyana’s money-laundering legislation in light of its regional and global regulatory obligations.
Conclusion The last topic left to be considered in this rather extended appraisal of the management of Guyana’s public investment programme is its third and fourth phases, namely, project management and implementation and the conduct of ex-post evaluation audits of projects.
Judging by the numerous requests which I have received from readers to comment on the Hydropower Purchase Agreement (PPA) between GPL and Amaila Falls Hydropower Inc (AFH Inc) this seems to be, by far, the public’s most troubling concern about the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP).
Part 6 Last week’s column indicated that the financing arrangements for the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP), envisaged GPL playing a pivotal two-pronged role.
Part 5 In this week’s column and the next I shall wrap up my discussion of the financing arrangements through which the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP) is being executed.
Project finance Last week I had indicated that this week’s column would be devoted to the further elaboration of the financing structure of the Amaila Falls Hydro Project (AFHP).
Last week’s column summarized the geo-technical features of the troubled Amaila Hydropower Project (AHP).
Introduction There has been, surprisingly, very little consistent and sustained official information flows to the public aimed at improving their awareness and understanding of the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP).
Part 1 Introduction Last week’s column completed the discussion of Phase 2 of the management of Guyana’s public investment programme (that is, project selection and sequencing).
Scope This week I shall conclude the discussion on the selection of public projects in Guyana and their sequencing.
This week I continue my discussion of Phase 2 (project selection and sequencing) in managing Guyana’s public investment programme.
Introduction In recent Sunday columns, I have divided Guyana’s public investment management programme into four sequential phases.
Introduction In assessing Guyana’s public investment strategy I have described both the Marriott Hotel project and the presidential spectrum giveaways as “opportunistic rogue investing.” Both activities reveal an abysmal absence of public information, as well as zero opportunities for independent/scrutiny of the methodology employed in their selection.
Introduction Last week’s column argued that because the Marriott project has no discernible origins in the most recent complete and systematic indication of the government’s investment strategy (the 2011-2015 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) it is fair to assess that project as an opportunistic rogue investment.
Revealed public investment strategy Last week’s column identified source documents from which the PPP/C’s public investment strategy might be revealed, thereby providing the basis for an assessment of its management.
Introduction This week I am going to examine the PPP/C’s pubic investment strategy.
Introduction As earlier indicated I intend to merge the ongoing discussion of Guyana’s public investment management into what is, hopefully, a fruitful consideration of the National Budget, 2013.
Introduction: At the end of last week’s column I had indicated that, beginning this week, I would merge my on-going consideration of the decision-making process in regard to Guyana’s public investment projects into a wider discussion of the National Budget 2013.
Introduction In this week’s column I start with a wrap-up of the discussion on uncertainty and risk as applied to government projects and then go on to offer brief comments on the notion: time is money.
Introduction The list of troubled government projects in Guyana is long and getting longer by the day.
Introduction If, as I observed in last week’s column, removing the unrelenting glare of public scrutiny from government spending is a certain recipe for the entrenchment of waste and inefficiency, then one important corollary follows.
Scarcity and choice As a prelude to my intended discussion of the 2013 Annual National Budget after it is presented to the National Assembly later this month, in last week’s column I had started an appraisal of the management of government investment spending in Guyana.
Economic efficiency In last week’s column I concluded the series of columns commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Third World Debt Crisis (TWDC) and addressing the performance of Guyana’s public indebtedness since then.
Part 3 Economic growth As I bring this discussion on Guyana’s public debt behaviour since 2006 to an end, I direct attention to its broader macroeconomic context.
Part 2 Introduction This week I continue the discussion of the burden of Guyana’s public indebtedness since the official introduction of its rebased 2006 price series GDP estimates.
Part 1 Problems of measurement For my remaining columns commemorating the Third World Debt Crisis (TWDC) I shall focus the discussion on Guyana’s public debt situation since 2006.
In this and the next couple of columns to follow, I shall broadly address Guyana’s public debt situation since the eruption of the Third World Debt Crisis (TWDC) in 1982, the year in which Guyana also announced its first default on its public debt obligations.
Global financial meltdown My efforts to draw readers’ attention to the fact that the Third World Debt Crisis, which started 30 years ago in Mexico (and as I noted Guyana also) is alive and well today is by no means intended to diminish the magnitude of today’s sovereign debt problems, which now centre on the First World economies.
Measuring debt burden As I proceed with the discussion of the debt crisis, the first issue that should be clarified is how to determine the burden of public or sovereign indebtedness among countries.
When I began my last series of Sunday columns (September 2, 2012) on the topic ‘Revisiting the political economy of the Guyana sugar industry’, which I concluded last weekend (December 23), I did not anticipate it would take as many as 17 weekly columns for a reappraisal of the industry with recommendations for its reform.
Mature industry Framing the reform of GuySuCo and the sugar industry must necessarily start with an identification of the major dynamics driving both.
Introduction Last week’s column covered the strategic role of maintenance in GuySuCo’s efforts to modernize the sugar industry.
Three policies For much of the period of the 2000s (and indeed for most of the presentation in this series of columns on sugar) attention has been chiefly directed towards the failure of the Skeldon Sugar Modernization Project (SSMP).
Introduction Recently, while examining the archival material in my possession on GuySuCo, I came across three documents which I believe readers would find instructive at this stage of my consideration of the sugar industry.
Introduction In last week’s column I urged the point of view that, the most important performance indicator for GuySuCo during the period of the Turnaround Plan, which has elapsed so far (2009 to the first crop 2012), is its annual sugar production.
Introduction Guyanese are rightfully concerned that all major industries in the economy are performing well.
Introduction Last week’s discussion on sugar in the economy focused on those long-run performance indicators, which would aid an evaluation of the viability of GuySuCo.
Introduction Last week I argued the realisation of sufficient economies of scale for Guyana’s sugar industry to make it globally competitive is unlikely simply because these would not result in a substantial lowering of the long-term average cost of production at output levels of 450,000 tonnes.
Globalisation and Sugar Today’s truly fundamental defining feature of the condition of the Guyana sugar industry (and Guysuco more particularly), is that, several decades ago it became mature, and from all appearances since the 1960s, it has entered a long-run declining phase, as described in classic industrial and firm theories.
Introduction In last week’s column I presented a graph, which illustrated both the downward trend and the wide variations in sugar production for Guyana over the last half-century or so.
Indicator Perhaps the single most revealing performance indicator of the state of Guyana’s sugar industry is to be found in its annual production figures.
Introduction Communications I have received concerning last week’s column have all expressed indignation at the remarks, which were reportedly made by the European Union (EU) Ambassador when speaking about GuySuCo and the Guyana sugar industry.