Blaming the victim

A Comment by
Norman Girvan

The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI, based in Waterloo, Ontario Canada) has jointly published with the Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CaPRI, based on the UWI Mona Campus) a paper on the impact of the Caribbean EPA. To quote from the CIGI website, the paper finds that the economic effects of the EPA on the countries studied — Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Lucia — will likely be minimal, despite the fierce opposition to and criticism of the EPA when it was adopted in October 2008, predicting that it will be disastrous for Caribbean economies.

Havelock Brewster

A large part of the paper consists of a summary of the results of the CAPRI study, The Impact of EPA on Caribbean Economies (September 2009). In my comment at the launch of the earlier study I listed 13 areas of concern which had been raised by the EPA critics. These concerns, mostly of a long-term and strategic nature, relate to the alleged development-enhancing effects of the EPA and its implications for regional integration, policy space, the direction of the region‘s development and the domino effect on the region‘s international trade negotiations. However, neither the 2009 study nor the present paper addresses these concerns in any substantive way. The focus of the study, and in consequence that of a large part of the present paper is on a quantitative analysis of the EPA’s likely trade/production impact and its fiscal effects. In addition, in the course of its generally favourable evaluation of the development impact of the EPA (pp. 7-9) the paper contains a number of assertions of questionable validity which have been the subject of critical comment elsewhere.

The paper contains some material not found in the September 2009 report—sections on ‘Consultations’, on ‘The EPA Debate in the Political Economy of the English-Speaking Carib-bean’ and ‘The Implemen-tation Dilemma’. The first of these says much of what is already well known about the uneven level of participation of non-state actors in the EPA consultation pro-cess and the limited extent of EPA awareness among the Caribbean public; a point made from the very outset by the EPA critics.

The section on the debate suggests that criticisms of the EPA sprung from ‘defence of a declining trade regime and the intellectual tradition that underpinned it’, and ‘represented for many of the Caribbean intellectual elite the battle over the very traditions upon which they had built their career edifices’. (p. 11). The present writer, Havelock Brewster and Sir Shridath Ramphal are referred to by name as representatives of this ‘elite’. However, the argument here raises issues both of method and content. In order to make their case, the authors resort to selective presentation of the views of the critics, combined with caricature of those views that are reported. Opposition to the EPA is reduced to a simple-minded defence of obsolete trade preferences; while the wider developmental and strategic issues raised are ignored.

Shridath Ramphal

The authors thereby relieve themselves of the responsibility to address these substantive issues; shifting attention from the criticisms to the critics. To use a cricketing analogy, it allows them to ‘play the man, not the ball’. This is hardly a satisfactory defence of the EPA itself. And even if the authors have problems with particular individuals, as they appear to do, they seem to be unaware of the considerable criticism that the EPA has attracted from other quarters, both inside and outside the Caribbean.

This kind of argument also opens the authors to scrutiny of their own philosophical and ideological biases; and of the intellectual positions on which they are building their own ‘career edifices’. We are now entitled to ask, who are Diana Thorburn, John Rapley, Damien King and Collette Campbell? Where are they located in the political sociology, and the institutions, of knowledge creation? By what paradigms are they ‘animated’? What is the underlying political purpose and message of this report, and for what use is it intended? Are they seeking to represent themselves as the avatars of new, ‘modern’ intellectual elite that is better attuned to the requirements of neo-liberal globalisation? Such a perception would be in line with statements made throughout the paper, as well as with its ending conclusion.

Curiously, the section on ‘The Implementation Dilemma’, contains observations that are virtually identical to those made by EPA critics—the onerous nature of implementation obligations, the lack of preparedness of the region‘s private sector to take advantage of market access in Europe and the ‘endless bureaucratic and administrative hurdles’ in accessing EU development assistance (p. 17) The authors seem to be unaware not only of this coincidence, but also of the apparent contradiction with the generally positive evaluation of the EPA’s provisions that appears earlier in the report (pp. 7-10). They also conclude that the EPA’s success turns on the full implementation of the CSME. But this ignores the noted implementation difficulties, and, more importantly, the argument that the EPA will supersede the CSME, rendering it irrelevant. Even if the authors do not share this view; they surely have a responsibility to address the issue, in a context where the EPA represents a set of time-bound legally binding obligations whilst the CSME can, in effect, be indefinitely postponed.

The authors might also have done greater service to their cause had they engaged in a reasoned evaluation of the conditions under which trade liberalisation between unequal partners can further development; and whether, and to what extent, these conditions are present in the EPA. Had they done so, they might have encountered the growing scepticism that exists in many quarters, including in its ranks at least one recent Nobel Laureate in Economics. Indeed, almost simultaneously with the appearance of the CIGI-CAPRI Report, the Washington-based Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA, hardly an anti-imperialist Think Tank), released a report on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that drew attention to several of its negative consequences, particularly in Mexico and Canada, and argued for its renegotiation. Interestingly enough, the last-minute insertion of a mandatory review within five years leading to the possibility of a renegotiation was one of the tangible results of the EPA criticisms; though CARICOM governments have so far shown little inclination to utilise this provision.

There is, therefore, a degree of incompleteness, as well as internal inconsistency, in the CIGI-CAPRI paper, which robs it of much of its intended impact. This is reflected in its concluding statement, to the effect that if the EPA fails, the responsibility will lie ‘not at the feet of trade arrangements,
but at the doorsteps of Caribbean governments’ (p. 19).

This sounds very much like blaming the victim. The authors do not consider the possibility that bad implementation may be related to bad design—even though some of the material they present clearly points in that direction. Shouldn’t development instruments be tailor-made to the reality on the ground, taking into account constraints on the implementation capacity of the public and private sectors? And if there is limited buy-in to implementation, what does this tell us about the process of concluding the agreement?

To be sure, Caribbean governments are not faultless in implementation matters, and the current inertia in completing the CSME is much to be lamented. But to use this as an argument in defence of the EPA as a satisfactory instrument of development involves a giant step in logic that many will not find persuasive.

Postscript: The report states (p.11) that ‘Girvan and Brewster were given an audience at a CARICOM heads of government meeting in 2008’. The implication seems to be that we had the opportunity to present our concerns to the Heads and failed to persuade them. The facts are as follows. The meeting at reference took place in December 2007 (not 2008) in Georgetown, Guyana, which approved the conclusion of the EPA negotiations. Havelock Brewster and I were not invited to the meeting in our personal capacities. We attended as Observers to the meeting, having been named as such by the University of the West Indies, one of several regional organizations enjoying this courtesy. Observers have no automatic right to speak at CARICOM Heads of Government meetings. They speak only when specifically invited to do so by the Chair. They are also bound by the rules of confidentiality. It would, therefore, be improper for me to give details as to what transpired at the meeting. Suffice it to say that we had aired our concerns about the EPA prior to the meeting, in public commentaries and in open communication to the Heads. On our arrival at the meeting it was made clear to us that the Heads had made up their minds on the matter, subject to some specific details; and that the main factor driving them was the threat of disruption to Caribbean exports made by European officials, come January 2008, if the EPA negotiations were not concluded. Towards the end of the day, and after the Heads had agreed on the position to be taken by the RNM on one or two outstanding issues in the negotiations, one of us was invited to speak, and was able to do so for five minutes. And that was that. The rest is history.

Reprinted from
the Trinidad and Tobago Review – October 3, 2010