Collective responsibility of the cabinet

Dear Editor,

I read with interest Dr Henry Jeffrey’s article ‘Future Notes’ in your issue of Wednesday November 2, 2011, in which he expressed his views on the doctrine of the collective responsibility of the government and what is expected of those members of the cabinet who may not agree with the decision of the majority of the members of the cabinet.

I wish therefore to take the opportunity provided by your column to make a contribution to the topic of collective responsibility discussed by Dr Jeffrey.  As a member representing the Caribbean Community (Caricom) on the Common-wealth Team assembled by the Common-wealth Secretary-General Sir Shridath Ramphal, to assist in the drafting of the Constitution for Namibia as a sovereign state and prospective member of the Commonwealth, the doctrine of collective responsibility of members of the cabinet was an issue to be determined.  Some members of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) delegation held the view that, having regard to the sacrifices made by them in the armed struggle for the eventual freedom of the territory and the emergence of the sovereign state of Namibia, they should not be penalised for the faults of other colleague ministers and, therefore, procedures should be established to deal with defaulting ministers. The constitution adopted finally for Namibia provides in Article 39 that the president shall be obliged to terminate the appointment of any member of the cabinet if the National Assembly, by a majority of all members, resolves that the Assembly has no confidence in that member of the cabinet.

I have since that time been reconsidering that constitutional provision.  Does Article 39 preclude the traditional prerogative of the head of the government, in his or her discretion, to remove a minister from office?  Also, if the motion to dismiss the minister is tabled by the leader of the opposition in the Assembly it is not likely to succeed, unless the decision is to be taken on a ‘free’ vote of members of the Assembly with the possibility of the motion being affirmed.

An interesting feature of the Constitution of Namibia is the abolition of the death penalty by the constitution itself.  The SWAPO delegation could not be persuaded by the Commonwealth Team that the death penalty could be abolished instead by parliamentary enactment at a later date.  The SWAPO delegation was firm in its resolve that the death penalty should be abolished by the constitution itself – the supreme law.  Members of the SWAPO delegation represented that many of their comrades in the struggle for freedom had suffered the death penalty under the South African regime and therefore the constitution itself ushering in the new state must abolish the death penalty.  The representations of the SWAPO delegation prevailed.

I thought that this intervention on my part might be of interest to your readers following Dr Jeffrey’s contribution on the matter.

Yours faithfully,
Brynmor T I Pollard