Guyana is a politically abnormal country and any attempt to analyse or administer it using only the normal tools/institutions of international political life is doomed to failure! As the failures have stacked up during the various political regimes, the political elite have become more cunning rather than clever. Instead of seeking solutions to properly manage this distinctiveness, all kinds of machinations are concocted to tell the masses that great progress is being made when all anyone needs to do to see through such claims is glance at the drains in front of their houses. The fact that notwithstanding the deprivation that is literally right under our noses, so many people are still willing to stick with essentially the same traditional political elites is the most visible demonstration of our unfortunate uniqueness.
The negative results of our distinctiveness are so all-encompassing that they are being experienced in the most unlikely places. Only a few weeks ago, our president and his Venezuelan counterpart were most effusive in explaining the border controversy as a colonial legacy that is best forgotten. Yet the Venezuelans have since come into our waters and unceremoniously stymied an operation upon which we had placed substantial developmental hopes. The outcome of this event is so uncertain that at best the operation will be blocked for some considerable time.
Of course, the broad brush of colonial legacy simply camouflages what is arguably the most significant strategic blunder in our history: the behaviour of the PPP that convinced international capital and the United States in particular that it intended to introduce communism in Guyana. It was not simply the fear that the PPP would introduce communism that was the problem, it was our uniqueness, namely the fact that the PPP would have introduced communism in an ethnic context that would have made its democratic removal extremely difficult, if not impossible. When the time comes for apologies I do hope that the PPP will remember this albatross it has left around our necks!
In an effort to help to sensibly manage our debilitating abnormality, I have over the years, repeatedly argued that Guyana is not simply a multi-ethnic society in which shifting group allegiances determine who will form the ruling coalition, but is in that category of countries, which includes Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Cyprus, Czechos1ovakia, Fiji, Guyana, Israel, Sri Lanka and the sub-national unit of Northern Ireland, known as bicommunal and which are more politically rigid. David E Schmitt tells us that bicommunalism “…. refers to societies where two principal groups, ordinarily comprising at least three-quarters of the population, exhibit significant social separation. In most bicommunal societies the two main groups typically comprise a higher percentage of the population, but the possible impact of social dualism upon political processes may make it useful to include societies with slightly lower percentages”(1991- “Problems of Accommodation in Bicommunal Societies,” Conflict Quarterly). In these kinds of societies ethnic conflict is even rifer and if we are to raise ourselves out of the pitiful state in which we are at present immersed, we have to urgently find ways to deal with this condition.
Last week I concluded with the contention that both a campaign to win over other ethnic groups and elite co-operation were posited by Burnham as two distinct but possibly interrelated approaches for achieving national/class unity. I also promised to this week put the case for a combination of these two approaches.
In claiming that Sir Arthur Lewis invented the power sharing model, Arend Lijphart(2008 – “Thinking About Democracy,” Routledge) said he did so logically “by trying to think what would be the logical solution to the problems of West Africa.” Burnham was nothing if not logical and given that he had to manage an ethnically divided society, it is not surprising that he happened upon the essentials of the two schools of thought that Steven L. Burg”(Steven L. Burg -1997 – “Preventing Ethnic Conflict: Macedonia and The Pluralist Paradigm,” Wilson Center) told us now dominate the academic literature on preventing ethnic conflict: the pluralist and power-sharing approaches.
Most briefly, according to Burg: “Rather than looking to political elites for solutions, the pluralist paradigm suggests that incentives for cooperation can be found in society itself, in interests that intersect with and moderate the appeal of ethnic identities. This is the essence of the “crosscutting cleavages” hypothesis widely cited in political science.” Power-sharing regimes tend to perpetuate any deficiencies in intergroup understanding that may exist because structural ethnic segmentation blocks intergroup communications. Burg supports this pluralist position but is suggesting an exclusiveness between the two models that need not exist.
Thus, Donald Horowitz, a renowned proponent of power-sharing, provided the following five techniques to facilitate ethnic conflict reduction in divided societies which appear to include those suggested by Burg ( 1985- “Ethnic Groups in Conflict,” University of California Press). He argued that interethnic conflict may be reduced by the geographic devolution of power and that arrangements to induce intra-ethnic conflicts could also be helpful. According to him “If intra-ethnic conflict becomes more salient, this may reduce the energy available for conflict with other groups.” Policies that create incentives for interethnic cooperation are also useful as are those that encourage cooperation based on interest other than ethnicity. Finally, ethnic conflict may be reduced by efforts that foster equitability and lead to the decline of dissatisfaction. “This mechanism cuts deeper than most of the other(s)… takes longer, though of course in the end the deep cut may produce the more enduring result.”
But Horowitz also argued that theories of power-sharing assume that “efforts to contain conflict must begin at the top: “… the agreement of group leaders is an important step towards accommodation, especially because the habits, sentiments, and loyalties of followers are difficult to alter in the short run.” Though he severely belittled the power-sharing approach, even Burg had to admit that “Some practices associated with the power-sharing paradigm may be useful as short-term preventive techniques. But in the longer-term … the creation of conditions that encourage cooperative action across ethnic cleavages on the social level, holds the greatest promise for moderating intergroup tensions and preventing conflict.”
These are very complicated issues but all parties agree that societies such as ours need special attention if they are to make sensible progress. Most of us wish that the time would come when people will vote on issues rather than race and the need for special arrangements to facilitate participation and regime turnover would become unnecessary. But national ethnic cooperation must exist if the cross-cutting themes are to be given a chance to develop, and this will not happen if the national political elites initially fail to cooperate.
