History this week – No 2009/36
Part 5
By Shammane Joseph
This is the fifth instalment in a series of articles which gives a brief overview of the History of the British Guiana railway with particular reference to the Georgetown-Mahaica link. This article will deal with the recommendations by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for the refurbishing of the railways in British Guiana.
Post war development in British Guiana commenced with financial assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945 under which initially $12 million was allocated to British Guiana. The country’s total allocation under the Act was $20.7 million. After the enactment of this legislation, British Guiana was required to prepare a ten-year development plan 1947/56 and a Development Committee of the Legislative Council was appointed to formulate this Plan. The ten-year plan was laid before the Legislative Council in December 1947, and in 1950, it was comprehensively revised. During this period, 1947-1952 government investment for development purposes totalled about $28 million. This amount was distributed broadly under the main heads of expenditure as follows: $l0.3 m. mainly on economic programmes such as agriculture, forestry, transportation, communications, industry and general surveys and research.
In 1953, at the invitation of the Government, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) sent a mission to the country to survey the economy as a whole and to make recommendations on the level and direction of future development, taking into account the internal and external financial resources that were available. The Mission found that British Guiana was a developing economy and that in many fields the degree of progress and development was already high. They agreed generally with the Government’s proposals for continuing development, and suggested a number of new proposals. Over the whole field of development, the Mission recommended an investment programme of $66 million for the five years 1954 to 1958 with emphasis on agriculture, transport and communication.
Major public investments were recommended in the field of agriculture, and of transport and communications; 37% of the development funds was allocated to agriculture and 34% to transport and communications. The expansion and diversification of agricultural production were seen as essential to the further growth of the economy. The proposed transport and communications system was closely linked to agricultural development.
The government accepted the World Bank programme in principle and as a sound basis for future development, but it was considered that a larger programme than the Mission recommended was required. In order to make an immediate start on such an expanded programme, it was decided to draw up an initial programme for the two years 1954/55 which would later be absorbed into a comprehensive long-term programme. Accordingly, a programme was formulated for the expenditure of $44 million during the two years 1954 – 1955. In this development plan, only 30% was spent on transport and communications.
In 1957, there was a change in Government and the programme was reviewed and increased from $91 million to $102 million. Most of the increase was allocated to agriculture which increased from $4 m. to $5 m.
It was stated that with the vexed problem of maintaining the East and West coast railways in terms of the likely changes in the traffic pattern without prejudging the issue, it seemed unlikely that the IBRD conclusions of 1953 would have stood without revision, especially if the price mechanism was intelligently used to encourage the maximum utilization of resources, and not discourage private investment in road transport.
Due to light construction, and poor maintenance throughout their existence, the railways had become an expensive unit in British Guiana’s transport system. The obsolescent equipment caused operating deficits; there were excessive costs of maintenance, and unduly high expenditures for administration and staff. The lines had carried substantial traffic, mostly passengers, some of it in daily peak periods. It was clear that if funds for renewals and modernization were available when the lines were taken over in 1921, the railways would have been made self-supporting. Competition between the two services was not the cause of the condition of the railways, nor did competition from road transport have any serious adverse effect. The problems developed simply through continued financial stringency. A sequence of difficulties during the twenties, the world depression, and the war and its aftermath led unavoidably to neglect in upkeep and maintenance of services. Until 1951, the situation had steadily worsened. Since then a hinted program of rehabilitation had some small effect. The economics recommended by a Ways and Means Committee of the Legislative Council in May 1952 and a new management had succeeded in halting the rising deficit. During that time, two possible ways to achieve solvency were prescribed. One was to bring the railway completely up to efficient standards; the other was to abandon the railway after alternative road transport facilities had been provided. The mission studied both methods and the alternative costs were compared.
It was recommended that both railways have a single-track line, with crossing loops at the stations and further crossing facilities at intermediate plantation sidings. On the East Coast line, the distance between crossing points varied considerably, and this reduced the capacity. One or two additional crossing loops were needed. The West Coast line did not require additional crossing facilities. Increased crossing facilities for the East Coast line cost $150,000. The track consisted of 70 lb. yard rails on hardwood sleepers. This was unusually heavy for the trainloads, which were limited to the maximum 10 tons per axle imposed by the strength of the bridges. A heavy track was required because the lines had no ballast and they were of soft formation. Such construction was sensible when good ballast was unobtainable. Hardwood sleepers of excellent quality were readily available and rails and fastenings were relatively cheap. In spite of its age, there was still a long life in the track, and a sufficient stock of second-hand material from Bermuda was still on site for relaying purposes. After a century of traffic, the formation was stable. Points and crossings were required.
Further, as stone ballast was procurable, it was recommended that a light ballast bed of not more than 6 feet depth was to be laid down on the East Coast main line, omitting the branch lines. This would have reduced maintenance and brought the growth of weeds under better control, and thus help rid the track of stray cattle that were now a menace to safe running. Relaying of track, points and crossings on the East Coast line were estimated to cost $ 350,000.
In addition, on the East Coast line there were over 200 bridges and culverts, On the whole, they were in good condition but a small number needed attention to make up for arrears in maintenance. Repairs to bridges and culverts estimated for the East Coast line was $267,000.
Also, buildings were made of wood, and if kept in repair and given a coat of paint at regular intervals, were indestructible. Small improvements in amenities and some improvements to platforms were needed. The estimated cost of repairs to buildings for the East Coast line was $50,000.
The rolling stock was the critical factor for the efficiency of the railways. Stock consisted of 7 steam locomotives, 2 diesel electric locomotives, petrol tractors, 4 rail cars, 55 passenger carriages (seating capacity 2,951), 87 vans and other coaching vehicles, 344 goods wagons (carrying capacity 2,463 tons), 9 ice vans vehicles (carrying capacity 76 tons) Of these, the following units were in reasonable working condition: 4 steam locomotives, 4 rail cars, 7 petrol rail tractors, powered only for shunting bout, 30 bogie carriages (seating 1,500), 9 vans, about 30 goods wagons (capacity 500 tons), a small number of tank and service vehicles. All the rest of the stocks were scrap value and, if the railways were retained, their repair and maintenance costs were prohibitive.
The mission further suggested that for the five years immediately ahead, it would be wise to schedule only a portion of investment as together with improved operating methods, this would assure the efficient handling of the existing volume of traffic plus a normal annual increase. Careful study indicated at that time that on that basis, the East Coast line programme would have been carried out as follows: 5 diesel electric locomotives cost $400, 000, 3 passenger rail cars and trailers cost $250, 000, 15 bogie passenger coaches cost $430,000, 400 tons capacity in bogie wagons cost $240,000, 600 tons capacity in 4-wheel wagons cost $420,000, 8 vans and other vehicles cost $60,000. The mission did not recommend any abridgement in the programme for the West Coast line. The rolling stock program for the two lines would have thus totalled an estimated $2,268,000.
They stated that due to the present layout of Georgetown, the good sidings, sheds, loading wharves, workshops and general stores were crowded together in a confined space, intersected by public roadways and commercial premises. The operation was cumbersome; there were excessive staff and heavy operating and maintenance costs. The solution was in the removal of the locomotive, carriage, and wagon workshops to railway land available at Kitty. This suggestion appeared feasible and simplified the planning of the railway connection with the new wharf that was recommended. There would have been a relief from the congestion on the present site which would have resulted in appreciable savings in operating costs. The removal of the workshops, their re-building at Kitty, and the inclusion of a permanent way workshop, sidings, staff quarters, office accommodation and the remodelling of the track layout of the present site, were estimated to cost $300,000.
