Introduction
Today’s column concludes my examination of project failures and weaknesses revealed in public investment management in Guyana during the 2000s. Last week’s column had introduced a distinction between project failures and weaknesses seemingly specific to Guyana’s unique legal and institutional environment on the one hand, and on the other, ones found worldwide. In practice, however, both types occur in Guyana’s prevailing investment environment and would naturally reflect this. Last week’s column focused solely on the “Guyana-specific” project defects manifest in NICIL’s operations and what I classified as “opportunistic government projects”.
Similar to last week’s column, today’s does not detail all applicable observations. It is selective, but hopefully adequately representative of the factual situation. Furthermore, while the present column is focused on “universal-type” project defects, where Guyana’s investment environment affects any of them it is indicated.
1: Cost Overruns
Project cost overruns constitute, I believe, the most recognized project defect worldwide. This is true also for Guyana. The project management literature describes cost overruns as unanticipated or unexpected changes in project costs incurred during completion of its works and undertakings, which exceed the
