General Stanley McChrystal’s negative remarks about the American/Afghanistan policy as conducted by President Obama, and the President’s dismissal of his commander of the armed forces in Afghanistan have together suggested that there has been a certain amount of disorder in the making and execution of American policy on the Afghanistan intervention.  And the President’s choice of General Petraeus, the so-called hero of Iraqi pacification, to replace McChrystal, has the aura of a last-ditch effort by the President to deal with what has looked like a failing effort.

That effort is, in turn, influenced by President Obama’s choice of the end of 2011 for a termination of the American intervention. But it would appear that that choice when made, was intended more to reduce the concern of American citizens with what seemed to be a stalemate in Afghanistan, characterised mainly by an increasing number of Americans killed, than by the play of forces on the ground. Now, with what might be perceived to be an apparent admission of the failure of the strategy in the country, the President’s opponents, including his last electoral opponent Senator McCain, are building their criticism of his war strategy on an assertion that to provide the enemy with a withdrawal date before there is real evidence of diminution of the enemy’s strength, is to hand the Taliban and al Qaeda good reason for simply persevering and awaiting the NATO forces’ departure.

The present predicament of the President is seen as having two aspects. The first is that the United States has still not succeeded in having a credible government in Afghanistan willing to give an indication that it has real legitimacy among its own people, and willing on that basis, to meaningfully assist in prosecuting the war. The American critique of President Karzai seems, to those who remember these things, to be increasingly reminiscent of the US critique of, and exasperation with then President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, that resulted in his forced removal and death.  As in South Vietnam then, so in Afghanistan today, a major concern of the United States is that President Karzai is unable to deliver the necessary political reforms to encourage conciliation on the part of those fighting against him.  But Karzai, conscious of American displeasure with what, to them, is his inaction, and conscious of President Obama’s exit date, is adopting a strategy of seeking to entice the Taliban, or some parts of it, into collaboration with his regime, and thus protect his own flanks. So while Karzai’s Ambassador in Washington has recently declared that there is the need for the US and NATO to provide the assurance that they are there “to finish the job,” he would also know that Obama’s deliberations on dates of departure are as much contingent on the political climate in the US, as they are on progress towards the elimination of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

President Karzai will also know that the US strategy is in part contingent on more practical cooperation on the part of the government of Pakistan, a government itself facing domestic doubts about its own legitimacy. The Pakistani regime, weakened by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the weakness of its legitimacy, led as it is by her husband whose credibility has long been in doubt, is itself loathe to move with full force against Muslim forces partial to al Qaeda and effectively harbouring them within sections of Pakistan. This has induced a certain amount of frustration with Pakistan on the part of the Americans, complicating their ability to harmonise allied policy.

To some observers, American policy towards Afghanistan is being conducted as if the US is the main country with primary interests in the future of that country. The American linkage between its own domestic protection since 9/11 and the necessity to subordinate al Qaeda wherever it seems to exist in strength, sometimes appears to give short shrift to the concerns of countries geographically proximate to Afghanistan. These countries, whether Russia, Iran or India, insist on the essentially domestic character of the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan, a situation that would require more local (that is both domestic and regional) negotiation and determination of the outcome of the conflict. Given its current attitude to the Iranians, dominated by the nuclear proliferation issue and the influence of the Iranian regime in Iraq, the US is loathe to provide any diplomatic space for Iranian diplomacy.  The Russians, with their negative experience of intervention in Afghanistan, and concerned with the influence of Islamism  in the ex-Soviet Asian states, naturally are unwilling to support a military drive in Afghanistan as the dominating strategy for dealing with the problems of that country. And the Indians, concerned with the possibilities of increasing confusion in Pakistan as the Taliban reinforce their ability to find safe havens there, are dubious too about a strategy that draws Pakistan, already somewhat unwilling, into a US dominated strategy dominated by military, as against diplomatic strategy and tactics.

In some measure this leaves the US somewhat isolated in that part of the world. The British, and indeed the EU states, while willing to participate in the current strategy, are keen to keep to their own withdrawal dates, as domestic economic problems induce reductions in defence budgets. In a previous editorial we had suggested that President Obama, in revisiting Afghan policy after his assumption of office, had in effect, put himself on the road to making the Afghan war Obama’s war. From their ongoing comments, it would appear that his domestic opponents, conscious of the deep concern of Americans, as reflected in polls, about the continuation of the intervention as death tolls rise, would want to continue to pin the war on the President. How he copes with this relationship between a negative domestic perception of the intervention and what many believe to be the erratic, and therefore unproductive, behaviour of the Afghan leadership, will determine whether Obama finds himself fighting his next presidential election mired in Afghanistan, as President Lyndon Johnson found himself during the Vietnam war in 1964 that forced him not to seek re-election.