Dear Editor,
The recent announcement by government of a new intelligence organisation to be named the Central Intelligence Agency has proven a contentious issue. From time immemorial societies were preoccupied with various forms of security, and thus in modern times, governments and civil society have found it prudent to place primacy on intelligence, it being a fundamental component of contemporary security management.
Historically, the subject of national intelligence management evoked notions of suspicion and ire, given the often clandestine and despotic manner in which a country’s intelligence operations are sometimes carried out. There were, for instance, the justifiable fears of the Germans after Adolf Hitler, and the Chileans after Augusto Pinochet. In the Caribbean, one could argue that several territories have contributed to the statistics on intelligence abuse.
Intelligence in all its forms has become the first line of defence in a country’s national security; as well as its domestic and foreign policy formulation. Even in corporate life, timely and accurate intelligence, allows policy-makers to execute corporate strategies decisively, and thus reduce the margin of error. In public and diplomatic affairs, intelligence allows advocates of the state to prosecute national interests based on prior knowledge and analysis.
A country’s national intelligence model (NIM) is more often influenced by, and a reflection of, its political maturity, among other things, as seen in its political culture. In addition, the prevailing socio-economic conditions, geography and domestic security requirements greatly influence a country’s choice of intelligence model and the subsequent manner in which the process is executed.
Critical to any discourse on national intelligence models is the thorny subject of management coordination and appropriate oversight, whether public or legislative. The absence of proper coordination often leads to serious intelligence breaches, while the lack of robust oversight mechanisms provides latitude for the abuse of intelligence resources, and the commission of fundamental human rights violations by intelligence organisations, which, from all indications, seem the bone of contention in Guyana’s context.
Though I have not been made privy to the consultations which preceded the selection process of a suitable model to replace what exists, I am sure that the choice of location has led to the conclusion that it is the government’s intention to micro-manage the intelligence process, thereby setting the stage for the capricious manipulation of an otherwise vital organ of the state. That could indeed allow the government to leverage its control throughout the intelligence process.
Notwithstanding this, the government’s actions in this regard should not be construed as being motivated purely by dictatorial considerations, as many countries have single national intelligence organizations, which coordinate intelligence functions and report to various subject ministers, namely, home affairs and national security, and in some cases, the prime minister or president.
It is to be noted too, that while the intelligence functions of many developed countries are more transparent, they too commit serious violations of privacy and even human rights abuses. However, given their economic wealth and lobbying strength, many developed countries are often capable of influencing favourable reports in the international media, while concealing the misconduct of their intelligence organizations.
Yours faithfully,
Clairmont Featherstone
