Caricom one week later

We wrote of last week as being an ominous one for the countries of the Caribbean Community. We referred of course to the decision to be taken by the community as a whole on whether member states should sign the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiated with the European Union; and secondly, we referred to the decision posed to the member states of the OECS as to whether they should collectively agree to the Trinidad and Tobago’s Manning Initiative for economic union and “appropriate political integration.”

The decision of the OECS states seems to have proven to be relatively easy sailing. Our understanding in the past weeks was that even when Prime Minister Manning visited the countries other than the original invitees, to inform them of the content of the initiative, those countries were more concerned that they had not been invited to the original discussions, rather than in any mood to peremptorily turn the Trinidad Prime Minister down.  Now, as Sir Ronald Sanders has observed in a recent article, the “devil is in the detail.” And so it always is in matters of this kind.

The history of countries as independent states counts for something as time goes on. A history of relatively independent activity accumulates and gives a sense of capacity to continue life in an autonomous fashion. And it isn’t only the politicians who get that feeling. Yet, time and circumstances do not necessarily stand still, and to most of the these countries,  the circumstance of the period between 1974 when Grenada achieved independence, and 1983 when St Kitts and Nevis did so, can hardly resemble today’s circumstances. For in the earlier period, even though the increase in petroleum prices posed a threat, there was relative global economic stability, both North American neighbours of Canada and the United States were relatively benign (in terms of economic and technical assistance) in their attitude to these small states – an attitude which continued after the US intervention in Grenada; and the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas still seemed to offer the possibility of orthodox economic growth with the transfer of so-called light manufactures from the MDCs to the LDCs. Even during the recession that gripped Jamaica,and  then Trinidad and Tobago, in the late ’70s into the ’80s, the OECS basic activities of tourism and banana exports held their own.

How different are the circumstances today. The banana industry does not give much hope for long-term economic sustenance of the Windward Islands, and the promising tourism industries of the OECS as a whole are subject to the effects of energy prices and a consequent diminution of air transportation from the large metropoles. Those large metropoles themselves show signs of serious recession, and American interest is in enhancing security in the region rather than in increasing economic assistance to permit the structural adjustment of the OECS economies which the international financial institutions still insist upon. In that context, the OECS states, already determined to enhance the possibilities for greater economies of scale through the creation of an economic union among themselves, seem to welcome an opportunity to create further possibilities for this through closer economic integration with Trinidad, and, we suspect, Barbados if that country were willing. And this is a Trinidad which today, is a dominant actor in the economic, financial and manufacturing activities in those islands.

From the accounts that we have had, there seems no indication that in this period, 34 years after Grenada achieved independence, and 21 years since they launched the so-called OECS Political Unity Initiative, the current OECS governments believe that such a venture involves anything but tedious negotiation. But it does seem, as the Governor of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank has recently insisted, it is the OECS countries which really have the most prolonged experience of the working of what might we might call “deep integration” institutions in this Caribbean sub-region. What are next to be seen are the initial proposals requested of the technocratic team established by the relevant governments, what the proposals for economic union and “appropriate political integration” look like, and whether they can form a basis for negotiation.

No doubt there will be, as there has already been, extensive expressions of cynicism about this initiative from various quarters. It would be surprising if there were not, given that the proposal of various initiatives for integration has become almost an industry in itself.

What can we say about the discussions of last week on the EPA? Preceded as they were by various strong bursts of opinion from various heads, it is amazing how little we know of what actually went on at the meeting.  A curious silence is being observed by heads. From appearances, Guyana held its own and maintained the position that a “goods only” agreement was really practicable at this time. Others, in particular the Governments of Barbados and Jamaica insisted that it could be all or nothing, and have left Guyana to discover what nothing can mean. Have Jamaica and Barbados, by the nature of their statements, given the EU the feeling that they can throw the gavel at Guyana, especially as President Jagdeo has conceded that he will have to sign if they stand firm?

The OECS countries, already feeling a sense of economic frailty, must have quickly concluded that, given the firm stance of Barbados in particular, there was little point in holding out.  Presumably, in an all or nothing scenario, nothing, for Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent could mean the threat of a reduction of the banana tariff so low, that frailty could become disaster. The EU has played a hard game, no doubt hoping that the Caricom example can be lesson to some of the still protesting states of Africa and the Pacific. Let us see what happens when the ACP – probably now in the EU’s eyes a figment of the ACP’s own imagination, meets in Ghana.

In the context, too, of the obvservations of some of the technocrats opposed to signing the EPA as is, that the EPA could have a divisive effect on the CSME itself, some of the OECS islands will be left wonder at the recent suggestions from Barbados’ Prime Minister that seem to go against the grain of agreements on the free movement of skills in the region.

What the actual implementation of the EPA will mean in the volatile economic atmosphere beginning to grip Europe is left to be seen. Whether the US and Canada will push hard to seek terms similar to those agreed with the EU is also left to be seen. And whether Brazil continues to insist that the MFN clause is likely to damage their own interests, as they have earlier protested, is similarly, left to be seen. In this case too, “the devil is in the detail.”