But in the course of this year, it has become commonplace to observe that with the rapid evolution of the American sub-prime crisis in the course of 2007 into a housing-market crisis, and then into the full-blown economic crisis in that country, the economics preached by the American gurus, whether Greenspan or Bernanke, has not done the job expected of it. And worse, the Americans and the western world have been astounded to see during the course of this year, a Chinese government using a variety of state capitalism to prime its economic pump and to keep extensive rates of economic growth, even as one of China’s major markets, the United States, folded.
The spectacle of China’s management of its economy so far, in the midst of what in the West is referred to as a ‘global crisis,’ has brought home to leaders and intellectuals in the Western world that the assumption of overwhelming dependence of the rest of the world on their economies has been overstated. The economic and market size of the Chinese domestic market, still in relative infancy as a driver of national economic growth, was understated in the West. Coupled with this, has been the ability of the Indian economy as well, to sustain quite reasonable levels of economic growth, even as the Western economies stagnated. The long process of liberalization of the Indian economy, undertaken from a perspective of India’s domestic objectives, as against being in deference to the ‘one suit fits all’ recommendations of the Washington Consensus version of structural adjustment, has permitted a certain stability and autonomy of policy operations, even as it has increasingly linked into the western economies.
During the decade, it has been commonplace to observe that the dramatic changes in Chinese economic policies have led to an American reconsideration of the likely status of the country in this new millennium. In that regard, an interesting consensus has now developed between both the Republican and Democratic parties in the US on the necessity to treat China, irrespective of the nature of its political institutions, as a Great Power in traditional terms – one whose opinions and policies have to be taken distinctive cognizance of, in respect of activities and events over the globe as a whole. And indeed, it is fair to say that, in the American perspective, China has now conclusively taken the place, in the American geopolitical map, of the old Soviet Union and Russia.
So, as the year ended, it was interesting to be told, as we alluded to in a recent editorial, of the American President finding himself seeking an audience with the Chinese President already in conclave with other powers, in the search for some resolution of the climate change issue. Particularly during this year, China’s widespread investments in Asia and the Far East, in domains previously under the domination of the Soviet Union, in countries on the African continent, and her effort to engage certain Latin American economies in investments relating both to metals and food security, enhance the picture of a dominant economy under calculated political direction, in regard to the world as a whole.
As we have observed the deliberate decision of President George W Bush, during the last phase of his presidency to arrive at a settlement with India on the issue of its nuclear capability, and to effect what some have referred to as an informal strategic alliance with that country, we see as one pointer to the geopolitical effect in global relations of the growth in economic stature of India. Bush’s effort has been followed up by President Obama, with his own engagement of the Indian leadership as almost one of the first acts of external relations in his presidency. And the recent determination of India, along with China, in not being, in their view, hustled into decisions on climate change by what they perceive as a substantially western consensus, suggests a resilience in international diplomacy of which the traditional ‘Great Powers’ of today’s western world will have to take increasing cognizance as this year turns into the beginning of a new decade.
The open discomfort of the European Union with the conclusions of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference would seem to reflect, too, a concern with a changing balance in global decision-making, extended from strictly economic matters to other considerations. The negative observations of British ministers, undoubtedly in respect of what they apparently considered a certain colluding of the Chinese, Indians, South Africans, and in part Brazilians, to force a change in direction, was clear evidence of this. They must see the transition from G2 to G8 and then to G20, as bringing into the arena new influences determining global policy – and in their zero-sum perspective on these things, limiting European influence.
The year 2009 brought to a virtual conclusion the long tussle between the United States and the Latin Americans on the one hand, and the EU and the ACP states on the other, over the market for Europe’s banana trade. From the Caribbean perspective this tussle has been going on since 1985, when the then European Community announced its preparations for a transition from a common market to a single market and economy. It was overtaken by the new rule and rules of the WTO, that allowed a certain alliance between Brazil in particular on the South American continent, and certain African countries in respect of the issue of the nature of free trade in commodities like sugar and cotton. Here in Caricom, we seem to have maintained our long-standing stance of appearing to be surprised every time the tariff on non-ACP bananas has been lowered. This year, 2009, will probably be the last year in which any of our protestations on this and related matters will be taken seriously by any of the major players of the globe, whether traditional like the EU and the US, or emerging like India and Brazil – and certainly China.
If then, we look at this closing year, and indeed the decade, from a Caribbean perspective, would it be wrong to suggest the following: first, that we would be well advised to take this latest banana trade decision as the close of a long post-imperial episode; second, that we begin to think of new ways to utilize and trade what we think we can produce, in the context of a newly appearing global relations format constituted of some traditional, and some so-called emerging states in which we have to make more deliberate and collective attempts at creating new alliances with states, some of whom hardly understand us or have an insight into our understanding of our development predicaments. This will have to be a long-term effort, rather than a for-now complaining posture in the context of the Caribbean in 2009’s international relations. For the emergence of new powers in global diplomacy has been the central characteristic of this decade and this year.
