Last week we looked at the definition of consent in Guyana’s Sexual Offences Act 2010. We noted some key terms in that definition: competent”, “informed consent”, and “freely given agreement”. We also examined what these terms meant, and their role in determining whether “true consent” is given to sexual activity, including sexual intercourse. Importantly, we saw how the use of fear, force, or fraud can negate or cancel consent given in those circumstances, and we looked at cases in which fear, force, or fraud were used to get consent to sexual activity, and how courts are likely to approach such situations. We also learned that any action which induces sexual activity by fraud or threats other than threats of force, or other intimidation may be enough to cancel consent given under those circumstances.
As promised, today we will examine statutory evidential and conclusive presumptions the law makes regarding consent. Like the definition of consent, these presumptions are found in the Sexual Offences Act 2010, and it may be interesting to know that many of these statutory presumptions are inspired by previous court decisions.
