President Irfaan Ali has in common with Opposition Leader Joseph Harmon the fact that he holds his present position as a result of an extremely non-transparent process with which substantial sections of his party apparatchiks were uncomfortable. The PPP’s adherence to that Marxist/Leninist nonsense called democratic centralism, which in practice entails central control and little democracy, gives that party’s leader the opportunity to do precisely as he pleases. Mr. Harmon has been the beneficiary of a process that is so arcane it defies description. In 2011 the PNC adopted an American-type primary process to choose its leadership and my enthusiasm that this portended a new day and should be encouraged, caused me to state that, ‘Multiple electoral defeats, internal convulsions and external criticisms have transformed the People’s National Congress Reform (PNCR) into the most democratic political party in Guyana’ (KN: 10/02/2011). But from the very inception, reversion to the old autocratic oligarchic way took place: Mr. David Granger’s election to the leadership position was marred by complaints of elections fraud and that was the first and last primary held by the PNC!
Political parties are archetypical oligarchies in which small elite groups perpetuate themselves in office. The existence of strong independent federal party structures, intra-party opposition and primary type arrangements to choose the top party and national representatives are ways to mitigate the power of the oligarchies. But these are usually systematically weakened by the party leaderships who accuse internal oppositions of factionalism, disloyalty, being agents of the other side etc. Also, given the ethnic nature of societies such as Guyana, it is amazing how easily oligarchies are allowed to accrue more power to themselves! The leaderships of the two large ethnic parties came together and made it impossible for a Member of Parliament to cross the floor and after the recent no-confidence motion to great applause, and pointing to the existence of such rules in India and Colombia, the PNC promised to make it impossible for MPs to even vote against their side of the House. It would be a relative safe bet that as memory fades the PPP will join it in its quest!
Add to these in many important respects, the activities of political parties and politicians are legally viewed as private activities outside of the reach of the law. For example, for a multitude of reasons attempts to make elections promises justiciable have not been successful. ‘As has been made evident, it would be impossible to make politicians legally accountable for their election promises, due to the fact that the separation of powers and Dicey’s first rule of law forbid it. … The separation of powers has been a part of governmental and legal systems for hundreds of years because it is a remedy to counter the abuse of power by those who have it. If society is to maintain order, it must be adhered to under all circumstances. … Undoubtedly, it would be detrimental to society to have an unelected and unrepresentative judicial system restricting the power of a democratically elected and representative government. … Ultimately, it seems as though the remedies against politicians who break promises are the common ones we all know -vote against them, or mount a campaign against them’ (http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1160/should-politicians-be-legally-accountable-for-their-election-promises).
Given the ideological status quo and Guyana’s divisive ethnic context, it appears to me that improvements in democratic participation in general rest in strengthening the internal democratic procedures to which political parties must adhere. The regulations of the German Democratic Republic were originally enacted after the war to convince the world that it had relinquished fascism in favour of liberal democracy and are considered to be among the most progressive. I have made examples of the snippets below.
The German constitution recognises that political parties are important in democratic society and as such need to ‘specify their aims in political programmes’. Unlike the position taken by the PNC above, article 21 states that ‘The deputies are representatives of the whole People. They are subject to only their conscience and are not bound by instructions (https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Germany_1919.pdf?lang=en). And according to German Political Parties Act of 1967 (amended 2009) (the Act) ‘Nomination of candidates for elections to parliaments must be by secret ballot. The nomination procedure shall be regulated by the electoral laws and by the statutes of the political parties.’ Of course, as elsewhere, German parties do recommend how their representatives should vote.
I have indicated above that a strong federal/regional organisation militates against oligarchic control and the Act pays much attention to membership participation and rights. For example, section 7 states ‘Political parties shall be organized in regional and/or local branches. The size and level of regional/local branches shall be laid down in the party’s statutes. Such territorial subdivisions must be extensive enough to allow individual members to participate, on an adequate scale, in the party’s policy and decision-making processes.’ It goes on to note that members’ and delegates’ assemblies are the supreme body of the respective regional/local branches. ‘Other party functionaries may be members … but in this case the number of those who are entitled to vote must not exceed one-fifth of the total number of assembly members as provided under the statutes. Furthermore, unlike the secrecy that dog party financing in Guyana the Act dictates that at national and regional levels, ‘The party convention shall, at least every two years, receive a progress report from the Executive Committee and shall pass a resolution on it. Before the report is submitted, its financial part shall be reviewed by auditors elected by the party convention.’
The party may refuse individual membership, but according to section 10 of the Act a member may be expelled only if s/he deliberately violates the party principles or rules that inflict serious damage on the party. However, the ‘Decisions on expulsion from the party shall be made by the arbitration tribunal defined as competent in the rules on arbitration procedures. The right of appeal to a higher arbitration tribunal shall be guaranteed. The reasons for the tribunals’ decisions shall be stated in writing.’
Most importantly, quarrels, even over whether or not party policies are being implemented, are adjudicated by independent arbitration tribunals chosen equally by the contesting sides. According to section 14 of the Act, tribunals ‘shall be set up at least at the level of the party itself and of the top-level regional branches to settle, and decide on, disputes between the party or a regional/local branch, on the one hand, and individual members, on the other, as well as disputes over the interpretation and implementation of the statutes. … The members of the arbitration tribunals shall be elected for a maximum of four years. They must not be members of the Executive Committee of either the party or any of its regional/local branches; nor be employed by the party or any of its branches; nor receive regular income from them. They shall be independent and not be bound by instructions. … The statutes may allow the parties to the dispute, either in general or on a case-by-case basis, to nominate equal numbers of assessors to the arbitration tribunals. The functions of such arbitration tribunals shall be governed by rules on arbitration procedures designed to guarantee litigants a legal hearing, fair proceedings and the possibility to reject any member of the arbitration tribunal for partiality until the arbitration tribunal has reached a decision.’
Of course, as I have argued in relation to the stability of the German economy, having proper rules and competent institutions in place is not enough: ‘the magic ingredient – the real power that defends the rules’ is the existence of a critical mass of citizens who understand that the rules must be kept and are willing to use what authority they have to ensure that they are kept’ (Future Notes: SN: 08/05/2019). Rules there must be but in establishing them one must be aware that Guyana is too ethnically divided to have that critical mass of committed citizens, and thus the outcome is likely to be suboptimal.
