Some reforms to think about

‘The consensual principle of democracy is in several ways the opposite to the majoritarian vision and emphasizes that the political institutions should encourage, in the extreme, mandate the inclusion of as many political per spectives as possible. Accordingly, democracy is improved in the consensual sense if it makes it easier for small groups to be represented in the political system and make their voices heard, and that require the national head of government to share power with other political actors and bodies. This also reflects the ideal that responsiveness is accomplished when each interest can   have its own party represented. Consensual democracy therefore emphasizes proportional electoral laws making large party systems possible, having two (or more) legislative chambers, forming oversized multiparty cabinets, sepa                       rating national and sub-national political units (federalism), constitutional provisions of supermajorities, strong judicial review, among other attributes’ (Varieties of Democracies (V-Dem, 2017) ‘Comparisons and Contrasts with Other Measurement Projects’)

Given the concerns I expressed last week (SN: 15/04/2020), the above vision expresses the system of governance I promised to deliver this week that I believe is most appropriate for Guyana at this point. The present crisis allows us to maintain the status quo, descend to something worse or rise to something better. Along the road, there will be opportunists, racists and reactionaries – some not even realising that they are – on all sides pointing to the negatives rather than the positives of what could result from efforts to change. While we must be prepared to make adjustments before, during and after the process, where would we be if our fore-parents had adopted such a negative approach – indeed where would mankind be if they had allowed the fear of negative possibilities to prevent them from aspiring and endeavouring to live better lives?

In Guyana, the wishes of the two large ethnic groups are mediated by their ethnic oligarchies that for decades have been pulling them from pillar to post. As such, a meaningful collective political opinion does not exist and so a people do not exist to sustain majoritarian democratic representative government. The central organising principle of what follows – and was presented by A New and United Guyana during the last elections – is the acceptance of this duality in Guyana and the creation of mechanisms similar to those that exist in every democratic state from the USA to Switzerland in which such divisions are geographically or ethnically sufficiently expressed. 

I present below only the basic framework of executive government because I believe that it is where the rubber hits the road with the majority of people. But the proposal is intended to be comprehensive and will be best expressed in a holistic system of constitutional reforms. The reader may find others, but I conceive of the following interrelated areas in which reforms will be required at the legislature, judicial and executive and public service levels:  collective responsibility; separation of powers; prorogation; term limits for parliament and the presidency; the budgetary processes; the nature, power and status of parliamentarians; a direct constituency representative electoral system, cross ethnic voting; super majorities and referenda; vetoes to protect ethnic interests; subsidiarity or strong devolution to regions and local authorities; encouraging intra-ethnic party formation; communalism; recognising ethnic groups both geographically and culturally;  political party financing; legally binding manifesto promises; appointments to the top of the judiciary; a single judge constitutional court; government’s capacity to increase its own emoluments; post elections coalitions; closed parliamentary top-up lists; political party reorganization; general and party primaries; presidential immunities; the elections commission and elections financing; civil society participation. 

A proposed government for Guyana: (existing ministries are reconfigured)

Notes:

(i) The individual presidency is abolished and one consisting of 5 persons (in the orange circle) is established as the chief executive authority of Guyana for a 5 year term.

(ii) The 5 members will be nominated by the  three largest political parties with seats in  the National  Assembly.

(iii) The members of the  Presidency shall be qualified to be but  shall not be MPs and  shall be approved by the National Assembly by a supermajority.

(iv) The two main parties will nominate 2 members each and the third largest party1 member.

(v)  Parties will be compelled to include one woman and one youth (the woman or man under 35) as their nominee(s).

(vi) A nominee for the Presidency may only be rejected by a super-majority of the National Assembly.

(vii)  If a nominee is rejected, the party nominating the rejected member shall be entitled to nominate another member.

(viii) The Presidency shall also be the cabinet of Guyana whose 5 members will be ministers in charge of ministries.

(ix)  These 5 persons shall rotate annually as the President of Guyana with no party  serving consecutive terms and the minister serving as president will be provided with added managerial support from permanent presidential secretariat. 

(x) The members of the Presidency shall be collectively responsible for all decisions of the government the vast majority of which will be made by a simple majority except on constitutionally defined occasions – e.g., where 60% of those who will be affected are of a single ethnicity – when consensus will be   required. 

(xi) The National Assembly shall, as is normal, have oversight of the government. 

Some explanations.

1. The suggested approach destroys what is most pernicious about the current system, which is the capacity of one party to win the government and act unilaterally. In the proposed arrangement for example, the PPP would have been unable to unilaterally determine where Africans wanted to place the 1823 monument and the 7,000 sugar workers would not have been disposed of so unilaterally. 

2.The suggested approach also destroys the capacity of a single president to over time accumulate power and entrench her/himself. Thus it seriously removes concerns about the powers of the president.

3. The separation of powers becomes more than theoretical as MP will not be ministers and  one need not be associated with a political party to be nominated to the Presidency. Hopefully over time, as in the United States, these factors and others (e.g. direct constituency representation) will facilitate the independence of parliament from government and thus improve national and local accountability. 

4. Collective responsibility will aid decision-making, cohesion and management for it will mean that no member of the Presidency will be able to publicly criticise decisions or disclaim responsibility for outcomes without first resigning.

5. More importantly, since it would be difficult for Africans to blame the Indian government and vice versa, the development of a united public opinion, so essential to political accountability and national formation, is made possible.

6. If no third party is represented in the National Assembly, that with the largest number of votes could be allowed to nominate the 5th member of the Presidency to encourage small party representation. 

7. The concern about youth and gender participation in the highest level of government is squelched when each party will have to nominate one woman and one youth to the Presidency. I believe that given the makeup of our electorate at this stage, electoral politics will also force the parties to nominate other ethnic groups.

8. Ratification by a super majority (say 60%) is necessary to prevent a majority party being able to object to the candidates of other parties. Furthermore, extreme ethnic entrepreneurs,  on both sides, are likely to face objections: forcing those aspiring to the Presidency to act more responsibly, particularly when campaigning.

9. All countries have different traditions and strengths but that does not mean we need to reinvent the wheel. If 7 ministers can manage a country such as Switzerland with 8.6m people why does Guyana need 27 ministers? Forbes Burnham had vice-presidents who were supposed to coordinate groups of ministries and now, absurdly, we have vice-presidents and pay them more merely for prestige purposes. Combining membership of  the Presidency and a ministerial portfolio is not onerous when one considers that the main job of ministers is not to micro manage but make and monitor policy and represent the sector nationally and internationally.

Conclusion

I have said before that constitutional reforms require expert advice. I am no expert but I feel certain that the removal of the present winner-takes-all political system is a sine qua non for good living in Guyana. I merely present here some reforms for us to think about, for if nothing else, the present crisis demonstrates the unacceptability and thus impracticality of the present arrangement and the latter should be immediately removed.  

henryjeffrey@yahoo.com