Guysuco’s Key Challenges – I

Introduction Before considering options for the way forward in the sugar industry, I shall first examine challenges posed by its underperformance as revealed in the behaviour of the standard performance measures since the 1990s as well as last week’s analysis of Guysuco’s predicament.

Turning the spotlight on GuySuCo’s losses

Introduction   When evaluating Guysuco’s profitability and/or losses as a performance indicator the conclusion reached was that the corporation has been “mired in a sea of losses and indebtedness since the 2000s.” The proposition was therefore advanced that its survival as a sustainable commercial venture rests squarely on its ability to earn regular accounting profits.

GuySuCo: Mired in a sea of losses and bailouts

From a dynamic perspective, over the medium to long-term the profitability of the sugar industry as a whole, and GuySuCo in particular, is more than any other variable, the best representative indicator of its sustainability as a commercial venture.

Guyana’s Sugar Industry: Six Key Performance Indicators

Indicators Despite the unavailability of detailed audited GuySuCo accounts after 2009, in the coming weeks I shall focus on six performance indicators (production, costs, profitability, land productivity, factory productivity, and combined (land and factory) productivity) in assessing the sugar industry since 1990.

Guyana: Export markets for sugar

I had earlier cautioned readers to be sceptical of the widely held view that the European Community’s (EC) denunciation of the Sugar Protocol (SP) in 2009 was “the final nail in the coffin of Guyana and the rest of Caricom’s sugar industry.”  I have put forward the alternative interpretation that this event was the proximate occurrence leading to the effective collapse of the region’s traditional sugar industry, and in no way either the sole or principal cause for that collapse.

Caricom: Contrasting responses to the sugar crisis

King Sugar As indicated previously, several analysts view the EC’s legal denunciation of the Sugar Protocol (SP) in 2009 as the “final nail in the coffin of Guyana and the rest of Caricom’s sugar industry.” That event has been held mainly, if not solely responsible for today’s crisis in the region’s sugar industry.

Guyana’s sugar: Its industrial life cycle and collapse

Introduction   As testimony to the present dire state of Guyana’s sugar industry and its continued importance to the socioeconomic, political, and cultural life of the country, last week I began a third series of columns on this topic in the space of only three years.

The Guyana sugar industry: The point of no return

Tipping point Alarmed at the crisis state of the sugar industry in 2011, I devoted more than a score of Sunday columns in that year (May 29 to October 16) to its discussion and drew attention to the crying need for radical reform and restructuring.

From the frying pan into the fire: Money laundering in Guyana and the tightening grip of the US tax evasion regime

Introduction   If perchance any reader might have had doubts about the serious intent of the United States as it opens a new front against tax evasion and money laundering, under its Foreign Account Tax Compli-ance Act, 2010 (FATCA), he or she should ponder the pointed remarks made by a Senior United States Treasury official (Robert Stark) on September 2013: “Offshore tax evasion is a significant contributor to the tax gap.” As a result of this, FATCA is designed: “To establish a process for foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to report information about their US account holders to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).” The IRS has further stated its objective very clearly: “It is to catch tax evaders.” When considered carefully, the implications of this development for Guyana are stunning in the extreme.

Measuring the value of money laundering

Introduction As indicated last week that column was prompted by the seemingly orchestrated public statements by private organizations, steps being taken by the US Treasury against tax evasion in the region as well as diplomatic and other pressures brought to bear on the parliamentary “opposition.” All this supposedly in the expectation that it would accede to the legislative amendments before the Special Select Committee and therefore not pursue “the goal of effective money laundering reform” designed to reduce the economic burden this deep-seated problem heaps on the country.

Guyana money laundering

Conclusion   This week’s column indicates the remaining markers that go along with the strategic guideposts provided earlier for a way forward in dealing with Guyana’s situation in regard to money laundering, the financing of terrorism and proliferation.

Setting the international standards – FATF

Introduction As I continue the series on money laundering and looking back on last week’s column, perhaps the main original contribution so far has been putting forward the thesis that there have been three principal drivers pushing money laundering and related concerns to the level of the massive global threat these now represent.

Money laundering and offshore financial centres

Introduction At this point of the ongoing discussion of the money-laundering situation in Guyana, readers would have come to realize that they cannot expect to form an intelligent appreciation of this issue, and as a result the several serious challenges which the country presently faces, without, at the very least, a rudimentary appreciation of the basic contextual issues surrounding this phenomenon.

The origins of money laundering

Introduction This week’s column provides a highly condensed, yet hopefully accurate portrayal of the origins of money laundering, which as we shall observe is a uniquely modern phenomenon.

Guyana and money laundering: What is money laundering?

Introduction The two topics that have dominated national as well as parliamentary debates on Guyana’s political economy in recent months are, namely, the future of the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project and Guyana’s money-laundering legislation in light of its regional and global regulatory obligations.

The management of the public investment programmes

Conclusion The last topic left to be considered in this rather extended appraisal of the management of Guyana’s public investment programme is its third and fourth phases, namely, project management and implementation and the conduct of ex-post evaluation audits of projects.

GPL and the Amaila Falls Hydropower Purchase Agreement

Judging by the numerous requests which I have received from readers to comment on the Hydropower Purchase Agreement (PPA) between GPL and Amaila Falls Hydropower Inc (AFH Inc) this seems to be, by far, the public’s most troubling concern about the Amaila Falls Hydropower Project (AFHP).