Last week there was no shortage of bad news about infrastructure. After a delay of two months a report finally filtered down to the coast about the mid-section of a brand new, sixteen million-dollar bridge across the Rupununi River repositioning itself to run under the water rather than over it. It had collapsed, apparently, under the weight of an excavator belonging to a Brazilian miner who is working in the Marudi area. And if that were not enough news of misfortune to come out of the Rupununi for one week, yesterday we reported that a man had died after falling between the planks of the half-repaired Moco-Moco bridge.
The yawning gaps in the decking cannot be closed for the time being because this is the rainy season when work cannot go on. This particular bridge, we were told, had caused not just two-footed creatures, but four-footed ones as well to slither into the creek below, although they all had managed to survive the plunge.
Of course this litany of infrastructural disasters had kicked off as early as Monday with the collapse of the New Providence bridge, where one man died and another was seriously injured. It gave way under the weight of a 20-tonne cement truck, although unlike the case of the Rupununi bridge at Katooranib, this one was known to have been in a fragile state, and the residents had lobbied the authorities about it. Then four days later not all that far away, the Guysuco koker near Peter’s Hall, a rickety structure it would appear, allowed the high tide to come crashing through its unresisting door at two o’clock in the morning. Needless to say, the hapless residents of the area woke up to water all around. These failures all seemed to take us back to the days of the infamous Pomeroon wharf, which the wags of the time used to joke had suddenly acquired a will of its own and had gone floating off to Trinidad.
Each of the cases above has its own story. The matter of the weight limit for the New Providence bridge was an issue which was raised following the accident, the Overseer for the Neighbourhood Democratic Council saying that a sign indicating a five-tonne limit had been there up to Sunday. The residents strenuously denied this, insisting it had been removed a long time ago. Of course it is a matter for speculation as to whether, given its state, the bridge could have withstood too many five-tonne (or even lighter) trucks crossing it either. Certainly the residents were sufficiently concerned about its condition to raise a portion of the funds needed for its repair themselves. However, Minister of Works Robeson Benn told this newspaper that the bridge fell under the NDC and had not been included in the national budget allocation for public works, and as such it would take some time to acquire the sum – around $8M on a preliminary estimate.
As for the koker, the attendant Mr David Petram told Stabroek News that he had filed complaints with Guysuco on several occasions about the sluice, while residents said that the cause of the collapse had been neglect. Agriculture Minister Robert Persaud was quoted as saying that the koker had been scheduled for repairs as part of a Guysuco rehabilitation programme, and that he had ordered an investigation to determine whether negligence on the sugar company’s part had been involved.
The full tale of the new $16M Katooranib bridge has yet to be told. Was it a case of faulty construction, or did it have a weight limit? If it did not have a weight limit, should it have had one, and if it did have a restriction was this clearly signposted? If it was, did the excavator come within the requirements, or if it didn’t, did the driver just ignore the sign? Somewhat more is known about the incomplete Moco-Moco bridge. As we reported yesterday, repairs had been suspended because insufficient funds had been budgeted for them in the first instance. The bridge had been built by the Chinese some years ago, and had begun to deteriorate. This newspaper was told by residents that the estimate for repairs had included the reuse of wood taken off the structure, but when it was stripped, it was found to be unusable and there simply was not enough new wood to complete the work. As mentioned above, nothing much can be done about either of the two Rupununi bridges, it seems, until the rainy season ends in October, and they join the Moco-Moco hydro-electric facility, therefore, as examples of further regional fiascos.
This country has a complex hydraulic environment. Learning how to manage the water from without and the water from within effectively, has taken centuries of trial and error backed in more recent times by academic knowledge. Providing the necessary infrastructure at all levels both to manage water and to bridge it, takes skills and substantial financial resources. Ensuring that this infrastructure functions, requires viable systems, monitoring regimes, constant maintenance and human discipline. The funding needed to cope with our particular water-logged universe is substantial, of course, and one cannot help but wonder whether in some of the regions particularly, there is a predisposition to cut corners for monetary reasons. Where major structures like bridges, for example, are concerned, the lowest tender is not necessarily the best, while it is simply counter-productive to ‘skimp’ on materials. Unfortunately, if we are to continue to live on the coast, particularly, we have to be prepared to invest the money required to make it habitable.
In fairness to Region 9, the authorities there are faced with huge problems owing to the vast distances involved, the wide dispersal of villages and the flooding of the savannahs in the rainy season. However, the central government has to recognize that with the advent of the Takutu Bridge, Lethem and surrounding areas will become a critical hub in the relationship with neighbouring Brazil, and in order to control the zone effectively, it will need to pay attention to basic infrastructure of one kind or another, among other things.
Of course the whole local government system is not conducive to the efficient maintenance of infrastructure; the ultimate control of funds by central government, the layers of bureaucracy and conflicting areas of responsibility simply get in the way. The New Providence bridge, for instance, may at least in part be a victim of this. The solution to the problem (hopefully) awaits the passage of legislation reforming local government.
The issue of funding aside, we still have not reverted fully to the old colonial habit of ensuring monitoring systems are in place and regular maintenance is undertaken. Even at the simple level of drainage, for example, one can see trenches and drains choked with grass or whatever, and this after they had been cleared for World Cup Cricket last year. Any hopes that the Georgetown ones, at least, would be done again for Carifesta are fast receding. Having said that, however, it should be emphasized that maintenance should not be an events-based exercise.
What the New Providence bridge and the Peter’s Hall-Providence koker tell us (and possibly the Moco-Moco bridge as well) is that ordinary citizens and people like sluice attendants have a better idea of what needs to be done and where the dangers lie than do the authorities. But when they go to the authorities they are ignored. The East Bank collapses could have been avoided if the powers-that-be had paid attention to the people.
