Scotland and the United Kingdom

Two weeks ago, as we drew readers’ attention to the struggle that British Prime Minister David Cameron was having to get his way in the European Union (EU), we observed that that struggle was part of a wider domestic political one being forced on the British public by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), perceived as essentially a fringe of the ruling Conservative Party, but opposed to membership of the EU.

The intention of Cameron’s struggle in Europe was to show the British people, but essentially his party supporters, that the United Kingdom continued to hold significant sway there, as the UKIP demonstrated its influence by leading in the European Union elections in late May. But the relative rebuff that he received in the process of the selection of a new President for the EU Commission, seemed only to strengthen internal Conservative Party forces in their view that it was time for Britain to leave the Union altogether.

Cameron, as he struggled against the odds on the EU issue, will have been well aware that the issue of Britain’s membership of the Union was secondary only to what many deem to be a major challenge to the internal coherence of the United Kingdom itself. For almost concurrently with his struggle on the European front and internally against the UKIP, Cameron’s government published, on June 16, the ‘Scottish Independence Bill: A consultation on an interim constitution for Scotland.’ This provides for Scotland to become an independent state in March 2016 and sets out a draft interim constitution. That, of course, would presuppose that Scots in fact voted to become independent in a referendum which is to be held on September 18 this year.

The referendum is the result of continuous pressure from the Scottish National Party, now leading governmental affairs in Scotland as a result of it gaining an overall majority in the Scottish elections in 2011, and follows a referendum agreement referred to as the Edinburgh Agreement between the UK government and the Scottish government, made in October of 2012. Alex Salmond, the First Minister (what in the Caribbean we would call the Chief Minister) of the Scottish Government, has taken advantage of his party’s victory to, in effect, force the issue and try to bring it to a positive conclusion.

In general, the British do not favour referenda, preferring to use general elections as the legitimizing agents for subsequent government policies. But essentially Cameron’s hands have been forced, in much the same way that Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s hands were when, in 1975, he decided that the pressure being exerted on his government to prove that continued membership of the European Union (then known as the Common Market) was acceptable to the British people could only be established by seeking the peoples’ assent.

Wilson, of course, had won the election of 1974, setting the precedent for Cameron. It is probably the case that the present Conservative government, given the negative result of the recent by-election and the continuing internal challenge from UKIP, would not be particularly comfortable holding a referendum at this time. The Conservatives have generally perceived themselves to be a pro-Union (continued unification of Britain) party, and could not instruct their supporters in Scotland to go against this.

Added to this, there is sentiment, particularly in England itself, that a constitutional separation of Scotland from the UK is likely to be difficult, in terms of the longstanding and complex economic arrangements that bind Scotland and England in particular.

Further, a British government having, only not long ago come to a settlement with Northern Ireland, would certainly be conscious of the implications there of a successful referendum in Scotland. And the British Conservative Party leadership is well aware that a British general election is to be held in May of next year, and the issue of responsibility for the breakup of the United Kingdom could well become difficult to handle, with polls so far indicating reticence on the part of the electorate about letting Scotland go.

From the perspective of the Labour opposition too, there is much awareness that the party has normally drawn substantial electoral strength from Scottish constituencies, balancing the Conserva-tives’ strength in southern England in particular. So the party’s fate, in a situation of Scotland’s departure from the United Kingdom, is not easy to contemplate.

So none of the major British political parties can read the electoral tea leaves, particularly at this time of slow recovery from the global recession. The Conservative-Liberal coalition would appear to have already damaged the Liberals quite substantially, and there will, no doubt, be substantial discussion and controversy within the Conservative Party, which has traditionally held itself up to be the party of British unity.

Though Guyana was not a part of the Federation of the British West Indies, some will be aware of the damage done, particularly to Norman Manley’s Peoples National Party, when he, no doubt like Cameron today, almost unwillingly yielded to internal pressure to call a referendum on the possible secession of Jamaica. Cameron must be feeling as uncomfortable as Manley did as he sees the need to concede to the Scottish SNP’s demands at a time when Britain’s relations with the European Union are under challenge at home as well.