The issue that dominated the American government’s assessment of the first election campaign during the latter months of 1968 in independent Guyana was precisely the issue that dominated its assessment and machinations during the two elections prior to independence, namely, how to prevent communist Cheddi Jagan from emerging as leader of independent Gu-yana. The American government was well aware and had kept constant track of the demographic changes in Guyana. American functionaries were cognizant of the reality that the Indian community had and was continuing to grow at a much faster rate than the African Guyanese population and of the reality that ethnicity was the dominant criteria used by the voting public.
Consequently they were devising strategies, largely with Burnham and the PNC after it became clear that the PNC/UF coalition would collapse, to ensure Jagan and the PPP continued to be shut out of power. As a memo from the local embassy in Guyana to the US Department of State on December 13, 1968 noted, Burnham “has carefully laid his own ground rules for the election through such maneuvers as registering overseas Guyanese to vote, pushing through legislation for expanded proxy voting, placing pro-PNC electoral commission beyond legal attack through special legislation and assuring that most of the balloting machinery would be under his personal control”.
In order for the PNC to secure a straight majority and obviate the need for a coalition, the US and the PNC discussed various measures between 1965 and 1968 that might persuade the East Indian community to support the PNC. Two of the main strategies employed during this period were first to provide evidences of peace, economic progress and development under the PNC and contrast these with the ethnic strife and economic stagnation during the PPP administrations from 1957 to 1964 and second to portray Burnham as a president who served all ethnic groups in Guyana. Consequently attention and funding were directed toward enhancing East Indian economic activities (such as the rice industry) and residential areas (such as providing better access to villages and farms by building road and bridge infrastructure).
By the beginning of the election year however, it became clear that the second strategy had failed as successive American intelligence reports noted that Jagan would most likely receive the overwhelming majority of Indian votes and that Burnham had not managed to convert the East Indian masses despite vocal support from some high profile East Indians some of whom had defected from the PPP and the UF. Moreover, haven spoken to the leadership of the PNC and the UF, the US Ambassa-dor Carlson was convinced that they would not mend their differences. Burnham had publicly appealed to the Guyanese public for a majority and noted that the choice they faced was between the PNC and the PPP since he was not going to form another coalition government.
By December 1968, D’Aguiar was assessed by the Americans as ‘vengeful and bitter’ due to Burnham’s co-opting his former lieutenants, some of his main economic and political supporters and even family members including John Jardim, Ann Jardim and Kit Nascimento. The public admission by these former UF members of their political conversion only served in their opinion to further embarrass and anger D’Aguiar. Intelligence and other official reports stated that D’Aguiar charged Burnham and the PNC of corruption without providing ‘supporting evidence’.
The Americans considered the possibility of persuading D’Aguiar to leave politics and even Guyana altogether but correctly perceived that this possibility would be dependent on his party’s performance in the 1968 elections since he was unlikely to depart if he held the balance of power. They were extremely concerned about D’Aguiar’s level of bitterness and desire for vengeance and considered the possibility that he might actually form an alliance with his arch communist enemy Jagan to spite and politically eliminate Burnham. D’Aguiar had publicly indicated that he would be willing to form another coalition government, even one with the PPP, but only on its terms. Although the American emissaries in Guyana ultimately believed that D’Aguiar feared the implications of Jagan’s communist rule more than he had grown to detest Burnham, they were very unsure of D’Aguiar’s intentions. They noted D’Aguiar’s comments that he was “personally ashamed to have been associated in the government with a political party that has adopted these means of perpetuating its power,” and his conclusion that the “only use for Guyana is the stirring up of public opinion at home and abroad to preserve the right of our people to free and fair elections”.
The Americans retrieved copies of D’Aguiar reports to both domestic and international audiences alleging that Burnham was manipulating the electoral process in Guyana. D’Aguiar was convinced that Guyana’s fledgling democracy was under dire threat and he contended that the PNC had set the stage for the establishment of a one party dictatorship by controlling the leadership and the electoral policy of the elections commission and in particular, manipulating the usage of proxies. The Americans were dismayed at D’Aguiar’s decision to finance a fact finding mission in England to scrutinize the overseas registration lists. Although the fact-finding mission detailed glaring inaccuracies, the American ambassador believed that Burnham handled the crisis quite competently and managed to deflect some criticism by arguing that: the list examined was preliminary and had been subsequently sanitized; the government had been the first to and had long acknowledged that the proxy lists were flawed; since the PPP and the UF had challenged the legality of the overseas voting process in court, the issue was sub justice and therefore could not be publicly debated and; that Jagan (his main rival) was implicated in a Venezuelan terrorist plot.
Further the US was aware that Jagan continued to be suspicious of its activities and sought to link CIA and other American agents to Burnham’s electoral malpractices. The Americans were therefore careful to publicly express concerns about issues of balance and fairness and distanced themselves from any alleged non-democratic activities. However, behind the scenes they entertained all strategies to prevent a ‘communist takeover’ including if necessary, rigging the elections to favour Burnham. In fact, Burnham had requested information from the United States on proxy voting models, and this request was addressed. The US’ preoccupation with maintaining its image as an advocate of liberal democracy had not been greatly damaged despite their machinations in the early 1960s in British Guiana, since the PNC/UF coalition government did secure a majority under a perfectly acceptable democratic proportional representation electoral model. In the ideological war with the USSR, the US was desperate to be perceived as a supporter of freedom and democracy and was aware that public revelations of its activities in Guyana could seriously damage its carefully constructed public image.
US preoccupation with its international image was also revealed in its concern over a potential boycott of the ‘68 election by the UF and the PPP since a boycott would essentially mean the non-participation of half of the country in the election. Once assured of the participation of the main parties, the next question over appearances was the ethnic balance of the party list of candidates. The US was pleased that Burnham’s post independence demeanor was ‘moderate’, ‘sensible’ and had a ‘national approach’ and expressed the hope that this stance would be maintained if he secured a majority. Moreover, the American Ambassador was pleased that Burnham apparently heeded his ‘advice’ over the ethnic composition of the PNC’s list of candidates for the 1968 elections which was approximately 40% non African (and the majority of this percentage was Indian), which he interpreted as the PNC becoming increasingly multiracial. As a confidential memo from Ambassador Carlson to the US Department of State on November 12, 1968 stated, ‘The PNC lists presents a serious effort to mirror Guyanese society as a whole’.
Unsurprisingly the US was most pleased with what it deemed the ‘apathetic’ and ‘defeatist’ attitude of the PPP and the disunity between the moderates and the extremists in the party with the former not always willing to follow what they assumed to be Jagan directives. Moreover when compared to Burnham, the perception was that Jagan appeared irrational and emotional while the former maintained a statesman like demeanor. Finally, the Americans were pleased to note that Jagan’s status seemed to diminish internationally and he was no longer receiving substantial material aid to assist his party and even moral support appeared to be waning. They believed that together these factors would negatively impact Jagan’s electoral challenge.
Undoubtedly, the Ameri-cans had invested greatly in Guyana during the early to mid 1960s as they were determined to ensure another ‘Cuba’ did not emerge in the region. This agenda remained the same in the immediate post independence era. Most analyses of Guyanese history during the post independence period credit Burnham with almost single-handedly mani-pulating successive elections to perpetuate his power. Such analyses however fail to realize that the Burnham agenda coincided perfectly with the American agenda. The Ameri-can government remained extraordinarily paranoid about ‘communist’ Jagan in the immediate post independence period and is equally implicated in the electoral malpractices of the December 1968 elections.
