In the previous column I explained that these articles on Forbes Burnham are from a talk I gave to a PNCR confab on his contemporary relevance and are grounded in my wish to find a political narrative, devoid of excessive bias that could contribute to Guyana’s elusive struggle for national unity. I argued that communist expansionism was against western interests and the West sought to determine that Guyana did not take that path. I concluded where the PNC took government alone in 1968 and in 1970 declared Guyana a Cooperative republic. With independence and the West somewhat out of the way giving Burnham some policy space, he immediately developed and sought to implement his own national priorities based upon his ambitions, experiences, assessment of his context and the resources at his disposal.
Two days before Guyana’s independence on the 26th May 1966 John Chamberlain wrote that Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt and one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), had advised Fidel Castro that he should ‘play both ends (West and East) against the middle’ to win Western support. However, while Castro was unable to do so because he was already too committed to communism, Chamberlain believed that Burnham was not so committed, and right up to about 1980 he played the East/West hand quite adroitly. (https://news.google.com/newspapers? nid= 1979&dat=19660524 &id=w YwiAAAAIBAJ&sjid =BaoFAAAAIBAJ&pg=990,4924914).
In the early period of decolonialization, for many of the leaders of the newly independent states – including Cheddi Jagan – political independence was a first step. ‘The achievement of economic independence’, Burnham claimed, ‘is yet another goal of our society. The necessity therefore arises for changes in the ownership structure of the economy without which the process of economic development would be meaningless’ (Tyrone Ferguson – 1999 – ‘To Survive Sensibly or To Court Heroic Death’ Georgetown). Nationalization and co-operatives were to be the main instruments of economic liberation and the objectives set out for the Guyana National Service that was established in 1973, are good examples of Burnham’s nationalistic worldview.
All Guyanese were to acquire the knowledge and experience for opening up, developing and living on the rich lands available in our hinterland and the following were to be done: mobilise and motivate support for our thrust to ‘Feed, Clothe and House’ ourselves; develop the necessary skills and attitudes which go with and into nation building and national development; transform individuals geared for depending upon external aid, into self-reliant and productive citizens; encourage the physical and mental discipline necessary for satisfactory and satisfying development, and ensure cohesion and unity between the various ethnic, religious, social and economic groups in Guyana. [Guyana National Service State Paper, 1973.]
Tyrone Ferguson claimed that ‘With regards to its external relations, the critical urgency for the newly independent Guyana was the management of its relations with the bordering countries – Venezuela and Suriname. Both countries laid claims to significant portions of the territorial patrimony.’ Cheddi Jagan suggested that ‘The border issue was to be used as a possible means of intervention in an independent Guyana with a PPP Government.’ To deal with this critical issue and others, Guyana’s foreign policy had as its main elements Caribbean integration, non-alignment, South-South co-operation, and involvement in the campaign for a New International Economic Order (NlEO).
Burnham’s contribution to the development of Caribbean integration is not in question, and in relation to non-alignment and South-South cooperation, Guyana was very active. ‘We shall be no man’s satellite; we shall be no man’s slave’ Burnham declared. ‘We shall be friends of our friends not the tools of those who would call themselves friends… It is my conviction that Guyana as part of the Caribbean has a contribution to make to the world, …The tale of how a small nation can act independently without making itself a participant in the Cold War’ (Ibid). In 1974 Guyana played a major part in the North-South dialogue in which the United Nations accepted that the South had the right to nationalize foreign companies; create international commodity cartels; regulate multinational corporations; seek equitable international trade; non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preference; technology transfer and technical assistance. When this is added to Burnham’s contribution to African liberation, Tanzania President Julius Nyerere’s assessment rings true: ‘The Co-operative Republic of Guyana is renowned to our people as this small nation has publicly identified itself with the progressive and liberation movements of the world’ (https://www.guyanaembassy-kuwait.com/forbes-burnham-legacy-in-non-aligned-movement/).
However, Festus Brotherson JR, a former close associate of the PNC, was later to claim that ‘This image of Guyana as a well-intentioned, principled loyalist of the NAM cause, made to suffer for its loyalty, is a flawed one. The country’s foreign policy was not crafted over the years to serve the objective national interest. Rather, the overriding objective of Guyana’s authoritarian leadership was to do abroad what it had failed to do at home: i.e., to establish legitimacy’ (‘The Foreign Policy of Guyana, 1970-1985: Forbes Burnham’s Search of Legitimacy. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Autumn 1989).
In the early days the regime was the beneficiary of massive aid from the USA and the favourable export prices of the first half of the 1970s suggested that all was on track. Notwithstanding disagreements with their owners over the terms of government participation and nationalization, by 1980 the regime was in control of over 80 per cent of the economy. But as prices began to wane in the second half of the 1970s, inflation accelerated, the economy declined and did not consistently revive again during the Burnham era.
In 1983, GDP was 42.7% below that of 1970 and some 64% below that of 1975. At around US$1.23bn, Guyana had one of the highest per capita external debt rates in the world. This economic situation, coupled with the dictates of the international financial institutions, resulted in heavy retrenchment, higher prices and widespread shortages of even basic items. Unemployment was given as 40% of the working population and the black-market became a standard feature of living. Guyana became only second to Lebanon in terms of crimes committed per head of population. Some argued that the decline in productivity as a result of bad management was the real problem, but rather than dealing with it, the government exacerbated the situation by rationing foreign exchange, thus encouraging the growth of a large parallel market etc. (http://countrystudies.us/guyana/55.htm).
As Chamberlain had predicted others contended that success depended upon the regime’s capacity to quell the ethnic situation, but the colonial solution did not satisfy the PPP and as the PNC continued in government by way of manipulated elections the PPP became generally obstructive to economic development. For example, hundreds of acres of cane were deliberately destroyed by arson and of the 653 strikes called in Guyana in 1982, 639 were called by the Guyana Agricultural and General Workers’ Union, an affiliate of the PPP. With a deteriorating economy; from around the late 1970s the regime was forced to hurt its traditional supporters with mass retrenchment in the state bureaucracy, cut subsidies on numerous food items and ban basic items as flour. These hardships were widely viewed as resulting from the undemocratic nature of the regime and opposition political activism and demands for its removal grew.
By 1976 Burnham had begun flirting with radical socialism, declaring that his party was guided by Marxism/Leninism. So that when in 1981 the virulent anticommunist Ronald Reagan came to the presidency of the United States and severe pressure was placed upon communist regimes generally; the PNC was not excluded. Burnham began national unity talks – which his successor abandoned after his death in 1985 – with the PPP around this time (Majeed, Halim -2005 – ‘Forbes Burnham: National Reconciliation and National Unity 1984-1985’ GCP, New York) and it is believed that this signified that he recognised that playing the East/West game had run its course.
Based upon the broad factual data provided in this and the previous column, next week I will conclude with what I consider a workable objective assessment of Forbes Burnham’s contribution and its contemporary relevance.
